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raace 
The unfortunate partition of Palestine on November 29, 1947 led 
to the creation of the Zionist state of Israel on May 14, 1948. India had 
very strongly opposed this move at the United Nations and had also 
objected to Israel's membership in it. However, in 1950 India accorded 
de-jure recognition to the state of Israel. But, the diplomatic relations 
for which Israel regularly approached \he Indian government was not 
established. 
After a gap of forty-two years the diplomatic relations between 
India and Israel were established in 1992 during Prime Minister Mr. 
Narsimha Rao's rule. However, the turning point in Indo-Israel 
relations came in 1998 when the Bhartiya Janta Party came to power. 
The BJP made a paradigm shift from cultivating the Arab-world 
towards a strategic partnership with Israel. It assiduously cultivated 
Israel as a friend and a military partner. 
Since 1998, there are constant Indo-Israel contacts on various 
levels, especially in the realm of cooperation in the purchasing of 
Israeli arms. National interest, however, does not require the 
government to grovel before Israel. In the past few years, the NDA 
government led by the BJP has systematically dismantled the entire 
edifice of the independent foreign policy based on non-alignment, 
which was created in the post-independent period. 
fhe present thesis entitled, "Indo-Israel Relations Since 1992" 
co\'ers all ihe phases of Indo-Israel relationship since Israel's prestate 
status to the present times. The thesis has been divided into six 
chapters. 
The introductory chapter is devoted to explain the, Indian 
National Congress's stand on Palestine question, Gandhi and Nehru's 
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thinking regarding the Palestine question, United Nation's Partition of 
Palestine. India's stand at the UN and finally the recognition of Israel 
by India. 
In the second chapter an attempt has been made to examine, 
India's viewpoint pertaining to Arab-Israeli wars, Janata party and its 
relations with Israel, India and the Gulf War of 1991 and finally the 
extension of diplomatic relations to Israel by Narshima Rao 
government. 
The third chapter sheds light on the aspects of, India and the 
regional military pacts, India's military relations with Israel since 1992 
to 1997. India's military relations with Israel during BJP government 
and finally Arab response to growing Indo-Israeli military relationship. 
The fourth chapter has been devoted to discuss, agricultural, 
cultural, trade, science and technological cooperation between India 
and Israel. The last part of this chapter consists an analysis drawing 
comparison between Indo-Arab and Indo-Israeli trade relations. 
In the fifth chapter, the ideological affinity between the Zionists, 
the Janasangh and the BJP, BJP's relations with Israel after 1998, 
Jaswant Singh and Advani's visits to Israel. BJP's support to US in the 
"Global War on Terror' and the visit of Brajesh Mishra to Washington 
have been critically analyzed. 
The sixth chapter is the conclusion where analytical viewpoints 
have been expressed in the light of facts and arguments brought forth 
in the preceding chapters. 
^ntwJuctwn 
India and West Asia: A Historical Perspective: 
Our natural tendency to assume that what exists today has 
always been, can only afford us psychic solace, at the terrible cosl of 
denying reality. The tendency to deny historical reality on our part 
would perhaps destroy our capacity to understand and react 
meaningfully to the present. 
Hence, in a study dealing with Indo-Israel relations-present 
phase an attempt has been made to briefly survey overall India-West 
Asia relations with special emphasis on Palestine in historical 
perspective in order to relate the past to its present circumstances. 
West Asia occupies a very significant position in the world 
politics particularly since the second half of the 20th century. Its 
geographical factor has great significance because no other region is as 
strategically located as West Asia'. It is a land bridge, which links 
three continents Asia, Africa and Europe. It is called the gateway of 
Asia-Africa and the back door of Europe. It commands three seas - the 
Mediterranean, the Red and the Arabian. It is a centre of international 
trade to different regions. It is also called the lifeline of Europe. Arab 
nationalism. Western imperialism and Zionism are the main factors 
that have conditioned the West Asian politics^. The creation of Israel 
and the subsequent three wars have made the region a cockpit of world 
politics. 
Ill ancient times, Indians had experiences of contact with West 
Asian region .For a long time, Indian and Arab civilizations have 
interacted with each other and have drawn inspirations from each 
other. The Nile Delta civilization of Egypt, the Euphrates River 
civilization in Mesopotamia and the Indus valley civilization in India 
were not only contemporaneous, but were also in close contact with 
one another-each contributing in its own way to the enrichment of 
human life and culture for the other. History is strewn with the 
evidences of mutually advantageous relations between the two regions. 
For example, it was the Indian muslin, which the Egyptians used to 
wrap the mummies. Similarly, it was the Arab craftsmanship, which is 
believed to have produced figurines for the Indian temples and 
buildings . 
Several evidences have been found from historical records that 
India had close relationship with West Asia in various fields. Such as 
Culture, commerce, religion, medicines and politics. During the time of 
King Solomon, son of King David, a port of Etzion-Gber was built at 
the head of the Gulf of Aqaba. It seems that from there he carried out 
trade with Arabia. Africa and India . Solomon also made voyage to the 
east every three years. The destination of his expedition was called 
Ophir, which was identified as Sopora near Bombay, from where they 
brought gold, precious stones, peacocks and almug trees^ His fleet was 
built by Hiram of Lebanoi/'. The argument has been strengthened by 
testifying some Hebrew words which are to be of Indian origin, like 
koph monkey (Sanskrit kapi) and Tukki peacock (Tamil togai) . 
Christian tradition also holds that St. Thomas, one of the twelve 
disciples of Jesus, who was a Jew, came to India and preached the 
gospel to the Indians before he died a martyr's death at the hands of a 
king called in Christian tradition Misdeos. This could be possible 
because traveling from Palestine to India was not totally unknown . 
Christian faith from Palestine found a way to India, which is still 
evident today. Not only Christians but Jews also had settled in Kerala. 
The king of the Cheras, Bhaskara Ravivarman, made the earliest 
reference to this community, in the lO"' century charter by which a Jew 
named Joseph Rabban was given lands and privileges. However, there 
are other views which push the date back to the first century A.D. 
whatever might be the case, it is a fact that Jewish community has 
existed in India for many centuries. One branch was called as Beni 
Israeli This community has lived for many centuries on the west coast 
of India 
With the rise of Islam. Palestine came under the Muslim Arabs 
and the inhabitants embraced Islam. By the ?"' century A.D.. the whole 
of Palestine became a Muslim land'^. The Arab conquest still expanded 
eastward and by 712 AD, they reached Sind. They captured both sea 
and land routes and Mediterranean sea virtually became an Arab lake. 
They carried on trade with India for some eight hundred years until the 
Europeans ousted them". In the north India, the Arabs came as 
conquerors, but in the south India they came as travelers and 
merchants. This made their relations with there Indian rulers peaceful 
and cordial'^. Though the Palestine did not occupy the hub of 
civilization in the Arab world, its importance could not be ruled out. 
The growth of the European maritime presence after 16"' century 
adversely affected these contacts. The British East India Company 
came to India as merchants in the 17"' century and became the ruler of 
the country. During this time, Palestine was under the Ottoman rule. 
Indian National Congress and Zionist Congress: 
During the colonial period, especially in the later part of the 19"' 
century, few educated Indian from Bombay and Calcutta met in 
London while preparing for their Indian civil services examination or 
law. Later in India, these people formed Indian National Congress in 
1885.Almost at the same period, elsewhere in Basle; the Zionist 
Congress was founded under the leadership of Theodore Herzl in 1897, 
which aimed for the creation of a homeland for the Jewish people in 
Palestine'". These two organizations were totally opposed to each other 
in their aims and objectives. Since the Indian National Congress was 
anti-colonial and directed against the Western colonial powers, the 
Zionist Congress was colonial in nature and sought the protection of 
the European colonial powers. The former organization fouglit for 
independence against the colonial rule while the latter constantly 
remained a movement of cooperation with the same powers for the 
creation of a state for Jews in Asia . 
Zionists intensified their brutal and harsh activities against the 
Palestinians under the protection of Western powers. To India's 
Nationalist leaders the Arab struggle for the preservation of their 
legitimate rights and retention of their land was a matter of basic 
importance. 
The aim behind the Indian National Movement was to expel 
alien rulers from their land while the Zionists were attempting to gain a 
foothold in another country from which the local inhabitants by force 
or persuasion would have to be evicted. In this aim, Zionists succeeded 
and Palestine, which under the Ottoman and British Authority was an 
Arab Majority area, was now being converted in to a Jewish majority 
and an Arab minority under the authority of a Zionist state. The 
Zionists who captured Palestine were in collusion with Western 
colonialist movement'^. 
Indian National Congress and the Palestine Question: 
The Congress looked at the whole issue as a struggle between 
nationalist Arabs and Zionist colonization where the Zionist had the 
support of the British imperial power. The fact placed them on the side 
of the Arabs. This was in consonance with their views way back in 
1922, when the Congress supported the Turks because of its policy 
against the imperial forces'*^. The Congress though expressed its 
sympathy to the Jews, deplored the way the Zionists were joining 
hands with the imperial powers. Therefore, in 1936, the Congress 
working committee sent its greeting to the Palestinian Arabs and 
observed September 27, 1936 as a Palestine day in order to show their 
solidarity with the Arabs of Palestine'^. In a meeting, which was held 
in Allahabad in support of the Arabs, Nehru appreciated the brave Arab 
people for putting up a valiant fight in the cause of National 
Independence. Expressing his sympathy with the Arabs he declared'^. 
Our sympathies and good wishes must go oul 
to the people of Palestine in this hour of their 
distress. The crushing of their movement is a 
blow to our nationalist struggle as well as to 
theirs. We hang together in this world 
struggle for freedom. 
Jawaharlal Nehru in his presidential address at the Faizpur Congress 
expressed: i'> 
The Arab struggle against British imperialism 
in Palestine is as much part of this great 
World conflict as India's struggle for 
freedom. 
There were many other organizations, which expressed sympathy 
towards the Arabs in Palestine. The Sind Congress Socialist 
Conference held at Karachi on July 18, 1936 sent its greetings to the 
Arabs in Palestine and hoped that they would keep up the fight till 
independent Palestine was achieved. Bihar Muslim Independent Party 
Conference held at Patna on September 12, 1936 criticized the British 
government's policy about Palestine. In a conference held by Muslims 
of U.P. on July 18, 1936 Nehru who also attended the conference in his 
message expressed his sympathy and solidarity with the Arabs . Not 
only this, as early as November 1923, the Palestine Arab delegations 
were allowed to visit and collect funds in India for the restoration of 
the Al-Aqsa mosque^'. In the 1930s, the Congress expressed its 
sympathy and support for the Palestinians in their struggle for 
independence against the British and applauded the bravery shown by 
the Arabs in their fight against the British. The committee also noted 
the Arabs and Jews should not fight each other but join their hands to 
have direct cooperation in establishing a democratic state in 
Palestine^'. 
Congress in her resolution expressed: 23 
While sympalhizing with ihc plight of the 
Jews in Europe and else where, the committee 
deplores that in Palestine the Jews have 
relied on British armed forces to advent their 
claims and thus aligned themselves on the 
side of British imperialism. The committee 
tritsts that Arabs and Jews will endeavor to 
find a basis far direct cooperation with a view 
to establish a free democratic state in 
Palestine with adequate protection of Jewish 
right. 
The Indian National Congress sympathized with the Arabs and 
hailed them as nationalists. But it was not outrightly anti-Jews but anti-
Zionist. Nehru who exerted enormous influence over the Indian 
National Congress met Jewish leaders in the late of 1930's regarding 
the persecution, which they faced in Germany. Not only had moved 
resolution in the All India Congress Committee, urging the British to 
facilitate Jewish immigration into India, he even arranged for setting of 
some Jewish refugees from Germany^''. His (Nehru's) approach to the 
whole problems was neither racial nor religious. This he clearly stated 
to the Indian Jews. He believed that the Arabs and Jews could live 
together and cooperate with each other for their mutual advantage^^. 
India and its nationalist leaders resolutely opposed the Zionist 
philosophy as a matter of principle. Their antipathy towards Zionism 
was reflected in the official statements of the Indian National Congress 
and after independence in the attitude of the government of India. 
There were some who believed that Indian National Congress's 
reaction against Zionism was due to the pressures from the Muslim 
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leaders like Abul Kalam Azad. It would be a gross mistake to presume 
that this policy of Indian National Congress was formulated to 
ingratiate the Indian Muslims or to appease the Arabs. The Indian 
National Movement led by Mahatma Gandhi and his disciple 
Jawaharlal Nehru cherished certain principles, which were close to the 
heart of every conscious Indian. One of them was separation of the 
religion from nationalism. The foundations of a secular India are laid 
on this principle. 
Again, in 1938 at the historic Tripura session, the British 
conspiracy to carry out partition in order to appease the wealthy British 
and American Zionists was condemned by a number of nationalist 
spokesmen. The Congress resolution deplored the British decision to 
carry out the partition scheme "in the teeth of the Arab opposition" and 
asked the local Jews who were being brought by the World Zionist 
Organization to settle in Palestine "not to seek the shelter of the British 
mandatory power and not to allow themselves to be exploited in the 
interest of British imperialism^*^. 
In her resolutions, the Congress stated:^^ 
The committee record their emphatic protest 
against the reign of terror that has been 
established in Palestine by British 
imperialism with a view to coerce the Arabs 
into accepting the proposed partition of 
Palestine and assure them of the solidarity of 
the Indian people with them in their struggle 
for National freedom. 
In another resolution 
the working committee wishes to express their 
condemnation of the ruthless policy now 
being pursued by British imperialism in 
Palestine, which must lead to grave 
consequences, and reiterate their opinion that 
the issue of the future government of 
Palestine should be left to be decided on the 
principles of self-determination. 
The attitude of the Indian national Congress towards Palestine 
question as a whole was influenced by its leaderships. The 
Organization's stand on the issue was almost symmetrical to Gandhi's 
and Nehru's views. This is not without reason, since Congress's 
uncompromising stand against colonialism. The Palestinian Arabs were 
placed under the colonial rule after the world war T'. They were 
struggling against the colonial power. This made the Palestinian Arabs 
associate with the Congress and with other national movements in the 
world. The Congress, thus, was brought closer to the Palestinians and 
the former believed that by associating with the latter, they would be 
able to kill two birds with one stone-the Muslim separatism and the 
British. This could also be used as a lever to strengthen the Hindu-
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Muslim unity, which could rock the very foundation of the British rule 
in India^^. 
The secularist approach of the Congress to politics be one of the 
major reasons for its opposition to Zionism. The Congress vehemently 
advocated secular politics. This made it see Zionism as a movement 
based on religion. It failed to consider it as national liberation 
ideology. Moreover, Zionism was seen as a tool to be used by colonial 
and imperial powers, which the Congress could not tolerate. For the 
Congress, colonialism and imperialism were anathema. Congress 
attitude towards Zionism was also influenced due to other reasons. To 
Indians, Zionism appeared to be a European movement and then 
suspected that, tenets of imperialism might be attached to it and that it 
might pose a serious threat to the ongoing liberation movement in 
India'^ 
Though the Congress was not very much attracted by Zionism, 
its policies were not taking an absolutely one-sided stand, it tried its 
best to strike a balance between the two movements. It made its stand 
clear that it was not anti Jews. While condemning the imperial polic\ 
of the colonial power, it urged the Arabs and Jews to look for amicable 
solutions. The Congress did not forget to underline the point that the 
problem could be solved between the two people with cooperation, it 
appealed to the Jews not to seek the shelter of the British power and 
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not to allow themselves to be exploited by their design''. By 
collaborating with the imperial power-the Zionists lost the sympathies 
of the Afro-Asian nations in general and India in particular and did 
more harm in their attempts to seek a place in the Asiatic nations, 
Gandhi and the Palestine Question: 
Indian Perceptions of Zionism, which was trying to create a 
Zionist entity in Palestine during India's independence movement 
greatly, shaped India's policy after independence. The most respected 
Indian leader, Mahatma Gandhi, who led the Indian masses againsi the 
colonial power since the beginning of the 20" century until the 
attainment of independence, had a close contact with the Jews when he 
was in South Africa. During his 21 years(1898-1914) stay in South 
Africa, Gandhi came very close to two prominent Jews—Henry 
S.L.Polak, a journalist and Hermann Kallenbach—a wealthy man. 
These two men however did not succeed and Ghandhi remained anti-
Zionist throughout his life" '^. Many a times Gandhi was asked b\ the 
Zionists his views on the Arab- Jewish question, and to favour the 
Jews. But he was firm on his idea. He said:"*^ 
My sympathies are all with the Jews. J have 
known them intimately in South Africa. Some 
of them became life long companions. 
Through these friends I came to learn much of 
their age long persecutions....But my 
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sympathy does not blind me to the 
requirements of justice. The cry for the 
national home of the Jews does not make 
much appeal to me. The sanction for it is 
sought in the Bible and in the tenacity with 
which the Jews have hankered after their 
return to Palestine. Why should they not, like 
other peoples of the earth make that country 
their home where they are born and where 
they earn their livelihood? Palestine belongs 
to Arabs in the same sense that England 
belongs to the English or France to the 
French. It is wrong and inhuman to impose 
the Jews on the Arabs. Surely it would be a 
crime against the humanity to reduce the 
proud Arabs so that Palestine can he restored 
to the Jews partly or wholly as their national 
home. 
He further expressed his views on the concept of the Promised 
Land, which is in the Bible:^'' 
The Palestine of the biblical concept is not a 
geographical tract. It is in their hearts. But if 
they must look to the Palestine of geography 
as their home land, it is wrong to enter it 
under the shadow of British gun . They 
can settle in Palestine only by the good will of 
the A rabs. 
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Mahatma Gandhi's rejection of Zionist philosophy was 
categorical. Since he refused to be pressurized into accepting it as a 
basis of a nation state. When his old associate from South Africa, 
Hermann Kallenbach who was a dedicated Zionist approached him in 
1937 to entice him in approving the Zionist Doctrine, Gandhi refused 
to accept Kallenbach's arguments. Gandhi stood firmly on his earlier 
stand despite unceasing efforts by the apologists of Zionism including 
the British Member of Parliament Sidney Silverman and American 
author and his friend, Louis Fisher. But Gandhi's replies to them were 
similar to what he had told to Kallenbach described on the earlier 
pages. His views were in the Harijan of November, 1938'''*. 
On the eve of the Palestine tragedy, he was more convinced of 
the grievous wrong done to the Arabs and wrote in August 1947 in 
Harijan expressing his moral support to the helpless Palestinians who 
were being uprooted from their homes and fields. "The Jews", he 
wrote \ "have erred grievously in seeking to impose themselves on 
Palestine with the aid of America and Britain and now with the aid of 
naked terrorism. Why should they depend on American money or 
British arms for forcing themselves on an unwelcomed land?" Gandhi 
was hurt when he was told that the Zionist lobby has given a new twist 
to his convictions against the Zionist antics. The International Zionist 
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magnates especially in Britain and the United States came out with a 
startling clarification of his pronouncements. 
They often repeated the argument that Gandhi was opposing the 
Zionist moves because he wanted to please the Indian Muslims some of 
whom are his close associates. Gandhi after knowing such perceptions 
of the Zionists came out with a stronger statement. "I have said often", 
he wrote, and "that I would not sell truth for the sake of India's 
deliverance. Much less would I do so for wining Muslim friendship""*^'. 
The inherent danger in the Zionist Movement, for which Gandhi 
rejected the Zionist doctrine, is that the foundations of the Zionist 
enclave were laid on the assumption that the Jews the world over 
constitute a 'nation" and that by virtue of their religion alone they are 
the prospective citizens of Israel. Like Indians the Arabs are also the 
victims of an unpardonable conspiracy of division of their land on the 
basis of race and religion. 
Gandhi was not alone in his condemnation of Zionism. The 
Indian National Congress held similar views and expressed them 
publicly whenever the issue came up. One of the main reasons of 
mutual understanding between the Indian leaders and the Arab 
Nationalists was their common aversion to the idea of religion being 
used as a means to achieve political ends. The Egyptian nationalist 
leader Saad Zaghlul and Gandhi had intellectually come very close to 
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each other because of their secular approach to national politics. It was 
because of this secular out-look, that Indian National leaders never 
reconciled to the transplantation of a Zionist State in Palestine. The 
Indian National Congress led by Jawaharlal Nehru condemned year 
after year in its annual sessions the sinister British moves of 
partitioning Palestine and handing over chunks of Arab territory to the 
Zionists. As early as 1937, the Indian national Congress expressed its 
strong disapproval of the partition of Palestine and the imperialist and 
Zionists machinations to strike terror in the Arab population. It 
condemned the "reign of terror unleashed with the view to coerce the 
Arabs in accepting the proposed partition"'*^. 
Jawaharlal Nehru and the Palestine Question: 
Jawaharlal Nehru had a similar view as Gandhi on Palestine 
question. His knowledge of the Jewish history and their persecution did 
not have much influence on his Judgment of the issue. Indian great 
nationalist leader Gandhi categorically rejected the idea of a Jewish 
national home' . Like him, Nehru too was against the demand for a 
Jewish national home. Jawaharlal Nehru wrote and spoke strongly 
about the deteriorating situation in Palestine. He firmly held that the 
Palestinian Arabs were struggling against a colonial power and its 
machinations. 
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To the Jewish victims of fascist terror and 
brutality", he wrote^^, "we must extend all 
sympathy and help, but that does not and can 
not mean that Arab interests in their country 
of Palestine can be ignored. Palestine is an 
Arab country and Arab interests must prevail 
there. 
The notorious Balfour Declaration made public in 1917 
embodied the Zionist principles of a national home on the territory of 
Palestine to the Jewry. Lord Balfour, the then British foreign secretary 
issued letter on November 2, 1917 addressed to Lord Rothschild, 
leader of the Zionist Movement, in which he mentioned: 
"1 have much pleasure in conveying to you", Balfour wrote, "on 
behalf of His Majesty's government, the following declaration of 
sympathy with the Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted 
to, and, approved by the Cabinet:''^ 
His Majesty's government view with favor the 
establishment in Palestine of a national home 
for the Jewish people, and will use their best 
endeavors to facilitate the achievement of this 
object, it being clearly understood that 
nothing shall be done which may prejudice 
the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights 
and political status enjoyed by Jews in any 
other country. 
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The declaration was received with indignation in Palestine and 
by the Arabs. Politically conscious people elsewhere protested against 
the British machinations of handing over a territory to a people who 
did not own it. 
It should be noted that the Balfour declaration was issued on the 
eve of the British conquest of Palestine but finally it came into being 
with the help of Britishers in May 1948 when Israel declared herself as 
a sovereign state. 
In 1923, Maulana Abul Kalam Azad, the then president of the 
Indian National Congress asked India to make common cause with the 
struggle of Arabs when the Zionist Congress demanded the creation of 
a Jewish national home in Palestine. 
Commenting on the Balfour declaration, Nehru, in a letter to his 
daughter, Indra Gandhi, in May 1933, wrote:"" 
But (here was one drawback, one not 
unimporiant fact seems to have been 
overlooked Palestine was not a wilderness, 
empty—- it was already some body else's 
home. So that this generous gesture of the 
British government was really at the expense 
of the people who already lived in Palestine. 
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Nehru was also disturbed by the reports that responsible Zionist 
leaders had suggested that a strong Jewish national home would help 
Great Britain in guarding the road to India . 
Pandit Nehru clearly understood British imperialist policies and 
felt that England was pitting the Jewish religious nationalism against 
Arab nationalism to make it appear that her presence is necessary to act 
as an arbitrator and to keep the peace between the two. One has to be 
conscious of the fact that Arab nationalism was secular in its character. 
His stand was clear on the Palestine issue. In December 1920, he 
wrote in "independent", daily English published from Allahabad about 
then prevailing situation in Palestine and the consequences of the 
Balfour declaration:'*'* 
l^he Zionist immigration and the English 
occupation had two dangers: the country 
could hardly maintain the people already 
inhabiting Palestine. The coming in of new— 
people from all the ghettos of Europe would 
mean either the driving out of the old 
population or their reduction to economic 
serfdom. The second danger was political 
Arabs in Palestine have to be left alone and 
strongly resent foreign domination. 
Nehru and Congress were entirely on the Arab side in their 
struggle against British rule as well as against the aims of the Zionist. 
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Despite its sympathies for the Jews regarding their persecution in 
Europe, Indian national Congress considered Palestine an Arab country 
and deplored the effort to establish themselves there under the cover of 
British armed might. 
Nehru remarked that the happenings in Palestine since the 
Balfour declaration of 1917 represented a gross betrayal of the Arabs 
by British imperialism. He argued that the Jews had a right to look to 
Jerusalem as their holy land and to have free access to it, but pointed 
out that the Balfour declaration went much beyond that and en\isaged 
the creation of a Jewish State within an Arab community. He also 
pointed out that certain number of Jews could go and to settle in 
Palestine in an atmosphere of peace and good will, but when they went 
with the object of dominating the country, they could hardly expect to 
be welcomed by the Arabs. He considered the problem of Palestine as a 
nationalist one. It was a pity; therefore, that the Jews of Palestine 
instead of aligning themselves with that struggle had thouglit ii fit to 
take the side of British imperialism and to seek its protection against 
the inhabitants of the country'*'*. 
The immigration of the Jews in Palestine in large number means 
driving out the native population. People living in Palestine professing 
different faith wanted to be left alone. They opposed the foreign 
domination. At Brussels Congress of Oppressed nationalities, Nehru 
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met Palestine leaders-Abdel-kader el -Husseini and Djomal Effendi, 
which gave him an insight into the Palestine affairs. This resulted in 
the formation of the League Against Imperialism, [LAI]. Its impact in 
India can be seen in 1928 when the INC for the first time passed a 
resolution in favor of Palestine Arabs'*^. 
The Congress policy on Palestine issue was consistent even after 
the Second World War. Earlier contacts between National Movement 
leaders from India and the Palestine led to the closer ties. After the war 
, when leaders of the world met at San Francisco in 1945 at the 
United nations conference on international organizations, Asian 
leaders conceived of the idea of convening a conference in Asia. The 
Asian leaders did not have much faith in the San Francisco conference. 
Since, they were still haunted by the collapse of the League of Nations. 
The idea of Asian conference began to grow since 1946, and 
Nehru put his weight behind it. In 1946, the Indian council of world 
affairs took the responsibility of planning the conference. On the one 
side, there was a sea change in the British government's attitude 
towards Indian national movement. The labour government announced 
in February 1947 the British decision to quit India not latter than June 
1947. In the midst of these political changes, the first Asian conference 
was opened on 22 March 1947'* .^ 
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Various leaders and scholars attended the conference. Nehru had 
already prepared the groundwork along with the Indian council of 
world affairs. Invitations were sent to 32 countries including the Arabs 
and Jews in Palestine. However, six Arab countries- Syria, Lebanon, 
Transjordon, Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Iraq did not accept "individual 
invitations". They had their own resentments over the invitation by 
saying that it was received too late. This excuse seems to be not 
convincing. The other more valid reason might be the inclusion of 
Zionists in the list. The Zionists responded to the invitation and came 
to the conference. The absence of the majority of the Arab state's 
delegation left the Zionists with an open field to argue their cause 
freely and effectively'* . At the conference, the settlement (yishu) was 
represented by the Zionist delegations, which included intellectuals 
like Dr. Hugo Bergmann and Alfred Bonne''^. 
In the inaugural speech of the conference Nehru, underlined the 
importance of the peace, which was also the responsibility of Asiatic 
nations. This peace according to him could come only "when nations 
are free and also when human beings everywhere have freedom and 
security and opportunity". He touched upon nationalism in each 
country in Asia and freedom movement in the continent. Freedom 
which he envisaged was not confined to a particular people but should 
spread "over the whole human race"''''. 
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On the second day of the conference, the issue of the Palestine 
came up. This had been a hot issue since the Balfour Declaration and 
the Arabs had antagonistic views over the issue. 
Dr. Bergmann argued for the Jews in Palestine in its historical 
perspective. He said that the Jews were "old Asian people" and now at 
last, after many years of wondering, returning and settling down in 
their "old-new home land." According to him, Jews could learn the 
idea of tolerance and cooperation among different religious groups and 
races, which Europe could not give. Dr. Bergmann even went further 
by saying that Jews would not try to solve the problem by 
dispossessing the Palestinians, though it was exactly done by them in 
the following years. He envisaged to return the desert green, revive 
Hebrew language and literature and expressed his hope that the 
conference would be the beginning of a new chapter^^. 
The Egyptian representative challenged the argument put forth 
by Dr. Bergmann. She did not want the "British rule to be replaced by 
that of European Zionists." She also welcomed Jews as settlers and 
stressed that the Arabs must live in Palestine. Since it belongs to them. 
Bergmann asked for the floor to refute the above statement, but was 
denied by Nehru who was presiding and, after a brief angry exchange, 
the Zionist delegation walked out. They were persuaded and requested 
by some Indian delegates to return. Nehru, in the speech referred to the 
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Palestine issue, while expressing his sympathy for the Jews because of 
their sufferings he clearly stated that: 51 
Palestine is essentially an Arab country and 
no decision can be made without the consent 
of the Arabs" and the issue would be settled 
between the two communities in cooperation 
"and not by any appeal to or reliance upon 
any outsiders 
The Asian relations conference was an important opportunity for 
the Zionists to express their views on Palestine issue and to advocate 
their purpose. As stated earlier, the absence of some of Arab states 
made their task easier. Through this conference, they sought to get a 
place among the Asiatic nations. They presented their case in such a 
way that it would be palatable for the Asian people. The Jewish 
delegation tried hard to convince other delegations by expressing their 
desire to learn from Asia, which Europe could not give them. But all 
was not well with them. The storm came from an Egyptian delegate in 
India remained firm on her stand on Palestine. The Jewish delegation 
could not get what they desired from the conference and failed in their 
attempt to draw India closer to their cause. Indian leadership was 
prudent enough not to pass their judgment through emotional 
influences. Therefore, the Zionist leadership had to accept that the host 
could not be taken for granted. 
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Nevertheless, it was not a complete failure. It was a mixture of 
failure and success. The Zionist side was presented and Palestine issues 
were discussed at length. They made appeal to certain sections of the 
Asian people that "the holy land is inseparable from the people of 
Israel"^^. Nevertheless, this had no impact on Indian leadership, which 
was steadfast in its commitment to Palestine cause. 
United Nations and the Palestine Question: 
The situation in Palestine was deteriorating since the beginning 
of the World War II. The movement launched by the Zionists to realize 
their national homeland was going in strength. This strength was 
vehemently opposed by the Arabs Higher Committee, which stood for 
the creation of Palestine state made up of Arabs and Jews, which went 
against the Biltmore programme of 1942: Palestine was to be a Jewish 
state^\ 
The Biltmore program became the official policy of the World 
Zionist movement. The Mandatory authority in an attempt to solve the 
problem convened conference at London, which did not bear much 
fruits. Various suggestions and schemes were placed at the conference. 
All the attempts made by the British to solve the problems proved 
futile and on February 14, 1947, the British, frustrated in their attempt, 
"threw up their hands and handed the problem over to the United 
Nations." The British government in February 1947 resolved to refer 
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the Palestine question to the United Nations. Within Palestine, the 
Zionist terror groups were engaged in spreading violence followed by a 
sharp increase in illegal immigration. Consequently, on April2, 1947 
Britain urged for holding a special session of the General Assembly for 
the purpose of appointing a special committee^'' "to make 
recommendations—concerning the future government of Palestine". 
The United Nations in May 1947 appointed a United Nations 
Special Committee on Palestine, UNSCOP, in response to the British 
government's proposal to investigate the issue and bring its 
recommendations before the world organization. The UNSCOP 
submitted its recommendations by the time; India had already gained 
its independence. India was also the member of the 11-member 
UNSCOP, which produced two reports—one majority and the other 
was the minority report. The United Nations approved the majority 
report, which recommended the partition of Palestine in to a Jewish 
state and an Arab state, on 29 No\ember 1947. While the minority 
report which recommended an independent Palestine as a federal state 
with Jerusalem as its capital was rejected b> the General Assembly of 
the United Nations^^. 
India's Stand at United Nations: 
The minority report was presented by Yugoslavia. Iran and 
India. India did not want that outsiders should take part in solving a 
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problem of a nation. Nehru argued that "Palestine is essentially an 
Arab country and no decision can be made without the consent of the 
Arabs"^^ 
Sir Abdur Rahman, the representative of India and the member 
of UNSCOP in a special note observed:^^ 
If the right of self-determination of peoples as 
envisaged by President Wilson, (and on which 
the first four paragraphs of Article 22 of the 
convenient of the League of Nations yverc 
based) is to be the determining factor and if 
imperialistic designs are to be countenanced 
no longer, there is no escape from the 
conclusion that independence should be 
granted to Palestine forthwith, subject to such 
intern arrangements for the transfer of power 
as may seem to be desirable. The people of 
Palestine have now admittedly reached a 
stage where their recognition as an 
independent nation can no longer be delayed. 
They are in no way less advanced than the 
people of the other free and independent 
Asiatic countries. 
India disagreed with the partition plan and along with Iran and 
Yugoslavia; it offered the minority plan of creation of Palestine as a 
federal state. Nehru on December 4, 1947 explained India's position in 
the constituent Assembly in reply to a cut motion:^^ 
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We took up a certain attitude in regard to it 
(Palestine), which was roughly a federal stale 
with autonomous parts of it. It was opposed to 
both the other attitudes, which were before 
the United Nations. One was partition which 
has now been adopted, the other was a 
unitary state; we suggested a federal state 
with naturally an Arab majority in charge of 
federal state but with autonomy for the other 
regions—the Jewish regions. After a great 
deal of throughout, we decided that this was 
not only a fair and equitable solution of the 
problem, but the only real solution of the 
problem. Any other solution would have 
meant fighting and conflict. 
The Arab League and the Arab Higher Committee rejected the 
UNSCOP report, which was published on September 08, 1947, but the 
Jewish agency accepted the report in principle with certain 
reservations. In spite of Arab rejection, the United Nations went ahead 
and adopted the partition plans on November 29, 1947 by a vote of 33 
to 13 with 10 abstentions^^. 
The UN partition resolution was followed by unrest and chaos. 
By the end of November, both Zionists and Arabs were preparing to 
take over the control of Palestine after the British withdrawal. There 
were sporadic clashes, and casualties were high on both sides. The 
thirteen member legislative committee of the Yishu-the people's 
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administration, after a long debate on boundary issue read out the text 
in Tel Aviv on Friday, May 14, 1948^° declaring the birth of the state 
oflSRAEL:^^' 
We, the members of the national council, 
representing the Jewish people in Palestine 
and the Zionist movement of the world, met 
together is solemn assembly by virtue of the 
national and historic right of the Jewish 
people and the resolution of the General 
Assembly of the United Nations, hereby 
proclaim the establishment of the Jewish state 
in Palestine, to be called Israel. 
Both the great Indian leaders Nehru and Gandhi rejected the 
Zionist claim to Palestine when the Israeli state became a reality; 
Nehru viewed Israel as an imperialist creation and another sectarian 
state like Pakistan. The BJP and its predecessors in the Hindu 
nationalist movement saw Israel in a different light, as a fellow 
struggler against Muslim militancy*"^ 
The Arabs and Zionists were already prepared for war prior to 
the withdrawal of the mandatory authority. The Arab Liberation Army 
from Syria had already infiltrated into Palestine to work with 
Palestinian Arabs. Jews were also operating under their terrorist 
organizations-The Haganah, the Irgun Zvi leumi and the Stern Gang. 
They mercilessly unleashed their terror tactics, many villages were 
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looted, inhabitants killed, and thousands fled. But the unconcerted and 
half hearted efforts from the Arabs was not much against the well-
trained terrorist occupiers of Israel and the war ended in favour of the 
Zionists state. She gained more territory of the Arab land, which was 
not officially allotted to them. Thus, the first Arab-Israeli war of 1948-
49 ended. Four Armistice agreements were signed by Israel with Egypt 
on February 24, 1949, with Lebanon on March 23, 1949, with Jordon 
on April 3, 1949 and with Syria on July 20, 1949". 
India followed a consistent policy. Her sympathy towards the 
Palestinian people persisted. The creation of the state of Israel, which 
brought the Jews and Arabs in a hot war, made many Palestinians 
refugees. Thousands of them fled Palestine, taking shelter else, where, 
becoming refugees and those in Palestine too had no better position. 
They become refugees in their own land. India wanted the problem to 
be solved amicably. She supported the United Nations Relief and 
Works -Agency, UNRWA, which worked for Palestinian refugees. She 
argued that this problem was due to the creation of the Jewish state, so 
It was the dut\ of Israel to create a climate of confidence in which 
refugees could return home safely with dignity and honour and thereby 
could fully exercise the right to self-determination*'''. 
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India's recognition to Israel: 
The Zionist state almost after a year of independence applied for 
membership in the United Nations. The United Nations Security 
Council accepted Israeli's application for admission to the United 
Nations on March 04, 1949. A week later the General Assembly passed 
a resolution, thereby granting membership to Israel^'^The Indian 
delegates voted against the admission of Israel into the United Nations, 
stating that India could not recognize a state, which was created by 
force not by negotiations. 
Though India maintained a consistent policy towards the then 
crisis in West Asia, there were certain groups of people who did not 
see to eye with the government. The Hindu Mahasabha represented it. 
In its working committee resolution, the aspirations of this group could 
be thus seen:^^ 
The discriminatory policy of (he Nehru 
government in refusing recognition of the new 
state of Israel, the people of which, after 
years of courageous and tenacious struggle 
against powerful international forces, has 
recovered their freedom and have established 
a progressive state on modern democratic 
lines. While Israel had been admitted as a 
member of the United Nations Organization— 
—the with holding of recognition by the 
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government of India has been creating 
misunderstanding and hampering the growth 
of mutual goodwill and friendship which is so 
vital for stabilizing India's position in the 
Middle East—steps be immediately taken for 
recognition of Israel and building up intimate 
relationship with the people of the state. 
Since the UNSCOP could not impose the partition until all the 
sides accepted the plan—either politically or militarily, it advised that 
the Mandate should end by P' of August 1948. However, the British 
terminated their Mandate on the night of 14-15 of May 1948. The 
Zionists declared the creation of a new independent state of Israel on 
14 May 1948 ^\ 
After claiming the independence, Israel made repeated appeals to 
the United Nations for granting its membership to Israel. On 4 of May, 
1949 the United Nations Security Council accepted Israel's application 
for the membership to the United Nations ^^ . A week later, the General 
Assembly passed a resolution, granting Israel membership '^^ . 
The then Prime Minister of India ordered the delegation to vote 
against a resolution, since "India could not recognize an Israel which 
had been achieved through the force of arms and not through 
negotiations"''". 
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The negative voting of India against Israel's admission to the 
United Nations at best be interpreted as a continuation of India's policy 
on the issue that it did not support the occupation of Palestine by the 
Zionists. As stated earlier India's leaning towards the Palestinian cause 
was a matter of principle, which she was fighting for. It was not 
absolutely due to her uncompromising attitude towards Zionism, but 
India was more motivated by her desire to demonstrate publicity to the 
Arabs that she standing by their cause, which was just and humane. 
Nehru continued to resist the recognition of Israel but on 17 
September 1950, India formally recognized the state of Israel as a legal 
entity in the international community''. The question of recognition 
came up as early as part the second half of 1948.The provisional 
government of Israel approached the government of India for 
recognition and its foreign minister Mr.M.Moshe Shertok sent telegram 
to India concerning the matter . The prime minister openly announced 
that he wanted to defer the matter because the new state, which was 
recently formed, had to be seen and watched. He added, "Normally we 
should have to be satisfied and know exactly what the international 
position is before taking any s tep" ' \ 
On 06 December 1949, Nehru made, in the constituent assembly, 
an announcement. He said:''' 
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Israel is now a member of the United Nations 
and its recognition by other member states 
cannot be indefinitely deferred. The 
government of India would like to act in this 
matter, which has been the subject of this, 
controversy among nations with whom we 
have friendly relations, that would avoid 
misunderstanding or ill-feeling and a hope 
that satisfactory decision will be possible in 
the near future. 
A year after recognition Israel was permitted to open a consulate 
in Bombay but attempts to move this office to New Delhi and to raise 
the same to a consulate general have failed because of Indian 
government opposition. 
India's refusal to move any nearer to the Jewish state has often 
been criticized by Israelis and by pro-Zionist Americans. It has been 
denounced as an act of cowardice, of hypocrisy and of cynicism, as a 
betrayal of non-alignment and of India's proffered claim to consider 
issues on their merits. But in adopting an aloof attitude to Israel, that is 
precisely what India did at that time: she had considered the issue on 
its merits and had concluded that in principle^". 
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(^establishment of'^ipbrnatic 
India and Arab-Israeli wars (1948-1982): 
India had vehemently opposed the partition of Palestine 
however, accorded the recognition to the state of Israel in September 
1950. But with the recognition of Israel, India did not exchange the 
diplomatic representatives between the two states. Though, Israel was 
later on permitted to open a consulate in Bombay (now Mumbai). 
Nehru the then prime minister of India explained his decision of 
extending recognition to Israel: 
It's not a matter of high principle but is 
based on how it could best serve and be 
helpful in that area. We should like the 
problem between Israel and the Arab 
countries to be settled peacefully. After 
careful thought, we felt that recognizing 
Israel as an entity will need not at this stage 
exchange diplomatic personnel—and we 
think it is correct decision. 
Moreover. India by giving recognition to Israel showed its 
respect to the decision making body of United Nations. 
India was looking at the conflict between Arabs and Israelis 
from ideological and principled perspective. So it was quite obvious 
that India could not go along with Israelies^. Before the termination 
of British Mandate over Palestine, Zionist forces moved to occupy the 
cities and areas in territories allotted for the Palestinian state. By 14 
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May 1948 over half of the Palestinian population was forced into 
exodus, as over two-thirds of the Palestinian land became occupied by 
the Zionists. Ben Gurion admitted before the Mandate ended that ".... 
No Jewish settlement however remote, was entered or seized by the 
Arabs, while the Haganah,...captured many Arab positions. So, on 
the day of destiny that part of Palestine where the Haganah could 
operate was almost clear of Arabs." 
On the eve of 15 May 1948, while Britain had completed the 
withdrawal of administration and army, David Ben Gurion proclaimed 
the creation of Israel. At this point the Arab League sent a telegram to 
the UN. The telegram stated that in consequence of Zionist 
aggression, the Arab States " were compelled to intervene for the 
sole purpose of restoring peace and security and of establishing law 
and order in Palestine", to prevent as well " the spread of disorder 
and lawlessness into the neighbouring Arab lands, and to fill the 
vacuum created by termination of the Mandate". 
However, the intentions of Ben Gurion and his terrorist 
companions were quite different under the garb of filling up the 
vacuum on account of liritish withdrawal, they unleashed 
unprecedented act of terror. I he annals of Zionist history are full of 
leaders outdoing other leaders in insisting on the importance of 
military power and the role of force and terror in the building and 
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safeguarding of the Zionist state: Joseph Trumpeldor. Vladimir 
Jabotinsky, Ben Gurion. and all the Israeli generals. They asserted 
that the violence and terror are the backbone of the plan to enforce the 
Zionist programme. This was necessarily so because the Zionists 
have... simply invaded a country, evicted the majority of the 
population, followed this up with further use of force and terrorism . 
"/ would suggest to you to come round in time to the" Greater 
Palestine" programmed before it is too late...The Basle programme 
must contain the words" Greater Palestine" or Palestine and its 
neighbouring lands...otherwise it is nonsense. You do not get the 
ten million Jews into a land of 25,000 square kilometers" were the 
words which David Trietch sent to Theodore Herzl on 29 October 
1899, expresses with perfect clarity the inner logic of Zionist 
.6 
policies: 
Deir Yassin" massacre has clearly exposed 
the Zionist policies and also put before the 
World a shocking example of what the 
Begin's movement stood for. Deir Yassin an 
Arab village on the main road to Jerusalem 
and surrounded by Jewish lands had taken 
no part in the war...On April 9 terrorist 
bands (Irgun, Lehi, Hagana) attacked this 
peaceful village...and killed most of its 
inhabitants. "It is imperative that the truth 
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about Mr. Begin and his movement be made 
known in this country....The undersigned 
therefore take this means of publicly 
presenting a few salient facts concerning 
Begin, and of urging all concerned not to 
support this latest manifestation of Fascism. 
Begin, Shamir and Sharon were nothing but a triumvirate of 
war criminals. Even Ben Gurion described Begin, as 'a thoroughly 
Hitlerite type'^ 
On May 1948 the Israeli state was duly proclaimed and Begin 
came out of the underground to make his first radio speech he said 
The Hebrew revolt of 1947-48 has been 
blessed with success...0 God of Israel, keep 
thy soldiers and bless their sword, which 
gives a new birth to the covenant that thou 
had sealed with thy beloved people and thy 
chosen land forward to the ground! Forward 
to victory! The terrorists had triumphed. 
In what the Zionists claim to be a "war of Independence" five 
Arab armies, i.e., Egypt, Jordon, Lebanon, Syria and Iraq crossed the 
borders of Palestine on 15 May 1948. Though the Arab armies were 
less equipped, in the face of a decisive Israel military superiority and 
despite the fact that its unified command was held by British military 
personnel, whose final target was to secure the new-born Israeli state, 
the Arab armies made limited military successes: while the Egyptian 
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army had reached an advanced line near Tel Aviv, the Jordanian and 
Iraqi armies controlled wide areas including Lydda and Ramlah. As 
its military position war deteriorating, Israel turned to the UN for 
intervention, charging that the Arab had started the war. On 22 May 
1948, the Security Council convened to discuss the situation and 
adopted, alter, a resolution calling upon "all governments and 
authorities, without prejudice to the rights, claim or positions of the 
parties concerned, to abstain from any hostile military action in 
Palestine, and to that end to issue a cease-fire order to their military 
and paramilitary forces". The tragedy became imminent when the 
UN through its Secretary General, Trygve Lie, upheld Israel's 
accusation against the Arabs for starting an aggression. Supported by 
the members of the Security Council, the Security General threatened 
the Arab States and warned of action, including sanctions. 
This endorsement by the World body opened a history of 
injustices against the Palestinians as U.N. had remained silent in the 
face of Zionist aggression and occupation offering a deaf ear to their 
complaints ignoring its own resolutions and charter^. 
The war which ended in the favour of Israel brought more 
Arab territories which were allotted to Palestinians by the UN, under 
the occupation of Israel. It resulted the forced migration of thousands 
of Palestinian Arabs to the other neighbouring Arab States. After this 
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war the Israel was again provided benefits by the UN when her 
application for the membership of the UN was approved in May 1949 
by the UN. Israel's admission to the UN was granted almost after one 
year of its creation. India voted against Israel's admission stating that 
"India could not recognize Israel which has been achieved through the 
force of arms and not through negotiations"' . 
India is linked with Arabs states by historical, political and 
economic cords. Arab solidarity with India in her campaign against 
imperialism and colonialism made India's foreign policy tinged with 
an Arab blend. In this kind of circumstances it was quite obvious that 
Arabs would like India to be along with them. Arab influence on 
India in later years loomed larger and made the latter appear to be 
more pro-Arab and anti-Zionist. 
Taking recognition as a welcome gesture, the Israeli 
government made a move for establishing normal diplomatic 
relations. Dr. Walter Eytan director general of Israeli foreign ministry 
paid an official visit to India in March 1952. According to him. it 
seemed that the Indian prime minister had approved the idea of 
establishing diplomatic ties with Israel. Yet formal decision had to be-
taken later, after the general election. The following year when l.xiaii 
met Nehru at Berne, the government of India had already jibbed what 
was accomplished was the permission of Indian government to 
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establish an Israeli consul general in Bombay, which is termed as 
'India's diplomatic Siberia' '. 
Nehru was the main architect of India's foreign policy. He look 
a great caution in dealing with Israel and later refused to normalize 
relations with Israel'^. The Jana Sangh, Swatantra party and the Praja 
Socialist were against the government policy. The Jana Sang argued 
that India should adopt more pragmatic foreign polic>. because 
foreign policy, according to them, was a policy and not an immutable 
principle. They said that Israel was the only democratic coun(r\ in 
West Asia and it was therefore imperative that India must have full 
diplomatic relations with Israel'^. 
The Jan Sangh thinking was oblivious of the fact that the so-
called democratic state of Israel was established at the expense of the 
majority of Palestinians, an act quite contrary to the basic principles 
of democracy. 
The main reason for the non-development of normal relations 
with Israel was due to the earlier principled stand so valiant!) taken 
up by the Indian Leadership of the Indian Liberation Movement. Ihc 
Congress party after independence dominated the Indian political 
system and its foreign policy. Its overwhelming majority in the 
parliament enabled it to overrule agendas set by Jan Sangh to benefit 
Israel at the expense of Palestinians. So, the non-establishment of 
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diplomatic relation with Israel could be ascribed to the continuation 
of the policy perused by the Congress in the preceeding years. 
In the early years of independence, Indian economic position 
was not sound. India was launching her first plan and could not afford 
to loose her Arab friends, which were of vital importance for her 
basic economic needs. Pragmatically, trade relations between India 
and Arab states were more significant and bigger in volume than 
Israel. They still are. Moreover, remittances which India gets from 
Indian community working in these Arab countries are exceptionally 
high. On the other hand, Indo-Israeli trade was limited and had lesser 
scope for expansion. The commodity pattern also made Arab 
countries advantageous for India. India imported from Arab states 
items like oil, cotton, phosphate and so on, which have less 
substitutes, unlike Israeli diamond and citrus fruits and its products' . 
Moreover, since 1973, Indo-Arab trade relations became increasingly 
important. The question of India's relations with the region was and is 
closely linked with the oil economy. On the other side. India's 
consultancy, if applied sufficiently could help Gulf countries in 
technology '^. India's west Asian policy had to be directed to counter 
Pakistani propaganda. This is necessary because of two main reasons: 
- to win the Arabs to her side especially at United Nations and to look 
into the popular sentiments of the liberal minded overwhelming 
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population in India. India's non-establishment of normal relations 
with Israel also had something to do with Pakistani factor- to give no 
chance to Pakistan's propaganda against India among the Islamic 
nations"'. 
India's West Asian policy was greatly influenced by her 
relations with the Arabs and the Arab Nationalist Movements. The 
Egyptian revolution in 1952 created a new dimension in Indo-Arab 
relations, which had a chain reaction to her attitude towards Israel. 
After the revolution (1952) Nasser's Egypt assumed the leadership of 
the Arabs more than ever before. Egypt, which had taken an 
uncompromising attitude against any form of imperialism and 
colonialism, represented a form of non-alignment. The very structure 
of her policy, which is governed by revolutionary idea made her not 
to align themselves with any other bloc. This ideological 
commitment made Egypt support all countries committed to the same 
objectives'^. 
Egyptian government's opposition to imperialism, qualified by 
non -alignment, found a place with Indian foreign policy makers. 
India's and I:gypt"s consistent opposition to all forms of imperialism 
intrigues and maneuvers led to their attacks on the Baghdad pact. This 
common policy brought India and Egypt closer. This friendship was 
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further cemented during the Belgrade Summit of non-aligned 
countries"*. 
India's relation with Egypt had a major role in her policy 
towards Israel. Since India was standing very close to Egypt in her 
foreign policy, it would be almost impossible to move closer towards 
Israel, which was seen as the outpost of the west and a belligerent 
state by Egypt. So, India did not take step towards the normalization 
of her relations with Israel'^. India was very much against the 
colonialism and imperialism. After adopting the socialist pattern of 
society it strengthened her friendship with the former Soviet Union. 
Nehru visited Moscow in 1955, which became able to get the Soviet 
Union's support in many ways^°. Since 1953, India had continuously 
rejected Israel's proposals for developing diplomatic tics. Regarding 
the clashes, which took place between Arabs and Israelis since the 
creation of Israel India came more open and vocal in expressing her 
condemnation of Israel. Her attitudes towards these conllicts (1948. 
1956) have been influenced by her national interest. India condemned 
Israeli alliance with imperial powers because o\ ihc large scale 
aggression. One more thing which India found contradiclorx with 
Israel was the creation of Israel on religious basis, which was totall\ 
against the secular ideology of India^'. 
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The year 1956 was a landmark in the history of West Asia. It 
marked the emergence of a new regional order. This was precipitated 
by the Suez crisis. On 26 July 1956, Nasser nationalized the Suez 
Canal Company in response to the withdrawal of Aswan Dam loans 
by contributing powers, which was done in reaction to the Czech arms 
deal of May 1955 and thus disturbed the regional status quo^^. 
A conference was convened at London. Nehru assured Nasser 
that the purpose of India in attending the conference was not to 
weaken Egypt's position but to prevent any unilateral action to be 
taken in the conference. In the conference India ardently prevented 
the western move to aggrandize their economic interest and upheld 
Egyptian right to nationalize the canal . In spite of a number of 
diplomatic efforts to solve the problems, Israel, in collaboration with 
Britain and France, launched a sudden and pre-meditated attack on 
Egypt on October 29, 1956 ^'^. India did not expect such a sudden 
attack and expressed her hope that the United Nations would be able 
to take steps to prevent extension of hostilities. Nehru publicly 
condemned Israeli action and branded it as a case of clear naked 
aggression . He even asked the former Yugoslavia and the Bandung 
countries to join him in public condemnation of the aggressor"^'. India 
held that Israel had no right to invade the Suez. By invading Egypt 
and also by joining hands with imperial forces, Israel lost the 
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sympathy of Afro-Asian nations including India. On the question of 
Egypt's denial of passage through the Suez to Israel, India had the 
opinion that it would be quite natural and obvious that an Arab 
country, which was at war with Israel, would show lethargy to the 
latter's flag passing the canal. But this could be solved through 
peaceful means^'. 
Nehru declared in the Lok Saba on 16"^  of November 1956 
when he spoke at length regarding the attack on Egypt that the 
aggression had come as a shock; it was a scandalous "'case of 
aggression by two strong powers against weaker country." 
India played a very constructive role in the crisis through the 
Afro-Asian meeting and in United Nations India was a co-sponsor of 
the 19-nations Asian-African resolution on the question of the 
withdrawal of Israeli -Anglo-French forces from the Egyptian soil . 
Even opposition parties had joined the government in condemning the 
aggressor. It was seen as a new phase of colonialism and imperialism. 
Various political parties urged the government to cut all liaisons with 
Britain and denounced India's membership of the common wealth^°. 
India's approach to the Suez crisis was an outcome of her national 
interest and her desire to solve the problem in a peaceful manner. As 
India was one of the principal users of the canal, her economic 
activity was affected due to its closure. Egypt and India held the 
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British responsible for the crisis^'. Throughout^^ th(e crisis India was/ 
busy coordinating the major event with other noniiigned riatiQ^^^n 
the initial period India was mostly acting alone but once the tripartite 
attacks were launched on Egypt, India supported Egypt fully and 
unequivocally condemned the aggressors . 
India also showed strong reactions against Israel in June war of 
1967. Indian government blamed Israel for escalating the situation 
into an armed conflict. Referring to the Indian soldiers in the United 
Nations emergency force who were killed by Israeli forces, Indira 
Gandhi condemned the killings as deliberate, unprovoked. The Indian 
government as always took a very pro-Arab stand and even went to 
the extent of sponsoring the UAR draft^^. The war also crystallized 
India's west Asian policy into supporting the Palestinians cause. She 
identified herself closer with the Palestinians and openly supported 
them in their struggle against the Israeli government^''. 
India being a non-aligned country was reluctant towards the 
hostile policy of Israel and condemned the American policy towards 
the Arabs. Due to Israeli aggression of 1967 against the Arab. India 
decided to break off relations even at the consulate level with Israel 
as an immediate measure and she extended moral support to the 
\ 
deprived Arabs who were the victims of Israeli aggression"*^. 
55 
The Indian government in conformity with its pro-Arab policy 
condemned the Israeli aggression. Looking at the crisis from global 
perspective, India's the then prime minister, Mrs. Indra Gandhi 
observed in the lok sabha on 6 June 1967:"*^ 
The world today witnesses a disastrous war 
in West Asia and the situation becomes 
grave by hour. If not stopped, this war is 
likely to expand into wider one drawing into 
its vortex other countries and developing 
perhaps in to a world war—. It is our 
solemn duty as a government to help in 
restoration of peace in the present perilous 
situation. 
Expressing the same concern for West Asia, she said in the 
Rajya sabha on the next day, i.e., 7"^  of June, 1967 as 
"The world is in grave peril. Our own national interests are 
bound up with peace and stability in West Asia'""^. 
In the United Nations, India stressed the need for lasting peace 
and wanted Israel to withdraw its armed forces to the positions held 
before the commencement of the hostilities. Speaking at the 
emergency session of the U.N.General Assembly on 2P ' June, 1967 
Mr. Chagla remarked, "The foundation of a lasting peace in the region 
can be based only on a total, immediate and unconditional withdrawal 
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of Israel from the areas now under its occupation... '" He also argued 
that disputes can not be settled through the armed conflict''\ 
Mrs. Indira Gandhi, while addressing the General Assembly on 
14^ "^  October 1967, also stressed the need for solving the problem by 
"political means" based on the principles of security, sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of all the states in the area"" .^ 
In December 1967, Mr.D.P.Dhar, a member of the Indian 
delegation to the U.N.Special Committee reiterated the Indian 
position, which recognized the Palestinians as a people and not 
merely as refugees. It was also emphasized that the lasting solutions 
of many problems existing could be worked out only when the key 
issue of the refugee problem was dealt with and steps were taken to 
ensure the just rights of the Arab people of Palestine on the basis of 
paragraph II of resolution 194(111)'". 
During the Arab Israeli conflicts through 1967-69 India took 
side with the Arabs and denounced Israel for attacks on Beirut 
international airport in December 1969. India was also unhappy with 
Israel over her occupation of Al-Aqsa mosque in eastern Jerusalem. 
At United Nations, India urged for the immediate implementation of 
the Security Council resolution on Jerusalem''^. 
India's stand on June war was not shared by all political parties 
and public at large. India Israel relation, though had touched a very 
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low ebb, was viewed by them in the context of Arab's stands vis-a-vis 
Indian crisis in the preceding years. Opposition leaders from Jan 
Sangh, the Swatantra party, the Praja Socialist party and the 
Samyukta socialist party criticized the government's stand. They 
advocated that by supporting the Arab unreservedly India unnecessary 
would encourage the Arabs to adopt more hostile attitudes towards 
Israel, which would create more tension in the region''^. They also 
pointed out that India was going out of her way and should stop 
acting like the fourteenth Arab state. And some people did not 
endorse government policy of supporting the Arabs blindly'*'*. 
Opposition members (excluding the Communists) who did not share 
government's view on the issue were conditioned by Arab stand on 
India's crisis in 1961, 1962, and 1965. When the Indian army took 
over Goa in Decmberl961, Israeli press accused India maintaining a 
double standard''^. On the contrary, Egypt closed Suez Canal and did 
not allow Portuguese arms and ammunitions to flow towards India. A 
shining example of Indo-Arab fraternity, non-aligned principles and 
third world solidarity in contrast to Israel's leanings towards West. 
This unfriendly tone of the Israeli press however changed in 
1962, when China invaded India. India sought military assistance 
from all over the world. Israeli response was favorable"*^. Israelis less 
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concerned with India's predicament have always tried to sell arms to 
friends and foes alike. Presently China is also on the buyers list. 
The US support to India also helped in that context. So, after 
1962 Chinese aggression, a powerful lobby was active in India, which 
canvassed, for various reasons, in favour of immediate establishment 
of diplomatic relation with Israel. It is also argued that India should 
adopt pro-American policy which would bring India and Israel 
together'*^ and that it was imprudent on the part of India to thrust all 
her weight behind the Arab cause when she got only lukewarm 
attitudes from the Arabs in 1962 and 1965 . Opposition members- Jan 
Sangh, the Swatantra Party, Praja Socialist, Samyukta Socialist Party, 
were astonished by India's indifference towards Israel. It was argued 
that while some countries like USA, UK, Yugoslavia, Kenya and so 
on maintained good relations with both Arabs and Israel, why could 
India also not do the same? It was said that leadership in India should 
not succumb to Arab pressure in a bid to appease them. They also 
argued that majority of the Arabs were with Pakistan and even UAR 
remained partially neutral. When UAR could remain friendly with 
Pakistan, India, China, why could India not be friendly with both 
Israel and UAR. Jan Sangh even asked whether India's policy was to 
be conducted in her interests or in Arab interests. They viewed Israel 
as a force in the region and as the symbol of stability'''\ While they 
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think so they conveniently forget that Israel is the greatest 
destabilizing factor in the region. 
In 1973, war broke out again in west Asia. During the war, 
India supported the Arabs as she felt that their action could not be 
termed as aggression as Israel had provoked the war by not adopting a 
more flexible attitude in negotiating a proper settlement. It declared 
that "the cause of tension in the area is Israeli aggression and the 
refusal to vacate the territories occupied by armed forces". Declaring 
India's sympathies with the Arabs, it further said that Arabs cause 
was based on justice and demanded immediate implementation by 
Israel of United Nations resolution 242(1967) for peaceful solution of 
the problem^°. 
On 6"^  December, 1973 the then Indian foreign minister Sardar 
Swaran Singh stated that, "our sympathies for the Arabs are for two 
reasons. First, they are our centuries old friends and second, their 
territories have been occupied following the Israeli aggression...."^'. 
Mrs. Indra Gandhi also gave two reasons for India's sympathy 
towards the Arabs. First India's old and solid relations with Arabs 
required India to "stand by its friends in the time of their travail'' and 
the secondly Israel's refusal to Arab lands occupied in 1967 war and 
its refusal to honour UN resolutions^^. 
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India's policy towards the Arab Israel conflict was based on the 
principled opposition to acquisition of land by force and it wanted 
Israel to withdraw to pre-June 1967 frontiers so that progress would 
be made to resolve the crisis. 
During the Israeli attack the Ministry of External affairs in its 
statement condemned Israel and held the view that the intransigence 
on the part of Israel was the basic cause leading to the outbreak of 
hostilities^^. 
After 1973 Mr. Arafat was called by the UN General Assembly 
to address the World body on 13 November 1974.Arafat in his 
historic address stressed the PLO's willingness and priority for a 
peaceful solution to the issue. He further stated as, "Today I have 
come bearing on olive branch and a freedom fighter's gun. Do not let 
the olive branch fall from my hand"^''. Responding to Mr. Arafat's 
address the then Indian Foreign Secretary, Mr.Kewal Singh made a 
statement at the UN General Assembly on 19'*' November 1974, in 
which he endorsed the views expressed by Arafat at the UN. India 
introduced a draft resolution on 21^' November 1974 in favour of 
Palestine cause. The resolution reaffirmed the inalienable rights of the 
Palestinian people to self-determination. It also stood for the 
Palestinian national independence and sovereignty^^. 
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Israel after singing the Camp David accord and its subsequent 
peace treaty with Egypt turned towards Lebanon. In their bid to crush 
the PLO, Israeli moves were an attempt to bait the Palestinians into 
provoking a confrontation in southern Lebanon, the Israeli 
provocation may be an effort to justify an attack that Israel otherwise 
could not afford to make because of unprecedented international 
pressure^^. The atrocities committed by Israeli military during the 
Lebanese crisis were very horrific and condemnable. 
South block expressed her shock over the Israeli aggression on 
Lebanon. She condemned Israel's infamous history of misdeeds 
stressed the recognition of the rights of the Palestinians for 
establishing durable peace in the region. India also put efforts to 
solve the problems, though her efforts had Arab tinge^^ In India the 
Israeli consul, Yosef Hassen, commented on India's official stand on 
the crisis, which is highly objectionable. In a newspaper interview, he 
bluntly said that Indian politicians were afraid of the Arabs and 
thereby succumbed to their pressure. This was seen by the 
government of India as an unacceptable interference in the domestic 
affairs of India and in retaliation, the Israeli consul was asked to 
leave the country within forty-eight hours^'^ 
When the extent and gravity of political and diplomatic support 
of India to PLO was popularly recognized, by yet another significant 
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diplomatic move, on lO"' January 1975. India accorded diplomatic 
recognition to PLO. India was the first non-Arab country to make 
such a move. Yassar Arafat endorsed the move and hoped that this 
would strengthen the struggle of Palestinian people "a very big push 
forward"^". India kept on arguing for the welfare of Palestinian people 
and the legitimate demands of the PLO at the UN and related bodies. 
Referring to the exhortion of Arafat in the UN General Assembly, 
India's representative Mr.R.Jaipai stated at the UN that the 
Palestinians had come to the UN for peace and the World body should 
take a decision that would give hope to the Palestinian Arabs. On 4"^  
October 1975, he again made statements on the situation in the 
Middle East. He also referred to the plight of the stateless 
Palestinians being at disadvantage to pursue their interests in 
effective way and the need for the UN to come to their rescue*^"'. 
The period of 1980's witnessed a new initiative and 
intensification of India's move to strengthen the PLO diplomatically 
and politically. On 26'*' March 1980 the then Indian Foreign minister 
Mr.P.V.Narsimha Rao announced in the Parliament that India had 
decided to accord full diplomatic recognition to the office of PLO in 
New Delhi .After this move Mr. Arafat paid a three day official visit 
to India between 28"" and 30"" March 1980 on the invitation of Mrs. 
Gandhi. During his visit Mrs. Gandhi stated that sympathy for the 
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Palestinians "has been a part of independent India's foreign policy 
from its very inception"^''. Mrs. Gandhi also reiterated that a just 
peace and comprehensive solution to the Middle East crisis could be 
found only with the "full participation of the PLO as an equal partner 
in any settlement"^"*. 
India's Palestine policy was further strengthened when Arafat 
again paid second visit to India as Head of the state in exile in May 
1982. During his visit he was described as "the symbol of a people 
afire with the spirit of freedom" by Mrs. Gandhi . 
The Palestinian agenda surged up to the forefront once again. 
Tel Aviv too suffered more causality in the Lebanon in 1982 war. On 
account of the role of the Shinbet, the Israeli secret service evoked 
greater international sympathy for the Palestinians^^. The PLO had 
appealed that the United Nations peacekeeping force should replace 
the Israeli troops in the areas from where they were pulling out^^. 
Indian solidarity with the Arabs and Palestinians in particular could 
be seen by the very fact that India permitted the PLO to open an 
office in New Delhi on 10 January 1975^*. This shows that Palestine 
factor became the guiding principle towards the West Asian crisis. 
The Palestinians cause was upheld as a high principle of humanity 
and Israeli government was looked upon as aggressors with 
imperialistic design. 
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India's reaction to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon was sharp 
and harsh. The then Indian foreign minister, Mr.Rao referred the 
matter on 19"' June 1982 as the "enactment of savage drama involving 
the butchery of our Palestinian brothers and sisters"''^. Mrs. Gandhi 
on 25"^ July, made a statement in the Lok Saba condemning the Israeli 
attack and maintained that " Israeli attempts to wipeout the 
Palestinian movement can not succeed in the long run"^* .^ In 
September 1982 Mrs. Gandhi further sent a message to Mr. Arafat in 
which she praised the PLO's spirited resistance to the Israeli invasion 
of Lebanon^'. 
Janta Government and Its Relations with Israel: 
Indo-Israeli relations had shown a negative trend since the 
beginning of the fifties. The government policy even sank deeper in 
the 1960's. But during the latter part of 1960's, there came up a 
strong pro-Israeli lobby in India. The Chinese invasion of 1962 was 
seen by this group of people as an acid test of friendship. Israeles 
transfer of weapon like mortar to India during the crisis was seen as 
an act of friendship since then this lobby had been campaigning for 
Israel in India. But with the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, Indo-Israeli 
relations touched the lowest ebb. The government of India's sympathy 
for the Jewish people for their suffering in the past though had not 
withered away it was very wary of Zionists actions. The Indian 
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government along with many nations asked the Israeli government to 
leave the occupied territories, which were endorsed by the United 
Nations Security Council resolutions 243 and 338. So, India was 
standing by the Palestinians cause within and without the United 
Nations. 
The parliamentary election of March 1977 brought to power the 
Janta Party headed by Morarji Desai, with the former Jan Sangh 
leader Atal Behari Vajpayee as the minister of external affairs^'. On 
west Asia, despite their canvassing for a change when they were in 
opposition, the Janta Party continued to back the Arabs and the 
Palestinians. India reaffirmed that for the establishment of the peace 
in the region, Israel should vacate those territories which they had 
been occupying since 1967 and allow the Palestinians the right to 
self-determination or even separate state of their own in which they 
could live in security and peace .The Indian government also 
reportedly deplored Israel's activity of aggression and of building 
Jewish settlements in the Occupied Territories which aggravated 
tension between the Israelis and the Palestinians^'*. 
The Janta party stressed cl earlv that in the international field, it 
would pursue a genuinely non-aligned policy. It should not only 
remain nonaligned but must also appear to be so. The party would 
follow a policy, which would not show that India was tilling towards 
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a particular bloc . So the non-alignment policy continued to form the 
cornerstone of India's foreign policy. In view of this, India had to 
follow the old policy which had been pursued since independence and 
there was no shift in it. During the Janta's rule it examined the 
foundation of India's foreign policy and considered nonalignment as 
one of the cardinal principles of foreign policy. Developing relations 
with Israel would sound to many Indians and Arabs as a turning away 
from the policy of nonalignment because of the simple reason that 
Israel was a very close ally of USA. Indo-Isracli ties remained on the 
shelf during the Janta period Moshe Dayan. the then foreign minister 
of Israel visited India but his trip did not produce the expected 
results^^. 
When Moshe Dayan came to India there was no diplomatic 
relations between India and Israel even though an Israeli Consulate 
was established in Bombay. The main reason behind the visit was to 
muster diplomatic relations with India. During his visit Mr. Dayan 
met with the then Indian Prime minister and had some discussions 
with him. Indian premier, Mr. Morarji Desai put his \ iews before Mr. 
Dayan:" 
You must make peace with the Arabs. The 
Israelis have suffered from the Nazis and 
from persecution in Europe, but (he 
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Palestinians should not be made to pay for 
that. The refugees should be settled and you 
had to withdraw from the occupied 
territories, which would be proclaimed a 
Palestinian state 
He further stated: 
Israel was now established fact, the Arabs 
must guarantee her existence, but Israel 
must make possible the rise of a Palestinian 
state. The solution is to establish a 
Palestinian state in the Arab territories, 
which Israel should evacuate 
Thus it is clear from the above discussion that Mr. Desai was 
firm on Israel's withdrawal and the emergence of a Palestine state. 
The refusal to allow Israelis to establish a second Consulate in 
New Delhi in addition to the one Israel had in Bombay clearly shows 
that how much Mr.Desai was firm regarding the Palestine issue. Desai 
also stated that he could be out of the office if the visit of Mr. Dayan 
were to be published . As Dayan himself has recorded that he felt 
humiliated and was let down by the then Indian Foreign Minster Mr. 
Vajpayee. 
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Israel's Move for Establishing Diplomatic Relations with India: 
At different stages Indian government was approached by 
Israeli government for the normalization of relations. The agenda had 
been pushed forth by various Israeli leaders. Ben Gurion was always 
interested in India and Buddhism. Ironically, BenGurion always did 
diamatrically opposite to which India and Buddhism stood for. He 
wanted to win Nehru to Israeli side though this did not yield positive 
results. Golda Meir and Abba Eban were also working hard to win 
India and the latter in 1967 diplomatically repeated that Israel belongs 
to Asia in the Israel -Asia Friendship League^^. Yigal Allan also 
apparently held had a similar view and considered the third world as a 
global political force. The centre of his interest had been India. His 
aim was to strengthen India-Israel friendship and wanted this bond to 
form the anchor of Israel's Asian policy . Though Moshe Sharatt was 
very much interested in India he could not materialize his dream of 
Q 1 
Indo-Israeli diplomatic relations , During the various crisis, which 
India faced, Israel tried to create opportunity for friendship in various 
avenues. In 1962, Israel not only helped India but also praised it for 
her self control and patience. In 1965, Israel supported India and 
accepted Kashmir as an integral part of India. Ironically Israel herself 
did not ever recognize Palestine as the integral homeland of 
Palestinians including Israel. In the following years, Israel supported 
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India's candidature to Security Council. Even during Bangladesh war. 
Israel sided with India and extended help in various ways. When the 
state of Bangladesh was declared, Israel along with India soon 
recognized her on February 4, 1972 . 
In the second half of the 80's India witnessed a change in he 
political leadership. The death of Indra Gandhi on 31 October 1984 
made Rajeev Gandhi the prime minister of India^". Indira Gandhi 
emphasized on enhancing India's security seeking external help in 
optimal manner, trying to play a dominant role in south Asia and 
raising India's voice in the third world politics, which made a closer 
move towards the former USSR. Rajeev Gandhi though keeping the 
old policy began to drift slowly away from USSR . The west Asia 
policy under him remained more or less the same as before. He 
maintained the broad framework of supporting the liberation 
movements in the region . Nevertheless he wanted to maintain good 
relations with USA and the Jewish people, Rajeev met .Jewish leaders 
when he visited USA . These meetings of Rajeev Gandhi with the 
Jewish leaders yielded tangible results, which enhanced relations 
between the Jews and the Indians. These gave impetus to the future 
development of relationship. It was the result of the Rajeev's 
meetings with the Jewish leaders in USA that a delegation of 
American Jewish Anti-Defamation League visited India. In the 
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delegation there were Mr. Burton Levison, chairman of ADL. .less 
Hordes, national coordinator, Abraham Foxman ADL's Washington 
Bureau chief. They met senior official in the ministry of external 
affairs^''. This visit was used by Israel as campaign to have diplomatic 
relations with India. 
The relation between India and Israel was not confined to open 
official meetings directly or through a third party, but also extended 
to secret meetings and consultations. After the assassination of Indra 
Gandhi, the Indian external intelligence agency-the research and 
analysis wing, RAW- invited Israeli security specialists to advice on 
the prime minister Security system . However, the advices of Israeli 
security specialists could not withstand the test of time when Ragiv 
Gandhi was assassinated. It was also reported that Indian and Israeli 
diplomats met secretly in Paris to discuss Tel Aviv's proposal for a 
joint action to destroy a Uranium plant at Kahuta in Pakistan. But the 
discussions did not yield any result. The reason might have been that 
India thought that her venture with Israel would be counter 
productive*^. At one point of time in 1988, it was reported that he 
even went to the extent of making a promise to Mr. Morris Abraham. 
President of a Jewish organization to upgrade Indo-Israeli ties when 
he (Rajeev) was in New York. Though all this was denied by him. 
latter . He also took some decisions like lifting of restriction on 
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Israeli sportsmen coming to India to participate in the Davis Cup 
92 
and Indian team was even willing to play with Israeli team givmg 
the rationale that India played against Israel in table tennis in years 
1981 and 1983 in the former Yugoslavia and Japan respectively \ 
Moreover he lifted the visa restriction on Israeli officials on private 
visits and created more avenues where there could be more meetings 
between Israelis and Indians. The consul general's post in Bombay, 
which was lying vacant since 1982, was reopened and its jurisdiction 
was formally extended to Kerala where there was a considerable 
Jewish population^''. India did not have any diplomatic link with 
Israel at that time but the prime minister took certain steps to create a 
room of common interest where they could play together certain role 
for the mutual benefits of both. 
Gulf War of 1991 and India's Response: 
The end of cold war had its ramification on international 
political environment. It brought in a different world order and its 
affect has spread far and wide. The disintegration of the former USSR 
and her socialist bloc led to the disbanding of Warsaw Pact, and left 
USA as the only super power^^ The USA policy having a free hand in 
conducting war against Iraq, by hijacking the United Nations should 
also be looked from the end of cold war political angle. In west Asia 
regional power, in the post cold war era, was concentrated at two 
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extremes; Iran in the Persian Gulf and Israel. The Gulf regimes 
mainly rely on the USA as their principle source of security and other 
Arab states suffered from the collapse of the former USSR. It made 
Israel unmatched military power in the region^^. This gave Israel to a 
great extent, a free hand in conducting her foreign affairs. 
New Delhi voted for the UN resolution authorizing the use of 
force to expel Iraqi troops from Kuwait and rejected Iraq's linkage of 
the Kuwaiti and the Palestinian problems. In January 1991, India also 
permitted the United States military aircraft to refuel in Bombay. The 
refueling decision stirred such domestic controversy that the Chandra 
Shakhar Government withdrew the refueling privileges in February 
1991 to deflect the criticism of Congress (I), which argued that 
India's nominal pro-United States tilt betrayed the country's non-
aligned principles'^. Others argued that India's pro-US policies and 
its support to the United States during the war was the clear 
indication of India's shift from the old practiced non-alignment 
stand'^^ 
On the regional level the Gulf war of 1991 witnessed a major 
realignment of forces in the West Asia. The leading Arab countries 
including radical Syria joined the hands with the US in waging a 
devesting war against a fellow Arab country-Iraq^'. On the 
International level, the Gulf crisis confirmed the unchallenged 
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dominance of the US as the principal external influence and power, 
and signaled the corresponding demise of the Soviet Union as a 
significant regional actor. The Arab-Israeli conflict is also the area 
where the US has the greatest potential for being a catalyst for peace 
in the region (Middle East)'"''. The Madrid Conference of 1991 in 
which the Arabs and the Israelis started talking face to face was the 
clear proof. It is because of this Madrid Conference that Israel and 
PLO recognized each other after two years of the conference, which 
was managed for the first time after the eight visits of James Baker to 
the region"^'. 
Establishment of Diplomatic Relations with Israel under 
Narsimha Rao: 
The decision of having diplomatic relations with Israel came 
from the Narsima Rao Government in 1992.After the Cold War era, 
India's decision making structure came under intense pressure and the 
establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel-a close ally of the 
US is the clear evidence of shifting of Indian policy from PLO to 
Israel. 
Narsima Rao's decision of establishing the diplomatic relations 
with Israel in 1992 was a hasty step, which was taken under the 
outside pressure than diplomatic prudence. The first sign of a change 
in the Indian pro-PLO and anti-Israel policy appeared little in the 
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meeting which was held between the then Indian Prime Minister, 
Narsima Rao and a Zionist leader, Isi Joseph Leibler in New Delhi in 
November 1991. The discussion centred round the possibility of 
establishing diplomatic ties between India and Israel. The Prime 
Minister's response, according to Leibler, was more positive and 
pragmatic than his predecessors. Further Leibler's talks with the 
Indian Prime Minister were facilitated by the US. Leibler openly 
admitted this in his press conference 
The Leibler-Rao meet was followed by a more visible gesture 
of Government of India under Narsima Rao softened stance towards 
Israel when India voted for the revocation of the UN Resolution 3379 
of November 1975 that had equated Zionism with Racism. The fact 
remained that mere revocation of the Resolution did not change the 
basic character of the Israeli State policy, which formed the raison 
d'etre of the 1975 Resolution. The State of Israel was founded, and 
continues to exist, on the basis of a racist ideology, i.e.. Zionism. 
Further, it led one to believe that the earlier motion (and India's 
support to it by implication) was a mistake or that Zionism had 
somehow changed and repented on its past policies. In reality it was 
neither, as the regime occupying Palestine became more outrageous 
and belligerent in pursuit of the expansionist dreams. Moreover, this 
was done without taking Indian public opinion into account, neither a 
75 
debate was held in the Parliament nor Opposition was taken into 
confidence. India's long cherished principled stand against Racism 
was thrown to the winds overnight. 
In this context it would be interesting to note the observation 
made by the Indian representative at the UN, Rikhi JaipaL in his 
statement of explanation of Indian vote in favour of Resolution 
3379: ' " 
Zionism has deprived", noted the statement, 
"the Arab people of their national rights and 
of the right to self-determination. It is surely 
understandable that the victims of Zionism 
should regard it as a form of racial 
discrimination and it is, therefore, proper 
for the General Assembly also to regard it 
as such. To condone the evil effects of 
Zionism would be giving green light to 
various other forms of racism endemic in 
human societies. 
Had this fact changed on 16 of December 1991, i.e., when 
India voted for repealing of the said Resolution? 
The argument that by attending the West Asia Peace 
Conference in Madrid, Israel had changed itself and shown its desire 
to work for peaceful solution of the Palestinian problem did not hold 
good in the face of the then prevailing situation in the occupied 
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territories. The then Prime Minister Yitzhak Sh^iY continued llj / / 
policy of building new settlements and expanding the e:?dsti4 
the West Bank and Gaza as if there was no peace process. There was 
no letup in the Israeli policy of brutalization, demolition, detention. 
and deportation vis-a-vis the Palestinians. Its adamant decision to 
deport twelve Palestinians from the occupied territories in the midst 
of the peace process was an example. This was done despite the fact 
that the UN Security Council passed a resolution strongly 
condemning it'^''. A statement issued, on 5"^  of June 1992, by the 
Council of Arab Ambassadors in New Delhi clearly indicated how 
much had the State of Israel changed around six months after the 
revocation of the Resolution 3379. While reminding the world of the 
25"^ year of the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Council statement said that 
even as apartheid was being dismantled in South Africa. Israel had 
adopted a "system of racial discrimination against indigenous 
Palestinian Arabs who are living on their own land as Second class 
citizen s"^^\ 
Hence, there were reasons to believe that in this case too it was 
the US factor, which influenced India's decision. India succumbed to 
US pressure after the discussions in New York and voted in favour of 
the pro-Israeli resolution. There was a general agreement, within the 
UN General Assembly, to proceed with the revocations sometime in 
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1992. This was obviously to wait and watch till Israel changed itself 
substantially vis-a-vis the Palestinians so as to justify a reversal of the 
1975 Resolution. But the then US President, George Bush, had his 
own domestic political calculations and compulsions to push through 
the repealing of "Zionism is Racism" Resolution as early as possible. 
It may be recalled that the then Bush administration had virtually 
irked the powerful American Jewish Lobby on the well-Known $10 
billion housing loan guarantee to Israel. The US President came down 
heavily on the Israeli Prime Minister on this issue, and ultimately 
Shamir had to bow down. Hence the repealing of the 1975 Resolution 
was said to be a balancing act. Moreover, this gesture was essential, 
argued the Bush administration, to coax Israel to soften its stand 
towards the peace process. Ridiculous logic indeed. The fact remained 
that in the aftermath of the Soviet collapse the US sought to use the 
UN for its own foreign policy ambitions. In this case too, the 
American diplomatic machinery at the UN was pressed into service to 
put pressure on countries, not excluding India, to support the US 
move in the revocation of the said Resolution by the General 
Assembly. Yasser Arafat, during his visit to New Delhi in the 
following weeks, candidly talked about the American pressure 
tactics'"^. Further, the statement made by the then Indian Prime 
Minister before the Parliament just two days after India voted in the 
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UN vindicated this. While declaring that his government would use 
foreign policy as a dynamic instrument to further national interests, 
Prime Minister P.V.Narsima Rao listed out the overriding priorities of 
India's foreign policy in the post-cold war era. They were: preventing 
any threat to India's unity and territorial integrity, ensuring 
geopolitical security by creating a durable environment of stability 
and peace in Indian region, creating a frame work conducive to the 
economic well being of the people by encouraging a healthy external 
economic environment, and trying to restore, internationally, the 
centrality and criticality of the development in the evolution of 
political and economic policies all over the world. A careful analysis 
of the last two points clearly suggested the reasons as to why the 
weakling Prime Minister had to follow the US line. Because otherwise 
in his opinion the loans from the International Monetary Fund and the 
World Bank would not have flowed steadily resulting in the total 
collapse of India's "ambitious economic liberalization" programme. 
The foreign policy postulates as enumerated by the Indian Prime 
Minister was nothing but an abject surrender in the face of 
difficulties. India was virtually mortgaging its otherwise independent 
foreign policy stance to the outside dictates, which could harm the 
nation in the longer run. 
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On the same day, 18 December 1991, Yasser Arafal requested 
an audience with Prime Minister Rao probably to protest against 
India's volte-face. The President of the State of Palestine, who. in 
earlier times, visited this country more frequently than any other 
world leader, was in for a great surprise this time. His visit kept 
getting postponed on flimsy pretexts- that the Prime Minister was 
preoccupied with two foreign dignitaries and with the preparations for 
the Republic Day. It was indeed ironical that Prime Minister 
P.V.Narsima Rao, who headed the foreign ministry for a long time, 
spearheaded many important pro-PLO decisions, and. above all. had 
to establish close personal rapport with the PLO leader, would deny 
an audience to Arafat under various pretexts. What was more ironical 
probably was that while Arafat was having a difficult time in meeting 
the then Indian Prime Minister, hectic efforts were on to facilitate the 
meeting of Indian and Israeli diplomats in the US. An official level A 
meeting, highest till then, between the Israeli Representative. .loscph 
Hadass and the Indian Deputy Chief of mission, Lalit Mansingh. took 
place at the Indian Embassy in Washington during the second week of 
January 1992. This meeting clearly indicated that the two countries 
were very close in establishing full diplomatic ties. In addition, this 
also brought to the open the active US role in facilitating this 
breakthrough.'"' 
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Finally, New Delhi took the initiative and gave a date, which 
was not so suitable for the PLO leader as he was tied down by the 
outgoing West Asia Peace negotiations. But still he had to make it in 
view of the far-reaching developments. The receptions accorded to the 
visiting Palestinian dignitary were lacklustre at the worst and make 
believe warm at best. It sought to conceal the subterranean tensions in 
Indo-PLO relations. During the official level talks with the PLO chief, 
the Indian Prime Minister reiterated his consistent and unequivocal 
support for Palestine and the inalienable right of its people to self-
determination. The Prime Minister also assured Arafat of extending 
all support to the Palestinians in whatever way possible to achieve the 
twin objective of establishing peace in the region and helping the 
Palestinian friends. While taking an appreciative note of the ongoing 
West Asia Peace Process and wishing it all success, Rao underlined 
the fact that India had a vital interest in peace and stability in a region 
so close to it. The security situation in West Asia, the Prime Minister 
added, impinged on India's security environment. On the whole, India 
tried to convince the Palestinian leader that it had not abandoned the 
Palestinian cause totally despite New Delhi's increasingly softened 
stance towards Tel Aviv. He was given the impression that while "our 
hearts" were still with the struggling and suffering Palestinian people 
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and with the martyrs of Sabra and Shatilla and the intifada but "'our 
heads"* were adjusting to the dictates of a fast changing world 
Arafat, on his part, gave a brief assessment of the peace talks. 
He expressed his strong conviction that India's participation in the 
third round of West Asia Peace talks, scheduled to be held in Moscow 
on 28 and 29 January 1992, was essential, though the modalities were 
not discussed. However, the most significant announcement from the 
PLO chairman came during a press conference on the second day of 
his stay in New Delhi"^^ "exchange of Ambassadors and recognition 
of Israel are acts of sovereignty, in which I can not interfere", 
declared Arafat. "I respect any choice of the Indian government", he 
further added hoping that such a change would not affect Indo-
Palestinian relationship, which was "so strong". 
Arafat's above mentioned statement was extensively reported in 
and interpreted by the media as a clear-cut go-head signal from the 
PLO to India to establish lies with Israel. In reality this was not so 
and reflected only a fragmented analysis of the whole thing. A careful 
reading of Arafat's subsequent statements in the same press 
conference, made it evident that the PLO leader's "clear message" 
was not so clear. It was a conditional signal. Arafat explicitly 
emphasized that India's full diplomatic relations with Israel was not a 
pre-condition for its association with the peace process"". In other 
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words, diplomatic relations with Israel were not only the way by 
which India could be involved in the West Asia peace processes. To 
substantiate his point Arafat remarked that Jordon, along with many 
other Arab countries, represented at the peace conference, were 
without diplomatic relations with Israel. In another context Arafat 
stated that he would prefer if India established diplomatic ties with 
Israel "slowly" to enable the PLO to attain its objective at the peace 
talks. 
Thus, an objective interpretation and correct understanding of 
Arafat's message required that India should have followed a cautious 
and go-slow policy in establishing full diplomatic ties with Israel. It 
should have waited till the ground realities in the West Asian theatre 
changed substantially so as to remove the very basis of its decade's 
old anti-Israeli policy. One failed to understand why Indian policy 
makers were in such a hurry? After all India had extended formal 
recognition to the slate of Israel long ago, notwithstanding its earlier 
opposition. From the very beginning, India insisted on a negotiated 
settlement of the Arab-Israeii-Palestinian conllicl. It neither 
encouraged nor supported the PLO position of dismantling the State 
of Israel. That was enough to convey that India accepted the fait 
accompli in West Asia. So what great difference did it make by 
establishing diplomatic ties with Tel Aviv? Israel's mere attendance 
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of the Madrid peace conference in no way reflected a substantial 
policy change on its part towards the occupied territories and the 
Palestinians living under military occupation in gross violation of 
established international law. Further, India did not have a guilt 
conscience...like the Western power who had shut their doors to the 
Jews during the Holocaust...to compel us to look for ways to 
compensate the state of Israel. The architects of independent India's 
foreign policy were very clear about the purposes and justification 
behind an anti-Israeli posture. By then, however, India's course of 
action had already been decided. A particular section, within the 
foreign policy establishment, who claimed themselves to be the 
realists guided by so called realpolitik considerations had vigorously 
argued for the immediate establishment of ties with Israel. Finally, 
within a few days of Arafat's departure from New Delhi. India 
decided, on 29 January 1992, to establish full diplomatic relations 
with Israel. It should not be forgotten that the announcement to this 
effect was made by the then Indian foreign secretary on the eve of the 
Prime Minister Rao's departure for the UN Security Council Summit 
in New York. 
It is essential to emphasize that a section, favouring normal and 
friendly relationship with Israel, had always been there within the 
foreign policy establishment, and the opinion-making institutions like 
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the media and universities. At times, it even permeated into the 
political circles. This was mostly due to the persistent lobbying of the 
Zionists in India. And certainly, the Zionists are unbeatable as far as 
the subtle art of lobbying and creation of pressure groups within a 
country's decision-making structure is concerned. The establishment 
of an alien entity, called the state of Israel, on Palestinian land, was 
largely due to the Zionists success in this field. Hence, India, because 
of its geo-strategic importance in the world politics, never escaped the 
attention of the Zionists. So much so that even during the time of 
Indra Gandhi, who was known for her activist pro-PLO and anti-
Zionist policy, the Zionists did not relent on their persistent efforts to 
effect a change of mind on the part of India in this regard. They did it 
when Rajiv Gandhi came to power. In both the times it was the same 
person: one Greville Janner, who happened to be the President of the 
Common Wealth Jewish Council '". Interestingly, Janner was a 
member of the British Parliament and belonged to the Labour party. 
He was a Zionist in belief and orientation. Notwithstanding their 
constant attempts, the Zionist lobby failed to achieve any 
breakthrough due to two interrelated factors: the then international 
power balance, and India's foreign policy orientation which 
maintained a synthesis between ideology (of anti-imperialism, anti-
colonialism, anti-racism etc.) and the high ideals of the freedom 
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struggle. This never meant that the pursuance of national interest was 
given a go-by under the euphoria of ideology. But national interest 
was never computed by the calculus of loss and profit alone. After all, 
India stood as a symbol and source of inspiration for most of the third 
world countries having similar experiences of colonial rule and post-
colonial nation-building processes. As a result, the section 
championing the cause of the Zionist lobby in India constituted a 
microscopic minority in the face of a broad anti-Israeli consensus 
within the country. 
With the changing international scenario leading to the 
emergence of the new world (dis) order, the small section broadened 
its support base and gained enough, rather decisive, influence and 
credence within the decision-making setup. Emphasis on pragmatism 
constituted the fundamental basis of its pro-Israel pronouncements. 
Not surprisingly, this was the main plank on which the Jewish lobby 
had been operating in India. The fact remained that the so-called 
emphasis on pragmatism could not be seen in isolation. In 
international politics the terms like ideology and pragmatism cannot 
be always counter-posed. Adherence to any particular ideology cannot 
be devoid of pragmatic considerations. Similarly, any talk of 
pragmatism cannot be made in a vacuum free from ideological 
connotations. In the present space, for instance, the pragmatic 
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considerations were to adjust to the fast-changing needs of a US-
dominated world. Economic liberalization, structural reforms, etc. are 
all essential characteristics of a capitalist path of development...the 
ideology which the US follows, champions, and, imposes on the 
developing world after the discredit of the socialist path of 
development. What better illustration could there have been for India 
to prove its adherence to the US line than the immediate and 
unconditional establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel. However, 
the protagonists of this line marshaled very sophisticated arguments to 
create an impression that the US had nothing to do with India's policy 
change towards Israel 
There are some main arguments put forward by the realist 
school, first, by establishing the diplomatic relations with Israel, India 
would be in a better position to involve herself in the West Asia peace 
process and thereby influence the Israeli policy in favour of the 
Palestinians. Those who believed this were probably living in a make-
believe world, faraway from the dynamics of Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict and negotiations. It has already been stated how Arafat 
disputed this logic by stating that there were other ways and means by 
which India could have been involved in the peace process. What was 
more important was the degree of influence India could have 
exercised on Israel by becoming part of the peace process. By 
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attending the talks, the Indian prime minister or foreign minister 
could, at best, have delivered and addressed the theme of which was 
known to everybody, including Israelis. The crucial question was: 
would the Israeli have heeded to it? The Israeli position vis-a-vis the 
peace talks was governed by the domestic compulsions/pressures that 
the then Shamir government was confronted with and not by our 
sermons. For instance, the shift from the procedural wranglings to 
matters of substance and the report that the Israeli negotiators in 
Washington had offered a plan for Palestinian self-rule in the 
occupied territories brought the wrath of two right-wing parties. This 
ultimately brought down the Shamir government for a while. And 
later the government survived a no-confidence motion in the Knesset 
due to the renewed support of one-the Tzomet party. 
This exposed how precariously balanced was the Shamir 
government and how the power equation in Israel and a decisive 
bearing on its policy towards the Palestinians. An> other 
consideration was no consideration at all. Here, it may not be an 
exaggeration to say that even the president of the US, which has been 
a constant source of support - diplomatic, political, military and 
economic - to the continued existence of Israel from the beginning, at 
times found it difficult to influence the Israeli government beyond a 
point. This is for a country from which Israel receives billions of 
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dollars (approximately $5 billion) in foreign aid annually. In view of 
this it sounded ridiculous to expect that India could influence Israel's 
policy even nominally. 
Second, it was argued that in concrete terms there were distinct 
advantages for India in establishing contacts with Israel in specific 
areas like military modernization, agricultural innovation and 
investments of global Jewish establishment. India could also benefit 
in combating militancy in Punjab and Jammu & Kashmir from the 
Israeli experience and expertise in this regard. 
Both the arguments were nothing new and had been surfacing 
off and on. There had been a section, which from time to time argued 
that India's non-relationship with Israel put her at a disadvantageous 
position preventing New Delhi from playing a positive and purposeful 
role in bringing the two adversaries closer to a settlement. To what 
extent India has been playing a role in this regard ever since its full 
diplomatic relations with Israel is there for everyone to see. As for the 
concrete benefits it may be noted that as far back in the 1960s, the 
government of Rajasthan has shown interest in Israel's arid-zone 
forming techniques. On the question of countering militancy, the 
problems in Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab had cropped up in the 
1980s - a period when India took many decisions in support of the 
PLO. Why did India not establish diplomatic relations with Israel and 
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benefit from its expertise in combating militancy when the problem 
was at its peak? ''. 
Apart from the untenability of the above arguments, the main 
issue, while dealing with Israel was that moral aspects assumed more 
influence that the so called real politick compulsions which often 
signified an outright selfish pursuance of national interests without 
any regard to World peace and human values. Israel was, and perhaps 
still is a state unlike any other. 
The establishment of diplomatic relations then certainly 
questioned and diluted India's commitment to the high deals of non-
alignment, which had been the guiding force of our foreign policy 
during ail the decades after independence Israel represented all that 
was anathema to the NAM. NAM's struggle against imperialism, neo-
colonialism, racism and rights of small countries to determine and 
shape their own future needs no repetition. Of course, there were 
some who argued that with the discredit of socialism in the former 
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, imperialism was dead and similarly 
with the collapse of the Cold War. NAM became redundant. Such a 
view smacked of one's ideological ignorance and lack of knowledge 
about the dynamics of international politics. The significance of NAM 
extends beyond a general resistance to bloc division. It signifies a 
refusal to the mere political and economic appendage of the centre(s) 
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of military, political and economic power. It is a struggle for the 
protection of the developing countries from external domination and 
exploitation. Moreover, bloc politics is fast getting replaced by 
hegemonistic politics. Hence, the relevance of NAM is more than ever 
before in view of the emerging unipolar (politically) world and the 
inherent danger of domination over small and economically weak 
countries. At such a critical juncture, the establishment of ties with 
Israel meant that India was distancing itself. From the NAM instead 
of giving direction to the movement in shaping the emerging 
international order. For instance, by Noting along the US line for the 
repealing of Resolution 3379, India for the first time moved away 
from a collective NAM position. In any case the concrete advantages 
that people talked about were not so lucrative as to compromise with 
the basic elements of India's foreign policy. Third, it was argued that 
the emergence of an Islamic bloc in world politics made it essential 
that India change its Pro-PLO stance and more closer to Israel. 
The talk of the emergence of an aggressive Islamic bloc is 
basically an American projected new horror in the Post-Cold War 
international politics"''. While establishing ties with Israel, the 
Pakistani factor was also utilized to justify the untimely/hasty 
decision. It was argued that in the event of the emergence an Islamic 
bloc, Pakistan would fully exploit it against India. Hence, there was a 
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need to counter this by forging an anti-Islamic alliance along with 
Israel and the US. The formation of an anti-Islamic alliance was. and 
still is, in conformity with the US-Israeli designs. But one fails to 
understand how it serves India's foreign policy goals and national 
interest. No doubt, the tensions between India and Pakistan is since 
1947, but India has even then dealing with the West Asian and North 
African countries and it has maintained fairly cordial relationship 
with the Muslim countries. That the India's pro-Israeli policy 
necessarily meant a dilution of her commitment and support to the 
PLO and its cause became clear from subsequent events. By 
establishing the diplomatic relations with Israel, India did not became 
anti-PLO but certainly she developed apathy towards it. The contacts 
between India and PLO since then have been almost insignificant. The 
only high-level official contact between the two sides was the Rao-
Arafat meet in Tunis on 20'^ November 1992. This too was a mere 
courtesy call, which the Indian prime minister paid to the PLO leader 
during a stopover in Tunis on his way to Dakar for the G-15 summit. 
The meeting lasted for about twenty minutes. There was no specific 
agenda even though Arafat was reported to have briefed Rao about the 
peace talks in general"^. 
As against this, Indo-Israeli cooperation stepped up to mark the 
new found friendship. This was specially so in the political arena. It 
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appeared that he Indian politicians were indeed suffering from a guilt 
conscience and wanted to compensate Israel for years of non-
relationship. There was almost a scramble among Union Ministers and 
state chief ministers to pay visits to Israel. In a period of one year 
from June 1993-July 1994 as many as nine political leaders visited 
Israel. In addition as many as 18 Indian delegations visited Israel 
within a period of two years after establishing the diplomatic 
relations"^. 
India's move to establish diplomatic relations with Israel came 
into effect during the weak minority Government headed by 
P.V.Narsimha Rao in 1992. Before this move the Narsimha Rao 
government voted the United Nations resolution to repeal the 
longstanding United Nations resolution equating Zionism with 
Racism. Not only this India even also abstained from voting on a 
resolution condemning Israel over fresh settlements in the occupied 
territories, at an International Habitat Conference in Nairobi"^. 
When the diplomatic relations were established some claimed 
that Chandraswami was instrumental in the process, others that it was 
part of a process of wooing the US, Israel's mentor. The government 
claimed it was a key element in India's overall West Asian strategy, 
which had been devasted by its less-than-categorical stand on Iraqi 
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invasion of Kuwait. It was said the move would get India a seat at the 
West Asia peace talks. 
The then Indian external affairs minister Madhavsinh Solanki 
argued that India's diplomatic ties were awaiting, 'genuine progress' 
at the ongoing peace talks. This was a clear dilution of earlier 
requirements of Israel vacating occupied Arab territories. India was 
looking for some reason to built formal ties, either at the 
ambassadorial or the consular level, with Israel. Meanwhile a decision 
had been taken to increase semi-official and private contacts with 
Israel. The Israeli consul in Bombay, Giora Becher, was invited to 
take part in a quasi-official seminar, also attended by high Indian 
government officials . Oddly, India neither established a consular 
office in Tel Aviv, nor permitted its diplomats to go to Israel, not 
even to make contact with Palestinians in the occupied areas. Now 
India has moved from one extreme to plunge into diplomatic 
relations. 
Relations with Israel are part of a process that began in the 
early 1980s when Indra Gandhi moved towards the US and began to 
open up the economy. Under Rajiv Gandhi the idea of a 'step by step" 
approach was given official sanction. However, according to an 
official, by 1991 'events overtook us'. The West Asian peace process 
got under way aided by the shift in the power balance following the 
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collapse of the Soviet Union. Iraq was neutralized and Syria. Israel's 
remaining great antagonist, sided with the US. 
"India would have looked holier than the pope had it insisted 
on keeping Israel at arm's length when the Arabs sat across them at 
the negotiating table" were the remarks of a diplomat, recalling the 
decision-making that went on in the Ministry of External Affairs at 
the time. Regarding the establishment of diplomatic relation the 
former foreign secretary, A.P.Venkiteswaran remarked it as 'a correct 
step but premature'" . He was obviously basing his call on the 
principled and expedient position India had taken so far. There is 
seldom any single reason for any foreign policy step. So far India had 
primarily anchored its refusal to set up ties to the Arab-Palestine cum 
Israel issue. 
It was decided that the Palestine-based principle had to be 
placed on a lower shelf—Whatever Indian spokesmen might say about 
India's longstanding commitment—than areas where India's security 
was considered more opportune to woo the US and the US Congress. 
The reshuffle did not mean ignoring other considerations, just a 
rearrangement of priorities. After all. in bridge the .lack of spades 
may be a trump in one deal but not in the next. India was playing an 
altogether new rubber. 
If India were to make a decision primarily on the criterion of 
Israel's West Asian attitude, there was and there still is no case at all 
for establishing diplomatic ties. True, all of them have begun talking 
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but Israel continues to hold out and is in illegal occupation of an 
entire country and parts of others. It is getting what was denied to it 
without an inch or an ounce of concession. There are those who 
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say: 
Well, if India can have diplomatic relations 
with China and Pakistan, who are supposed 
to be in occupation of our own land, what is 
the problem in having ties and yet opposing 
the policies of some one who is occupying 
not our but some body else's territories? 
This argument, used by the BJP, the palkhivalas, the general 
Jacobs, the Jethmalnis and the Subramaniam Swamys is utterly 
amateurish. For one thing, India's ties with China were reopened 
precisely to talk and iron out problems peacefully just as the Arabs 
and Israel have now decided to. More important, Israel is in 
occupation of an entire country whose creation was legitimized by the 
World's premier International body, is stealing all its water and is in 
the process of appropriating occupied lands through illegal 
settlements being allotted to immigrants welcomed on the basis of 
religion. A doctrine diametrically opposite to What India professes to 
stand for. 
The one big misgiving in the minds of many Indians has been 
the fate of the Palestinians. It is recognized that these hapless people 
have been attacked not just by Israel, but all those who they thought 
were their friends. At various times they have been attacked by 
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Jordon, Egypt, Kuwait and Syria. Indian officials in Tel Aviv say 
Palestinian leaders and even the PLO have welcomed India's 
participation in the West Asia peace process. Being realists, they 
realize that India's establishment of diplomatic ties with Israel was 
inevitable. Another related worry among secular elements in India is 
the tendency of the Hindu right-wing to see Israel as a fellow 
'Muslim-basher' 
The changes in the relationship between India and Israel and 
between Israel and its Arab neighours are the profound consequences 
of the end of the Cold war and the emergence of a multipolar world. 
Increasingly, as the world's remaining superpower shrinks to normal 
size, the responsibility of resolving regional conflicts will devolve on 
the region. Responsibility and accountability will be spread more 
evenly. 
The development of relations between India and Israel or the 
decision of establishing diplomatic relations which is supposed to be 
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India and the Regional Military Pacts: 
Many military alliances under the umbrella of western powers 
were formed in the region. The Middle Eastern Defense Organization, 
MEDO, in 1952, the South East Asian Treaty Organization SEATO, 
the Central Treaty Organization CENTO, the Turko-Iraq Pact, and the 
Baghdad Pact in 1955 came into being. Nehru strongly opposed the 
MEDO. He also showed strong reaction to Baghdad Pact of 1955. 
India strongly opposed the creation of this military alliance on several 
grounds. First it aggravated political tension in the Arab World. 
Secondly it unwillingly encouraged and helped the very forces that it 
intended to restrain or suppress. In other words, it provoked the 
Soviet Union to enter the region in a big way with offers of massive 
arms and economic aid to anti-pact Arab states. But the reasons of the 
opposition to the pact from India was the inclusion of Pakistan in the 
pact. India considered Pakistan's inclusion in the pact as a serious 
threat to its (India's) security. Nehru argued that, 'the Baghdad Pact 
would affect India if not Today then Tomorrow or the day after''. 
India was strongly opposed to these alliances as they divided the 
Asian nations extending imperialist influence. In this regard Nehru 
commented, "/ fail to understand what good these little pacts and 
alliances can do in war or peace. One thing they certainly do is to 
vitiate the atmosphere and to bring conflict and bitterness''^ 
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To Him, the creation of the regional military pacts were 
unfortunate and did not help the cause of peace and security. The 
purpose behind the creation of such pacts, as he saw it, was an 
attempt by the Western Powers to not only "keepout the Communist 
Countries" from the region but also to secure for themselves the 
economic resources of the region, especially oil . 
As India was the advocate of 'non-alignment', so its reaction to 
these pacts or alliances was obvious. But it is the Same India which is 
now very close to Israel-a controversial state in the region, as for as 
security or military cooperation is concerned. Though its relations 
with the Jewish State remained cool for several years, especially 
before 1990's. But the changes in the international geo-strategic 
environment, Gulf War 1990-91, disintegration of Soviet Union-a 
traditional friend and partner of the India especially in the military 
fields, emergence of USA as a lone super power, moreover, an 
unimaginative Indian leadership throwing principled strands of 
foreign policy to wind and hiding itself behind the curtain of 
'pragmatism', pushed India to move towards West particularly Israel 
and the USA . Israel has since then looming large on Indian scene 
and has then been selling arms under the pretext of helping India in 
combating terrorism. Here, some of our pro-Israeli friends call it a 
military cooperation and partnership. 
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Building up of close relations with USA and Israel means 
India's drift not only from the Arab countries of the region but also 
from 'non-alignment' which is being adhered by India almost since 
her Independence. 
Jawaharlal Nehru was the architect of the Indian foreign policy. 
Regarding the foreign policy he stated, "We, in India, have 
endeavoured to follow a foreign policy which we feel is not only in 
the interests of World peace but is particularly indicated for the 
countries of Asia. That policy is an independent one and on non-
alignment with any power bloc". Anti-colonialism, anti-racialism, 
Asianism and solidarity, self-determination and non-alignment were 
the corner stone of his foreign policy^. India's first Prime Minister 
Jawaharlal Nehru, kept the relations on a low key in deference to the 
value he attached to India's relation with the Arab countries, the 
Israeli authorities, nevertheless, tried from time to time to upgrade the 
relationship. All the successive governments in India were courteous 
to the visiting Israeli officials, without upgrading the level of 
diplomatic representation and sought Israeli help in mililar\ maticis. 
Before the two countries established diplomatic relations, they 
cooperated clandestinely on military and intelligence matters. It was 
January 1963, a few months after the Indo-China conflict, that the 
government of India consulted the Israeli specialists in military 
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matters. It was then the Israeli chief of Army Staff and Chief of 
Military intelligence visited India for an exchange of views with some 
of the India's military top brass, including the chief of the Army 
Staff^.In the subsequent years, Israeli dignitaries visited India from 
time to time, for instance Yigal Alon, a member of the Israeli cabinet 
visited in 1965^ and Moshe Dayan in 1977^. 
Secrets arms deals have been negotiated also between India and 
Israel. It was an open secret that Rajeev Gandhi's bodyguards used 
the legendary Israeli Uzi machine guns^. Similarly, on two separate 
occasions, Israel sent emergency shipments of arms to India during 
the times of war. The first was during the Sino-India war of 1962 
when Israel responded to Nehru's urgent written communication and 
dispatched a shipload of automatic rifles, mortars, grenades and so 
on. Nine years latter, during the Bangladesh war, various weapons 
were imported from Israel'^. There was also prolonged cooperation 
between India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) and its Israeli 
counterpart, Mossad (the Israeli secret agency). Such cooperation 
existed even during the premierships of Indira Gandhi (1966-77) and 
(1980-84) and Rajeev Gandhi (1984-1989)". India's secret contacts 
with Israel were also substantiated by other sources. According to a 
controversial book, 'By Way Of Deception', written by Victor 
Ostrovsky, a formal Israeli agent and a weapons testing expert, 
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recruited by Mossad, India sent a secret mission to Israel, comprising 
of top nuclear scientists in 1984. According to him, the Indian 
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delegation came secretly to Israel to exchange information . 
Military cooperation between India and Israel Since 1992 to 1997: 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, there 
have been several visits related to the military field, contacts and 
consultations between Israel and India. While Israel was more eager 
to enter into a collaborative partnership with India in defense 
production and anti-terrorist measures, the Indian government was 
reluctant to respond. According to S. Krishna Kumar, minister of state 
for defense, "there was no proposal, no initiative and no offer for 
any kind of defense ties with that country- the subject had not been 
even formally discussed in the defense ministry"^^. 
India's traditional Arab policy had been mainly responsible for 
this, and was dictated by altogether different considerations. First, the 
Arab countries being the largest suppliers of oil to India and the 
sources of hard currency remittances from NRIS, India did not want 
to antagonize them by entering into diplomatic relations with a 
country hostile to them'''. Further Indian policy vis-a-vis West Asia 
was governed by a combination of many other variables such as, 
support for non-alignment, pan-Arabism, Secularism and broadly 
conceived south-south cooperation. Of these, the policy of non-
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alignment brought India closer not only to several West Asian states 
like Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, but also to the masses at large 
who were opposed to the policy of joining Pro-Western alliances 
pursued by some of the regional powers, since non-alignment was 
seen by them as a positive assertion of the ethos of anti-colonialism 
and anti-imperialism. There were others who believed that India's 
policy towards the Arabs and Palestinians was to appease the Muslim 
minority in India and also the Arab states. But they perhaps forgot 
that India's unequivocal support to the Palestinian cause since the 
very beginning was not based on Islamic solidarity but on the broad 
principles of anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, justice, 
non-alignment and third world solidarity'^. 
Defense minister Sharad Pawar visited Israel in February in 
1992. He indicated that the formal establishment of diplomatic ties 
between India and Israel had paved the way for drawing upon Israel's 
successful experience in curbing terrorism. And that India would like 
to benefit from the Israeli experience in Anti-terrorist operations'^'. 
Firstly the Indian defense minister willfully ignored that Palestinian 
struggle for Liberation was not an act of terrorism. Secondly even if it 
was Israel till now had been an alter failure to curb it. Weapons 
certainly are no solution to suppress a struggling people. Israel should 
have realized that political process was the only solution for curbing 
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'terrorism'. Krishna Kumar too said, 'teciinicaliy no country could be 
excluded in such matters and Israel had certain defense capabilities 
worth nothing''^. By mid-1992, India and Israel had made 
considerable progress on the possibilities of cooperation in key 
defense areas. A six member Israeli defense team came to India and 
had meetings with several defense ministry officials . The team had 
come at the invitation of the ministry of defense. This visit within the 
five months of establishing of diplomatic relations between India and 
Israel was a significant indicator of the rapid progress in Indo-Israeli 
military relations. In an interview, Prime minister of Israel Yitzhak 
Rabin talked very positively of defense ties with India. "/ believe if 
there is interest on the part of India, I believe there is room for it. 
We are more than ready to cooperate with India in the field of 
defense whenever and wherever it suits /iirf/a"'"^.Regarding 
fundamentalism and terrorism ,he said that Israel had been a victim 
of this for a long time and emphasized that the same had been the 
concern of India^°. Raising the bogey of fundamentalism and 
terrorism has always served Israel's clandestine purpose. This 
victimizer was calling herself victim and Indian leadership was ready 
to be duped. J.N.Dixit's visit to Tel Aviv in the wake of Bombay 
blasts added to the speculation that cooperation in combating 
terrorism was a possible area of common interest^'. In May 1993, 
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Israeli foreign Minister Shimon Peres visited India. He too dealt with 
the issues of terrorism and India's territorial integrity. He also 
supported India's stand on Kashmir. 'We support fully and 
completely the territorial integrity of India and agree with the Shimla 
Agreement'^^. 
Earlier Shimon Peres had emphasasised Israel's support to 
India on the Kashmir issue. In this context one must not forget the 
single contribution of the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat bringing 
closer, through his untiring efforts both India and Pakistan which 
resulted in the signing of 'Shimla Agreement' . This agreement till 
now forms the basis of Indo-Pak negotiations. Arafat who called the 
iron lady of India, Mrs. Indira Gandhi sister proved to be a harbinger 
of peace and goodwill in the region. 
In contrast the Zionist leader Shimon Peres had different 
designs. He suggested the changing of the demographic character of 
the valley of Kashmir on the pattern of Palestine^''. This suggestion by 
Peres speaks volume of the Zionist mindset. Peres was trying to sow 
permanent seed of discord as he and his friends in Israel had done vis-
a-vis the poor Palestinians. It was a colonial solution by a colonialist. 
Moreover Israeli supply of arms can be seen as catalyst of arms race 
in the region. 
114 
General Herlz Bodinger from Israel visited India in 1995. 
During his visit, India was offered a package deal, which included 
airborne warning and control systems, remotely piloted vehicles, 
access to an air platform for an anti-detection and anti-jamming 
maneuvers and specialized weapons^^. In July 1995, a high level 
Indian defense team led by defense secretary K. A.Nambiar went to 
Israel. The defense secretary's trip was necessitated by the urgency to 
identity the avionics and weapons systems for the Mig-21, which was 
being upgraded for India under an Indo- Russian Joint Venture. The 
talks on the upgradation of the Russian T-72 tank too were part of 
agenda at that time. India showed interest in remotely piloted vehicles 
too^^ 
President Ezer Weizman visited India in January 1997. He 
underlined India as a potential partner in the area of aircraft 
industry . One of his aims was to push for an increase in 'defense 
cooperation' an euphemism for the selling arms to India under one 
pretext or another. During his visit the two countries decided to 
exchange military attaches. Following the visit. Senior Indian 
officials visited Israel and inspected defense systems. India's top 
defense ministry scientists too visited the state of Israel secretly and 
toured satellite and missile programmes'^. 
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Bhartiya Janta Party and Its Military Collaboration with Israel: 
A few days after India tested its nuclear devices in May 1998. a 
top ranking delegation from the Israel Arms Industry (lAI) toured 
India. The purpose was to accelerate the sale of Israeli made pilot less 
aircraft and anti-ship missiles . India's defense secretary 
T.K.Banerjeee led a high level military delegation to Israel in 
February 1997^°. Chief of the Army Staff General V.P.Malik toured 
Israel in 1998^'. According to India's military attache. Col.Brown, it 
was a goodwill visit, 'we are looking forward to building a long 
lasting defense relationship'^^. The principal secretary to the prime 
minister, Brajesh Mishra met with Israeli Prime minister Ehud Barak. 
This meeting was regarded as part of the ongoing diplomatic 
dialogue. The dialogue between India and Israel touched on strategic, 
political and economic issues \ 
In 1998, the lAI finalized a large-scale deal with India to sell 
advanced electronic Equipment^"*. The equipment was developed and 
manufactured in Israel and comprised no American technology. But 
the US was against the deal because of India's Nuclear Tests of May-
1998 and demanded Israel for halting the deal. US pressure on Israel 
came after the India's nuclear tests which were carried by India in 
May 1998.US argued that the deal can violate an international arms 
control treaty''^. However, Israel did not agree and resisted the US 
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pressure to cancel the sale of Advanced Electronic Equipment. AEE 
to India. It is reported that Israel sold the advanced electronic warfare 
system to India despite the strong objections from the U.S.'^'.The 
nuclear tests carried out by India under BJP rule in 1998 started arm 
race in the region. Pakistan became nuclear. This was a god send 
opportunity for the Israelis to take advantage of the situation During 
the Kargil Incidents in Kashmir in 1999, Israel agreed to speedup 
shipments of arms and military equipment to India on the request of 
the Indian government to accelerate the arms orders, which had been 
submitted earlier. The Israeli defense establishments responded 
favorably''^. Kargil war of 1999 was a tremendous opportune moment 
for Israelis to market their military products when India was reeling 
under the sanctions. 
To expand their cooperation in the area of defense, India and 
Israel, in September 1999 negotiated a fresh conventional arms deal 
estimated at about 150-200 million dollars a year^^^In April 2000. an 
Israeli company, Soltam Systems Ltd. won a crucial contract worth 
47.5milliondollars to upgrade Indian artillery out competing its 
French, Swedish, Czech and South African Competitors^^ 
The signing of a two billion dollar arms agreement between 
India and Israel in July 2001^^ was considered an important step in 
the field of defense cooperation. Under the agreement Israel Aircraft 
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Industry could deliver to India aircraft, radar systems and surface-to-
surface missiles via Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd. (HAL). The lAI will 
also deliver surface to surface naval Barak missiles, worth 280 
million dollars, pilot-less planes valued at SOOmillion dollars, and 
Green pine radar systems, estimated at 250 million dollars . In 
addition, the lAI will develop super Barak missile for India, which 
will have twice the capability of the original Barak surface-to-surface 
missiles. Potential deals withal included the upgrading of Russian 
built Indian warplanes-MIG-21s, MIG-29s and sukhois. As well as 
Mil-8s and Mil-17 helicopters and T-72 tanks'". 
It is noteworthy that Israel agreed to sell its arms to India 
despite American objections. The US tried to block Israeli-Indian 
military cooperation after India conducted five nuclear test explosions 
in May 1998. In the earlier part of 1999, Israel sold an advanced 
electronic warfare system to India over objections from the 
US'*".Israeli officials defended the sale by saying the Weapons system 
was defensive in nature and wholly developed in Israel with no US 
funding or technology'*^. Although the Phalcon surveillance aircraft 
owes nothing to US technology. But combines Israeli technology with 
a Russian airframe'''*, the US was opposed to the Phalcon deal 
between India and Israel arguing that some of the avionics were 
American made and hence could not be transferred to a third country, 
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especially one like India which was under the US sanctions. Israel 
was also forced to terminate a potential 1 billion dollar early warning 
phalcon deal with China in July 2000. The termination happened only 
after the intense pressure by US''^. Israel undermined the US pressure 
on Indo-Israeli phalcon deal''^. 'Israel and India have good and 
developing defense ties. These have no connection to the existing 
dialogue between Israel and the US relating to technological issues' 
were the words of deputy spokesperson of the Israeli defense 
ministry. 'The dialogue between the US and Israel in aspects of 
technology is ongoing and no change has occurred in the situation 
relating to the Phalcon' he pointed''^. Moreover up till now the 
military cooperation was unilaterally benefiting Israel at the cost of 
Indian taxpayer. 
An important dimension of the growing Indo- Israel military 
relations has been in the field of establishing joint ventures to 
manufacture defense hardware in India, ranging from missiles to 
armoured vehicles and their selling to third world countries. 
According to Doran Suslik, director of corporate communication for 
lAI, the proposal could cover the transfer of sophisticated technology 
and production techniques developed by Israel's state owned defense 
industries. 'Israel's policy is to involve clients in local defense 
production and manufacture of Israeli equipment in cooperation with 
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local defense industries through transfer of production, techniques 
and technologies to industrial counterparts in the client country" were 
the words of Doran Suslik . The decision would depend on the 
volume of the bilateral trade and licensing production approvals given 
by both Indian and Israeli governments. Israel has already established 
similar relationship with defense industries and defense Organization 
in the Switzerland, Belgium and Finland''^.The issue of joint 
production was discussed when India's defense secretary Yogendra 
Narian, accompanied by senior military and civil officials paid a 
four day visit to Israel in May 2001.According to an Israeli defense 
ministry official. Joint production of defense equipment is possible 
because of ' the quality of India's high-tech manpower, its 
considerably lower production costs, high industrial capability and its 
solid and reliable experience'. The official further argued, "because of 
our close strategic understanding , a formal agreement or a 
memorandum of understanding is unnecessary and actual co-
production can be decided between India and Israeli military 
industries on an item-by-item basis'^°. 
Among the Israeli hardware that can be jointly produced with 
India are the Popeye missile and all-terrain Merkava tank. "Neither 
has been discussed but we are certainly open to Indian proposals.' the 
Israeli official said^'. Earlier, in 1998, India and Israel were 
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negotiating on potential joint production in India of Israeli unmanned 
aerial vehicles and fast patrol boat projects". Israel's interest, 
however, of selling its Unmanned Aerial Vehicles to India could be 
traced as far as back as 1992 when in the middle of that year, soon 
after the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and 
Israel, the former was offered the UAV by Israel when a team of 
Israeli experts from Malat, a subsidiary of the State-owned lAI visited 
New Delhi". 
Yogendra Narian's visit to Israel in 2001. of course, 
reciprocated a trip to India earlier in 2001 by a high level Israeli 
military team led by General Yaron to examine India's defense 
production capabilities. Narian's visit also came close on the heels of 
a trip by Indian Navy Chief Admiral Sushil Kumar to Israel earlier in 
the same month, reflecting the rapidly growing defense ties between 
the two countries. Israel, besides selling arms to India, at the same 
time, has also expressed its desire to buy arms from India. Israel is 
eager to buy the pilot less target aircraft Lakshya from India 
Israel's defense source said 'while we are intending to sell one 
weapon to India, we want to buy another from them'^'*. It is a matter 
of interest how far India has been successful in selling some of its 
indigenous military products to Israel-data so far are missing or there 
is nothing to mention what. Stating that there are several other 
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defense equipment that Israel wanted to acquire from India, the 
sources said, the issue had come up in various meetings between 
officials of the two countries and 'negotiations are going on". 
India is currently Israel's second largest market, after China, 
for military hardware. India is one of the 39 countries with which 
Israel has signed 'secret cooperative agreements' to prevent 
information leaks from Joint security projects^^. As per the 
agreement, in the event of an information leak or transfer of sensitive 
information to a third party by a spy, both countries must work 
together to investigate the matter. It is indicative of the rapidly 
growing defense ties between India and Israel that since of the 
establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992 until the middle of the 
2000, there had been more than fifty military related visits, contacts 
and consultations between the two countries^^. 
L.K. Advani and Jaswant Singh's Visits to Israel: 
The visits in the middle of 2000 by the Indian Home minister, 
L.K.Advani and the foreign minister, Jaswant Singh to Israel have 
given fresh impetus to bilateral ties between India and Israel. Before 
their visits to the Jewish state India organized its first-ever trade fair 
in Israel in May 2000 and following its success, India and Israel have 
agreed to increase cooperation in high-tech sector, especially in soft 
ware, telecommunications and information technology sectors. 
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L.K.Advani visited Israel in the middle of June 2000. He was the first 
senior Indian Minister to visit Israel since the establishment of the 
diplomatic relations between the two countries in 1992. Besides, 
Israel Advani's foreign tour included France and U.K and he was 
accompanied by a galaxy of security officials including Union home 
secretary Kamal Pande, intelligence Bureau chief Shyamal Dutta. 
Director General of BSF-E.N.Rammohan and CBI head 
B.K.Raghavan. The main agenda of the team was to get the counter-
insurgency tactics of Mossad and the study of the security systems of 
France and the U.K . In fact, the issue of counter terrorism has been 
widely considered as an area in which both India and Israel used to 
have identical concern. Israelis are generally understood to have 
extensive experience and expertise in counter terrorism. India's 
defense minister Sharad Pawar when visited Israel on 23 February 
1992 said, ' the new Indian move had paved the way for drawing on 
Israel's successful experience to curb terrorism'. This statement on 
the part of Sharad Pawar must, at best, be construed as his personal 
viewpoint and many in India disagreed with it. Pawar conveniently 
forgot that Israel was not curbing terrorism but a people's movement, 
which over the years had become militant on account of brutal 
suppression of the genuine demands of Palestinians. He also said that 
such an exchange would be of mutual advantage to the two states, 
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adding that India would also like to get acquainted with Israeli 
experience in developing technology for anti-terrorist operations' 
Pawar in his capacity as defense minister miserably failed to see that 
military technology has no answer to insurgency. Israel up till now 
has failed in this regard. During his visit to Israel. India's Home 
minister L.K. Advani discussed with top Israeli police brass various 
techniques employed by them to curb terrorism. He also had, after 
visiting the Israeli side of the border with Lebanon, first-hand 
knowledge of Israel's border management techniques and said that it 
would help India in effectively managing the Indo-Pak border to 
tackle 'cross border terrorism'. Obviously home minister's visit to 
Israel had attracted attention because of the apparent consultations on 
terrorism and sharing of intelligence. Israel is well known for its 
exceptionally professional intelligence apparatus. Leading defense 
expert Jasjit Singh observed that, "Israel is a great deal' for India to 
learn from the principles and practices followed by Israel hut he 
further said that,' we need to constantly bear in mind the structural 
and situational differences between the two countries"^'\ Adxanis 
visit was followed by external affairs minister Jaswant Singh's visit 
to Israel in June 2000. Jaswant became the first external affairs 
minister who visited Israel after both the countries established the 
diplomatic relations in 1992, Singnalled another step, which would 
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further strengthen ties between the two countries. In his dialogue with 
the Israeli leadership Singh was able to score an assurance that Tel 
Aviv would keep New Delhi's security concerned in mind while 
selling arms to Beijing and would not encourage any deal that 
jeopardize Indo-Israel relations^^. On account of India's obsession 
with Pakistan in recent years the one factor that has been ignored is 
Israel's arms sales to China. China is a major concern for India in 
terms of defense and security and Israel's supply of arms to it should 
be seen in this context. As part of newfound bonhomie, the two 
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countries agreed on a structured dialogue to broad base and strengthen 
relations in the political, economic and security spheres. They 
decided to set up a Joint ministerial commission to have regular 
dialogue on security and counter terrorism and on substantial 
cooperation on information technology^'. The ministerial commission 
will meet twice a year, alternately in the two capitals, to give India 
and Israel an opportunity to discuss all political issues at the bilateral, 
regional and global levels. 
Emphasizing the importance of fighting terrorism, Singh even 
told David Levy, the Israeli foreign minister, about the 'need to set up 
a global mechanism against terrorism, and asked that there should be 
intelligence cooperation in between the governments of Israel and 
India' .He suggested that the two countries should take the lead in 
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the fight against terrorism, Saying that the two countries had much 
combined experience in this regard. Besides strengthing bilateral 
cooperation in various fields and bringing the two countries closer, 
Singh's visit to Israel could be considered as significant in the 
political field. Israel officially acknowledged that the Singh's visit 
had broken 'a psychological barrier that had created a political gap in 
ties' between India and Israel. Israel has stressed that despite 
establishment of full-fledged diplomatic relationship between the two 
countries and bilateral cooperation in various fields, a political gap 
had existed before Singh's visit and the 'gap' has been bridged 
because of the Indian external affairs minister's visit to Israel in June 
2000 ". Aircraft, surveillance equipments, main battle tanks, missiles 
and the navy are the military fields in which both the countries have 
shown deep interest for cooperation. Indeed, India opened itself to 
Israeli military hardware benefiting Israeli arm sellers and triggering 
arms race in the region. 
India has a complex history of military collaboration with a 
number of countries. Scrutiny of its defense collaboration initiatives 
with US, Russia, France and Israel is of high significance. For over a 
decade successive Israeli governments were trying to initiate and 
develop deeper and wide ranging cooperation and collaboration with 
India in economic and defense fields to serve their geo-economic and 
126 
geo-political interests. From the Indian side, L.K.Advani has always 
been a strong advocate of such relations with Israel; for, in any event 
Advani's own political party and the other like minded radical Hindu 
parties saw in Israel a valuable strategic partner on the grounds of 
mutually common anti-Muslim and anti-Pakistan agenda. L.K.Advani 
and his BJP is fully in command of Indian decision-making process 
for the first time after independence, 'the Vajpayee government has 
shifted its foreign policy focus from Arab nations to the Zionist State-
Israer*^" 
^The recent major shift in India's foreign policy and diplomacy 
relating to Israel, from a 'quiet' recognition to a very active 
collaboration, has received much media coverage both in India and 
Muslim countries. India and Israel are so far concentrating on 
interaction and cooperation in two fields; one, according to Kesava 
Menon, intelligence cooperation to help each other against the 
Muslims of various regions who according to the perceptions of 
these countries, are source of threat to their national security '^'^  and 
second cooperation in the conventional and high tech military fields. 
Kesava Menon has further elaborated that Israelis perceive Muslim 
terrorist threat coming mainly from Syria and Iran, Whereas India 
obviously sees that threat coming from Pakistan, Afghanistan and its 
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connections in the Arab countries. However, what is important to note 
in this context is: 
the details of Advani's meetings with Israeli 
rulers, particularly the heads of the Israeli 
home ministry and its intelligence agencies 
Mossad and Sabak, reveal that the 
arrangements he had made for the Joint 
Indo-Israel espionage operations in key 
areas of the Muslim world make the Indian 
embassies in these Muslims countries the 
eyes and ears of the world wide cloak and 
dagger Israeli Spy network. 
As for Israeli military assistance to India, Israeli equipment is 
certainly sold at an exorbitant price in comparison to similar 
equipments provided by US, France. UK. However, what is important 
is the fact, as asserted by Kesava Menon, that, 'Israel is also not 
likely to cut supplies on the grounds of secondary considerations on 
the political or human rights front'^'^ Israelis are hardly concerned 
about the purpose of the use of arms purchased by them, as long as 
they go on pocketing profits and fomenting troubles in the region. 
It is obvious that both India under BJP and Israel would try 
their utmost to carry through these new found deals, because they 
have some objectives which include induction of the controlled 
military high-tech of US/ Western origin through Israel and utilizing 
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the Israeli intelligence expertise in eliminating not only ongoing 
insurgencies in Muslim majority areas but other areas in India. On the 
Israeli side, their objective is the narrow self interest which include 
finding new avenues through India for their arms/intelligence 
expertise/commercial sales in the Asian and other third world regions, 
so as to rid Israel of its dependence on US and Europe, and utilizing 
Indian embassies, media leverage and lobbies etc in the Arab world 
and other Muslim countries for expanding the Mossad and Sabak 
network^^. A very dangerous game these two have started in the 
region. 
After the nuclear explosion by India in May 1998 both India 
and Israel have come in for criticism and have been accused of 
cooperation in the nuclear field. A number of attempts were made to 
link Indian actions to Israel. New Delhi reported that Pakistan's 
foreign minister Gohar Ayub Khan claimed that for the nuclear tests 
Israel supplied the devices to India^^. Further the Centre reported that 
Pakistan government claimed that the Israeli F-16s were preparing to 
attack Pakistani nuclear facilities'^ The Arab league also showed 
anger to India and accused Israeli's military and nuclear cooperation 
with India and warned against its consequences to the Arab and 
Islamic world. The league's deputy secretary General Mohmmad 
Zakria Ismail said that the league had information to prove the 
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alleged nuclear cooperation^'. New Delhi claimed that Pakistan is 
spreading false information regarding Indo-Israeli nuclear 
cooperation. She further claimed that Pakistan is seeking to 
delegitimise and isolate India in the Arab world and looking for Iran 
and Arab for support after facing sanctions after its own nuclear 
tests^l 
Israel kept a low profile with respect to these events and 
showed no interest to involve her in India/Pakistan/China triangle. 
The Israeli deputy minister of defense declared in the Knesset that 
'Israel has nothing to do with the tension on the Indian subcontinent. 
Israel does not regard either India or Pakistan as an enemy and all the 
reports to the contrary have been false' "'. After fomenting problem 
Israel was conveniently lying low and denying the reports 
vehemently. 
Indian diplomats have denied allegations that Israel assisted 
India in the May 1998 tests^'' and claimed that the speculation of 
Indo-Israel cooperation in the nuclear field is baseless. Indian 
ambassador to Israel Ranjin Mathai denied any cooperation with 
Israel in the nuclear field . External affairs ministry spokesperson 
stated that 'India had nothing to do with its nuclear program'. Alon 
Ben David, Israeli army affairs correspondent said, 'It is important to 
stress that the defense ties between India and Israel did not deal with 
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nuclear issues, only conventional arms export' . So far as Israel's 
response to India's nuclear tests was concerned, Israel's foreign 
ministry did not condemn India's nuclear tests^^. There is however, a 
section in Israel, which brought forth the view that India's nuclear 
tests could indirectly pose a threat to Israel. Some of them also 
believe that these tests provide momentum to the Pakistani nuclear 
program and gave it more legitimacy and Pakistan's nuclear program 
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was supposed to be the source of the so called Islamic bomb . Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's spokesman said that, 'we worried that 
Pakistani tests will give boost to Tehran and the Baghdad to acquire 
nuclear weapons'^^. 
'z Indo-Israeli military cooperation did not fade in the wake of 
nuclear tests by India. Israel was providing India with intelligence on 
Pakistan from its spy satellite and India gave permission for Israeli 
military intelligence experts to undertake missions on Indian Territory 
to monitor points of interest . The deal on the AEE too was made 
even after the nuclear tests carried by India in May-1998. 
Israel is heavily dependent on the US for military as well as 
political and economic support. Much of Israeli defense equipment 
has US components. For export of these items, Israel has to seek the 
consent of the US. In 1991, Israel was brought under the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and this seriously limited its 
131 
ability to export sensitive technologies to India. For instance, the 
Arrow anti-missile project, developed by Israel and funded by the US, 
comes under the technology rights agreements between the US and 
Israel. US blocked the sale of many military types of equipment from 
Israel to India. Because of the poor relations of US with India . After 
the nuclear tests in 1998, the US imposed sanctions on India. But 
these sanctions could not stop the growing Indo-Israeli relations. 
Indian national security advisor Brajesh Mishra visited Israel in 
September 1999, gave a major boost to Indo-lsracli relations. 
Professor Sherman a strategic analyst and professor of international 
relations at Tel Aviv university during his visit to New Delhi in June 
1999 remarked, ''India can take maximum benefits from Israel's 
advanced technology in modern warfare. India and Israel seem to be 
compatible in numerous fields and all it requires is systematic 
efforts and identification of fields of common interest among both 
sides to provide greater mutual understanding" On security threats 
faced by both India and Israel his words were, 'India and Israel can 
become each other's strategic partner in a joint coilaboraiion to 
counter the threats of terrorism'. Professor Sherman was Glutting 
India with Israel since according to him both were facing security 
threats. How could Professor Sherman ignore the naked reality that 
Israel was offensively setting on the large chunk of Palestine territory 
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and talked of security for itself? As for Indian security her situation is 
entirely different from Israel. 
According to professor Shermon, "Israel has a long experience 
of war which can be of help to India. It can take maximum benefit 
from Israel's advanced technology in modern warfare. Its avionics 
and radar surveillance systems can be extremely helpful for India in 
patrolling its border areas". Nevertheless Israel cooperated with 
Indian military establishment to design advanced aerial vehicles for 
surveillance, fast attack patrol boats and automated maneuvering 
combat instrumentation, an excellent training device for combat 
pilots. Israel also worked jointly with India to upgrade its Mig-21s 
and to equip them with Israeli electronic avionics. It is high time that 
Israel must also have some experience of peace making. 
t / The potential of Indo-Israeli cooperation has assumed 
significances after the kargil crisis with avenues of cooperation in 
security, defense and technology sectors opening up. During the 
kargil conflict, Israel was one of the countries to extend a lot of 
backstage help to India on various aspects from information sharing 
to Strategic consultations . During the kargil war, Israel responded 
magnificently, despite pressures from various quarters not to supply 
UAVs for high altitude surveillance, laser-guided system and many 
other items were supplied within twenty-four hours^^. Israel has also 
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emerged as India's second largest defense supplier after Russia. It is 
expected that Israel may emerge as India's number one defense 
supplier^''. A high level delegation of Israeli anti-terrorism experts 
traveled to India in September 2001. The delegation was led by 
officials from the counter-terrorism bureau of the prime minister's 
office, included representatives of the Israeli police and military 
intelligence .The team also visited the Jammu and Kashmir state to 
assess the India's security needs in Kashmir . Israel is also to tram 
four battalions of nearly three thousand Indian soldiers for specialized 
anti-insurgency strikes, adding to their training in desert, mountain, 
jungle and counter-hijacking and hostage crisis situations. New 
Delhi's turn to Jerusalem for combat soldier expertise is due, in part, 
to disappointing results in border clashes with Pakistani forces and to 
the December 13, 2001 suicide attack on Indian parliament house. 
Among the many tasks expected of them, the newly trained Indian 
troops are expected to stop infiltration from across the border into 
India via the contested Kashmir region^^ Bilateral defense relations 
had also been kept under wraps to prevent them from affecting India's 
ties with the Arab states, including Palestine, on whom it is largely 
dependent for its energy needs. But the kargil conflict changed all 
that, for at that point Israel dug deep into its military equipment 
reserves to supply ordnance and unmanned aerial vehicles in order to 
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give the ill-prepared and ill equipped Indian army the edge over 
Pakistan in the 11-week long war of 1999.It is high time India should 
start political process since Israel is a major beneficiary on account of 
the disturbed conditions in the region. 
The director general of Israeli defense military, Major general 
(retd.) Amos Yaron, made an unscheduled stopover in Delhi, while 
ostensibly on a trip to Bangkok in 2001, to meet Yogendra Narian, the 
then defense security, to establish a Joint Working Group for defense. 
Headed by the respective defense secretaries the Joint Working 
Group, which meets every year alternately in New Delhi and Tel 
Aviv, has prepared a road map to cement the military ties, deal with 
defense purchases and joint ventures and to coordinate intelligence 
and related security matters . 
^ Indian government is seeking enhanced Israeli cooperation to 
counter all potential threats including nuclear, from Pakistan and 
deals are already underway to acquire sophisticated weapons worth 
billions of dollars with a possibility of New Delhi buying Submarines 
capable of carrying nuclear warheads from Tel Aviv^**. In the last 
decade the two countries have built extensive military collaboration, 
involving arms sale, equipment upgrades, and the transfer of 
technology and joint weapons development programmes. The latest 
multi billion dollar defense agreements are seen as another watershed 
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in the Indo-Israel strategic partnership. Under these agreements the 
Israeli aircraft industry will supply India and latter build Jointly the 
Barak naval surface-to-surface missiles and a plan to develop the 
super Barak missile at a cost of approximately $250 million. Further 
shipments from Israel to India include Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
worth approximately $300 million and the green pine radar system, 
which is an integral part of the Arrow anti-ballistic missile system 
worth $250 million. Military intelligence reports suggest Israel has 
also been given a contract to fence off areas in the volatile Kashmir 
region and is the probably only foreign state, which has access to 
sensitive installations in the border region. The two countries at 
several occasions were ready for joint military exercise in the region, 
if this were happen, it could have a significant impact on the security 
of the most volatile regions in the world i.e. South Asia and the 
Middle East . Israeli experts are training their Indian counterparts in 
checking infiltration along the borders, detecting explosives, defusing 
bombs and the use of many other devices and tactics developed by 
Israel. 
J Israeli foreign minister Shimon Peres visited India in January 
2002. His visit was a clear indication of the Israeli desire to upgrade 
relations between the two countries. In his discussions with the Indian 
Prime Minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, External Affairs Minister, 
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Jaswant Singh, Home Minister-L.K.Advani and Defense Minister 
George Fernandes, where 'terrorism' featured prominently. He 
offered India 'every possible help in every possible way' as India 
seeks to defend itself against external terrorism. According to Peres, 
India can benefit immensely in the area of defense as Israel has a 
highly military industry. At a press conference, he said that his 
country would be by India's side in the fight against terrorists in 
every possible way. Peres, like many of his ilk visiting India before 
him raised the bogey of 'terrorism' and under the pretext prepared 
ground for massive arms sales to India by Israel. 
Counter insurgency and border management have been the 
areas where cooperation between the two countries was thought to be 
necessary. India finds it useful to learn from Israel's experience not 
only in counter insurgency but also night warfare and air surveillance. 
The background to all this has been provided by a growing 
understanding of the challenges facing both countries. In this 
direction there has been India-Israel strategic dialogue in September 
2001, which discussed matters like the threat to both countries from 
terrorism, developments in south and west Asia and the future 
direction of their cooperation. While New Delhi and Tel Aviv have 
taken steps to further economic and cultural cooperation, defense and 
security have emerged as areas of primary importance. This became 
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clear in November 2001 when a seven member Israeli military 
delegation visited India under the leadership of Amos Yaron, director 
general of Israel's defense ministry and met top Indian officials, 
including the defense secretary and discussed the matters related to 
security and closer military cooperation^*^. Of immediate relevance, 
the post September 11,2001 situation has resulted in increasing i 
strategic cooperation between the two countries, defense and related 
interaction intensifying manifold from even the high levels reached in 
the post-Kargil days, 'We continue to cooperate, collaborate and 
enhance the relations that already exist', remarked Amos Yaron, 
director general in Israel's defense ministry^'. How far this 
cooperation has resulted in benefiting India is yet to be seen. As for 
Israel any body can say that it has not been able to curb Palestinian 
militancy inspite of its sophisticated arms and ammunitions, used 
against them. 
The quietly growing strategic cooperation between India and 
Israel is the result of shared perceptions and short sightedness of the 
two governments. Increasing convergence of Indo-Israeli strategic 
interests is leading to a wide-ranging partnership between New Delhi 
and Tel Aviv with intelligence sharing, counter insurgency operations 
and border management forming the core of this emerging 
relationship. Israel has rapidly emerged as India's second largest 
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defense partner after Russia. While Russia provides the platforms to 
India tanks, aircraft and ships. Israel supplies the systems that go with 
them, including radar, electronic control measures and weapons. 
Israel defense projects with India have included avionics upgrades for 
Indian-built MiGs, unmanned aerial vehicles for reconnaissance and 
the transfer of the green pine fire control radar system . The 
burgeoning military ties have been underlined by the flurry of visits 
to Israel by Indian top ministry and defense brass, including the chief 
of the naval staff, the army vice-chief and the secretary, defense 
production, in the last two decades. The two countries have also been 
collaborating on missile technology. India's top missile scientist, now 
the president of the country, APJ Abdul Kalam also visited Israel 
twice before the 1998 nuclear tests carried by India in the same year ^^ . 
J There are constant Indo-Israeli contacts on various levels, 
especially in the realm of cooperation in counter terrorism measures 
and purchase of Israeli arms. The second meeting of the Indo-Israel 
Joint Working Group on counter terrorism was held in New Delhi on 
27-28 May 2002. The Israeli delegation was led by Zvi Gabay, deputy 
director general in the Israel ministry of foreign affairs and major 
general Uzi Dayan, the national-security advisor of Israel. The Indian 
delegation was led by Shri R.M.Abhyankar, special secretary (East) in 
the ministry of external affairs. This dialogue was held in the context 
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of India's cooperation with the international community to counter 
the scourge of terrorism and to address this problem in light of United 
Nations Security Council Resolution 1373. Israeli intelligence 
agencies have been intensifying their relations with India's security 
apparatus and are involved militarily within the province of 
Kashmir^"*. 
After the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the 
pentagon, the United States lifted all the sanctions, which were 
imposed on India after its 1998 nuclear tests. This trend reached new 
heights when US has given the go-head to Israel for the sale of the 
Phalcon air- borne radar system worth one billion dollars to 
India^^While Israel sees India as a comrade in the fight against 
'Islamic militants', the US has a somewhat broader agenda to pursue 
with New Delhi, particularly India as a counter-balance to China, 
which US hawks see as Washington's strategic competitor in Asia. 
'India is the most overlooked of our potential allies in a strategy to 
contain china' were the words of Lloyed Richardson of the Hudson 
Institute, a think tank very close to the administration^^. 
Washington put on hold the Phalcon deal last year (2002) when 
Pakistan and India were mobilizing their forces along their common 
border. Tensions between the two countries have since eased 
considerably and there was hope that a new peace initiative by Indian 
140 
Prime Minister, Atal Behari Vajpayee may yield progress. Bui the 
fact that the deal was approved before any indication of serious 
forward movement in the bilateral talks suggests that more hawkish 
forces within the administration are wining the argument over the 
value of tilting evermore sharply in India's direction . India is the 
biggest customer for Israel's sophisticated military industry, which 
last year (2002) ranked 5"^  in the world among all arms exporters, 
after the US, the European Union, Russia and Japan. The Phalcon and 
Arrow deals are likely to propel Israel even higher in the ranking over 
the next few years, arms experts argued. Almost one half of Israel's 
total military sales last year (2002) of $4.2 billion went to 
no 
India .Before the Phalcon deal came up for consideration, Israel sold 
Green pine early warning stations to India for $400 million (US) and 
Barak missiles for $300 million (US). Israel is also refurbishing 
India's fleet of MiG 21s, MiG 29s and T-72 tanks .Non state Israeli 
companies are also involved. Soltam has refitted Russian 133mm 
canon into 155mm howitzers, as well as bidding for a half billion 
dollars tender to fit the canons on trucks. Rafael, the state owned 
corporation for weapons development is hoping to provide Gil anti-
tank missile systems. Meanwhile, the Indian air force is interested in 
Elisra Electronic Warfare systems^^. 
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Ariel Sharon's Visit to India: 
Indo-Israel defense relations were more strengthened when 
Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon, the main culprit behind the 
innocent killings of Sabra and Shatila in Lebanon in 1982, visited 
India in September 2003.He was accompanied with a 150 member 
delegation of officials and business people, including chiefs of major 
arms firms. 'We are very much interested in developing and 
strengthening relations with India' were the words of Israeli prime 
minister to the media reporters at Rashtrapati Bhawan. 'It is a historic 
visit and I am confident it will bring the two countries closer' were 
the words of Indian prime minister-Atal Behari Vajpayee. A senior 
official in Sharon's delegation, had the audacity to declare, 'events 
like September 11, 2001 and the global campaign against world 
terrorism have created an opportunity to create a stronger ties 
between India, Israel and the US and also joining hands to combat 
terrorism in Asia, where we see a large rise in terror activity, 
particularly of the radical Islamic brand''°°. Nothing better could be 
expected from Sharon, a celebrated terrorist himself. He talking of 
combating terrorism was like a devil quoting scriptures. Again the 
BJP leadership was fooled when trade balance tilted heavily in favour 
of Israel. 
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During his visit to India Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon 
cleared the sale of the Phalcon Early Warning Radar System to India. 
The world's most advanced AEWCC (airborne early warning 
command and control) system, the Phalcon, mounted on the Rusian 
IL-76 air craft, costs $ 1 billion and will enable India to have mastery 
of the subcontinent's skies. US have already given green signal to 
Israel for the sale of the Phalcon to India. 'There is no major obstacle 
to the Phalcon deal as the US has given its approval' argued the 
Israeli deputy prime minister Yosef Lapid when he was on a visit to 
India with Ariel Sharon, Israeli prime minister in September 2003 
The Indian security and intelligence agencies with Shin Bet and 
Mossad personnel accompanied their prime minister did not show any 
negligence in the protection of Ariel Sharon when he was in India in 
September 2003. They also restricted his public exposure because of 
his threat perception. 'It is much higher than even Clinton's, when he 
visited India' were the words of a top security official'"". India's 
recent defense ties with Israel which has given the cutting edge to 
India has seriously affected Pakistani missile capability as affirmed 
by Kamal Matanudin the retired general. Officially Pakistan went 
with deep concerns regarding the India's latest defense purchase from 
Israel . Major general Amos Yaron, the director general of Israel's 
ministry of defense accompanied by Colonel Yoash Rubin recionaJ 
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director of SIBAT, the Israeli defense export organization met the 
chief of Air staff, Deputy Air chief, Air Marshal Raghu Rajan, 
Dr.V.K.Aatre. Chief of the Defense Research and Development 
Organization, DRDO, during his visit to India in September 2003. 
DRDO is the agency with which Israel will have to work with for its 
major defense deals with India. The Phalcon radars, Arrow missile, 
Barak antimissile system were the latest defense deals of India with 
Israel'^"*. The Israeli announcement about the imminence of the 
Phalcon deal and their reference to the Arrow offer apart, the Indian 
navy and air force have indicated a marked preference lor Israeli 
electronic warfare systems and surveillance radars. There is 
considerable interest in growing defense supply relationship between 
the two countries. 
For upgrades of lAF and naval aircraft Israel appears to be the 
preferred destination. Besides the MiG-27 upgrade, India is looking 
towards Elta of Israel for the avionics renewal of the Russian made 
Kamov-25 and 28 anti-submarine helicopters. The navy is already 
using Elta radars for its Dornier fleet, which uses ELISRA electronic 
warfare systems. Rafael is also interesting to offer air to ground and 
air-to-air missiles to lAF. With these deals Israel is emerging as the 
main defense supplier to India'°^. After getting an assurance from 
India that it will not leak sensitive defense technology to a third 
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country particularly Iran, Tel Aviv has offered New Delhi partnership 
in the development of a state-of -the- art attack submarine. A 
significant new proposal made by Israel during Sharon's visit to India 
in September 2003 was the co-production of submarines. The two 
sides discussed the likelihood of partnership in producing a 
conventionally powered submarine. The other joint venture the two 
sides are pursuing is the co-production of unmanned aerial vehicles. 
Since 2001, India has purchased eight Searcher and four Heron UAVs 
from Israel for the navy while another squadron has been purchased 
fortheIAF'°^ 
Ariel Sharon during his visit to India had the meetings with 
Indian Prime Minister, deputy prime minister, president, defense 
minister, external affairs minister, finance minister and other Indian 
officials to discuss the bilateral relations'^^. Military cooperation 
between the two states and the measures for tackling the terrorism 
were the main issues discussed by Ariel Sharon with his counter part 
and other Indian officials during his visit to India. 
u A decade after New Delhi and Tel Aviv formally established 
diplomatic relations, the two countries set up a Joint defense 
cooperation group around end-2001. Ostensibly, this was to help India 
plug key gaps in its military capability and to improve its internal 
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security environment, but in reality it was intended to boost flagging 
Israeli military sales in an internationally depressed market. 
Besides, the Hindu Nationalist BJP, which leads a coalition 
government at the centre, also considers Israel its 'natural ally' and 
strategic partner, 'wholly dependable' in times of conflict. 'Russia 
delivers the hardware—tanks, aircraft and ships—and Israel provides 
the smaller weapon systems, the radar, the electronic control systems 
and other high-tech addons' were the words of an Indian military 
official'"^ 
^ Many delegations from India and Israel visited each other's 
country to boost the Indo-Israeli military relations. The recent 
delegation headed by The Israeli premier Ariel Sharon visited India in 
September 2003 also concluded some agreements in the military field. 
Ariel Sharon was the first Prime minister of Israel who tripped India 
in September 2003. Regarding his trip many raised some questions as 
to whom the trip was productive. It was more beneficial to the Israeli 
arms dealers who visited India with Sharon. Currently half of the 
Israel's total military sales of $4.2 billion are purchased by India. 
Before Ariel Sharon's arrival to India the Indian cabinet committee on 
security had approved a huge sum of $97 million worth Israel's 
electronic warfare systems for ships'°^. 
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The Indian budget, therefore, subsidizes the Israeli arms 
infrastructure and in effect the atrocities of the Israeli defense force. 
Even two generally conservative Indian analysts concur that the 
Indian military does not gain immensely from the arms deal. Uday 
Bhaskar of the Institute for Defense studies and Analysis, New Delhi 
noted regarding the arms deals as, 'Israel is not doing us any favors. 
They drive a hard bargain'. Brahma Chellaney of the centre for policy 
research, New Delhi, stated regarding the relationship as, 'It 's a 
patron-client relationship rather than a relationship of equals'"". 
The context for this visit is very significant'". For one, both 
countries are now ruled by coalition governments dominated by the 
hard right, the BJP in one and Likud in the other, while behind the 
curtain US state policy has been hijacked by a core of neo-
conservatives who are far more reactionary than any previous ruling 
clique in Washington. 
Second, the general tenor of the Global War on Terror has 
shifted conflict resolution from rational discussion into the use of 
force. The US invasion of Afghanistan, the occupation of Iraq, the 
renewal of plan Colombia, the insertion of troops into the Philippines, 
and the aggression on the Korean peninsula create a climate of 
legitimacy for Sharon's incursions into the Palestinian Authority 
territory or for Advani's dream of'hot pursuit' into Pakistan. 
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Thirdly, the visit had perhaps more to do with the US's Global 
War on Terror, GWOT, and of the Pentagon's plans for the world than 
it did with the lives of ordinary Indians or Israelis. Prime Minister 
Vajpayee did not announce it in Parliament, nor did Ariel Sharon do 
so in the Kensset. Brajesh Mishra announced the visit in Washington, 
at a 'tribute to US allies', where he hoped for the creation of some 
kind of core alliance or triad"^. Sharon had intended to spend the 
second anniversary of 9/11 in Delhi, a day that now signals not only 
the suicide attacks, but also importantly fealty to the Bush-Pentagon 
interests and the manipulation of every conflict into an anti-Muslim 
campaign. The US continues to occupy Iraq, to label any act of 
resistance as terrorist and to finagle states such as India to send in 
troops to offer target practice for an enraged citizenry. US, state 
department spokesman, Richard Boucher stated regarding the visit of 
Ariel Sharon to India as, 'we are always glad when our friends make 
friends with each other and work together'"^. Israeli Deputy Prime 
Minister Yosef Lapid stated the Indian Council of World Affairs 
during the visit as, 'There is a mutual interest between the three 
countries in making the world a more secure place for all of us. There 
is American support for development of this unwritten axis'. While 
there is no 'formal triangular agreement', an axis had emerged 'in an 
abstract sense and even the US department of state has been hoping 
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that Indo-Israeli relations flourish'""*. The BJP led government in 
India and the Likud-led governments preen and look forward not only 
to more mutual participation, but also to the growth of a formal US-
Israel- India entente against terror. 
Sharon, Advani and Bush, the three faces of the new alliance, 
are eager to profit by the tragedy of the various suicide attacks, to 
bolster the global right and to ensure that their model of security by 
the fist becomes the common sense of the planet. These are the 
'Strategic delusions'"^. 
The official visit of Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon 
underlines the shift in India's West Asia policy, which is bound to 
erode further the country's standing in the Arab World. It was the 
Indian security advisor Mr. Brajesh Mishra who talked much about 
the bogey of terrorism and US-Israel -India triad to combat this bogey 
during a visit to Washington in 2003. External affairs minister 
Jaswant Singh and Home Minister L.K.Advani also had articulated 
the views similar to those of Mishra during their visits to Israel. 
Jaswant Singh went to the extent of saying that it was 'vote bank 
policies' which prevented the two countries from becoming natural 
al l ies"^ 
Jaswant Singh has probably forgotten that India's relations with 
the Arab World was neither a policy of vote bank nor to appease the 
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Arab countries and the Muslim minority in India but a policy which 
was based on the broad principles of anti-colonialism, anti-
imperialism, non-alignment, anti-Zionism and justice. 
The international community has been closely observing the 
growing defense and strategic cooperation between India and Israel, 
especially since the BJP-led government assumed office. In the last 4-
5 years, Israel has emerged as the second biggest supplier of arms to 
India. It is doing more than a billion dollars of business annually. 
Indian officials say that they are particularly obliged to Tel Aviv for 
rushing in urgently needed military equipment during the Kargil 
conflict. They claim that Israel is a reliable supplier though the prices 
it charges are exorbitant, even by the standards of the international 
arms bazaar. Israel has in the last couple of years provided the Indian 
armed forces with sophisticated radar and border monitoring 
systems"^. 
The opposition parties have protested strongly against the 
Indian government's decision to invite Sharon. In a joint statement 
the leaders of the Communist party of India(Marxist), the Communist 
party of India, the Rashtriya Janta Dai, The Janta Dal(secular), the 
Samajwadi party and others described the invitation of the Vajpayee 
government to Sharon as 'a most unfortunate decision'. The statement 
also remarked that to have such a person as an honoured guest is an 
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insult to India's longstanding tradition of unequivocal support to the 
struggle of the Palestinian people for national liberation and an 
independent state. Others remarked the India-Israel alliance as 
against the national interest"^. 
Arab Response Towards Indo-Israel Military Cooperation: 
The growing strategic ties between India and Israel and their 
cooperation in the nuclear field have created serious concerns in the 
Arab World with the Indo-Israeli strategic collaboration gaining 
momentum in recent years; Arab leaders are becoming more vocal 
and critical of it"^. However the Arabs are positive towards the Indo-
Israeli economic cooperation. On August 24, 1999 the Arab League 
for the first time has alleged that both India and Israel have 'military 
and nuclear cooperation' and warned against the consequences for the 
Arab world. Suspicions, about the ties were further reinforced after 
India's Pokhran -II nuclear tests in May 1998. It was propagated that 
India and Israel clandestinely worked to develop India's nuclear 
weaponry. The deputy secretary general of the Arab League, 
Mohammad Zakaria Ismail went to the extent of alleging that the 
'Organization has evidence to prove it'. Arab diplomats further 
alleged that Dr.A.P.J.Abdul Kalam, the chief of the Defense Research 
and Development Organization visited Israel thrice in 1996-97 .Indian 
officials ,however, maintained that Dr.Kalam visited Israel only once 
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and rejected the allegation as 'baseless' and contradicted the Pakistani 
charges that India has acquired nuclear technology from Israel with 
the intention to destroy Pakistan's nuclear capabilities. Arab countries 
are worried about the growing defense cooperation between India and 
Israel and some Arab diplomats felt that Israel was trying to make an 
all-out bid to get lucrative defense projects by playing on India's 
security concerns and threat perceptions. The Arab countries feel that 
the defense ties between India and Israel would have an adverse 
impact on the region and jeopardize peace and security'^". 
During his visit to Israel in May 2000, Indian home minister 
L.K.Advani assessed the prospects of Indo-Israeli nuclear cooperation 
positively: 'I support the expanded cooperation between India and 
Israel in all field including nuclear field'. This further increased Arab 
apprehensions. There were strong protests from the Arab Capitals 
against Advani's comment. The pro-Arab lobby in Delhi became 
active and demanded an explanation from the government. Some 
reports revealed that an Arab ambassador in Delhi went to the extent 
of openly warning India of the 'unpleasant consequences' of its new 
friendship with Israel'^'. 
An Arab diplomat viewed that the Sharon visit could have an 
adverse impact on Indian diplomacy in the Arab world. 'This visit 
will be construed as an anti-Muslim and anti- Arab'. Another 
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diplomat from the West Asia stated that it is not merely a question of 
India and Israel having good relations. 'India has a role to strengthen 
peace, security and human rights. Israel should at least implement the 
road map for peace. By receiving Sharon, India is now encouraging 
Israel in its aggressive policies and human rights violations', said the 
diplomat. He said that during the presence of the Palestinian Foreign 
Minister in New Delhi, India should have sent a strong message to 
19 7 
Israel that it wanted peace and an end to bloodshed in West Asia 
When Yasser Arafat was asked to comment on the recent visit 
of Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon to India, he stated that Mr. Sharon can 
only escalate the situation and war between Pakistan and India'^". 
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A^cuhural Cultural Q^cimce 
and ^ecknoh^cal ^ooperatim 
In the past, that is, prior to diplomatic relations, there were 
limited points of contact between India and Israel. But after developing 
diplomatic ties, trade relations between these two countries have been 
growing'. Soon after the establishment of diplomatic relations between 
the two states in January 1992, the Consulate in Bombay was made 
Consulate General. In addition, there was also an honorary Consulate 
in Calcutta. Since 1992 various agreements have been signed between 
India and Israel. Prior to 1992 there was little direct trade between 
India and Israel. However, trade in diamonds was carried through 
Indian merchants in Israel . 
Moreover, India had brisk economic relations with the Arab 
world, which dates back to the ancient times. In those times, India with 
exportable surplus of resources like coffee, tea, spices and other 
consumer goods had been a centre of big competitive market to the 
West and to the Arab World. India's trade relations are not only 
confined to the consumer and commodity products but also entered 
potential fields like engineering goods, gems, jewellery, chemicals and 
so on, which has widened the scope for trade. Further, India depended 
much on the Arab world for its oil consumption. This indicates that 
Indo-Arab trade relation is a complementary and not competitive one\ 
This emerging trade relationship and mutual economic dependency led 
to the increasing economic and technological cooperation between 
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India and the Arab World in tiie subsequent periods. During the later 
years, it turned out to be a fact that India's main imports from the Arab 
states consisted of oil, cotton, phosphate and dates, where the Arab 
states have alternative and easy source of supply of tea, textile, jute 
and light engineering goods, India's alternative of oil, cotton, 
phosphate are too far away to be commercially advantageous to her''. 
Actually, the oil factor and the Indian manpower in the Gulf 
region influenced the economic relationship further. Some believed 
that these strategic and economic factors have largely conditioned 
India's West Asia policy in a bigger way. The same view was 
substantiated by M.C.Chagla, as "Even our material interest dictated 
the very same policy which we were preserving. There was a large 
volume of trade between India and Arab countries and this would be 
jeopardized if we adopt a pro-Israeli policy"^. 
Because of the tremendous trade relationship between India and 
the Arab States, the state of Israel remained off from the policy 
priorities of India in the region for a long run. But by 1990's some 
events in the world changed the very character of global politics. It 
also brought technological progress and shifted traditional approaches 
to economic policies. Further, the end of the Cold war has unleashed a 
wave of global political integration and the Marrakesh Agreement of 
1994 changed the rules of the global trade^. This changed scenario 
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probably brought both India and Israel closer to each other which 
resulted in the establishment of diplomatic relations between these two 
States in 1992. But the low level of diplomatic relations was a 
deterrent for the development in trade. According to the Israeli Consul 
General Giora Becher:^ 
the official Indian policy on trade with Israel 
is still preventing the public sector from 
dealing with us even if it means spending 
more money or buying less quality products 
else where. Further more, although there is 
no restriction what so ever on the private 
sector to do business with Israel, the political 
atmosphere prevailing between the two 
countries makes many Indian businessmen 
believe it is better not to be engaged in many 
commercial contacts with their Israeli 
counterparts 
By the early 1990 all this started changing. Around the time that 
India and Israel established the diplomatic relations, India globalized 
its economy and opened its doors to economic cooperation with the 
West and the rest of the world. Subsequently, there was a government-
to-government interaction between the two states which led in forging 
of a framework for the trade and economic cooperation. In May 1993, 
the two States signed a Memorandum of Understanding, MOU, and this 
followed by the signing of an agreement on such cooperation in 
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December 1994. This agreement came into action from August 28, 
1995. This agreement grants the Most Favoured Nation, MFN, status to 
both the countries and allowed for import of Indian goods to Israel 
without import permits, except where such permits are required, from 
Q 
all countries under Israeli custom regulations . 
The agreement on customs cooperation was signed in January 
1996. Under the standards of cooperation M.O.U, the Standards 
Institution of Israel (SII) and the Bureau of Indian Standards (BIS) 
have agreed to cooperate in testing of the quality of goods in both the 
countries. The Industrial Research and Development cooperation MOU 
envisaged the setting up of a fund to finance Research and 
Development projects in the private sector, which cover the 
developments of products and applications of commercial use^. The 
final draft of the agreement was initiated in January 1996, besides this, 
the agreements on double taxation and bilateral investments were also 
signed in January 1996. These agreements have smoothened the frame 
work for trade and economic cooperation between the two states. The 
double taxation treaty signed by both the countries widened the 
business relationship between the two markets'". Despite of imposing 
new taxes, this treaty ensured that an entity conducting business in the 
other country will not be exposed to double taxation on the same 
income both in the country of origin and in the country of residence. 
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As a result of this facilitation, the trade volume between the two 
countries has risen by an average of 50% every year from 1992 to 
1996. Steadily from $186 million in 1992 to $386 million in 1995 and 
from $456 million in 1996 it reached to $1004 million inl999" (see 
also Table No. 1). This was five times the level of trade in 1992. 
Amiram Halevy, the Israeli counselor for Economic Affairs remarked 
that, "it was something unexpected". He further said, "A level of one 
billion $ bilateral trade was targeted only for the year 2000, but in 
reality it turned out to be better than expectation"'^. But in 2000 the 
bilateral trade reached to $1009 million. However it declined to $ 857 
million in 2001'^.The trade between the two states is almost limited to 
two major items in both sides. That is, rough diamonds and chemicals 
together form about 63% of Israel's export to India. While as the 
polished diamonds and cotton yarn account for approximately 76% of 
Indian exports to Israel'"*. 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations between these 
two states, many delegates from both the countries visited each other 
for exploring the market opportunities. The delegates from Israel 
included Ministers of External Affairs, Finance, Industry, Trade. 
Telecom, Agriculture and various other dignitaries from different firms 
and associations'^. But the recent visit of Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon 
to India in September 2003 is considered very important as he was the 
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first Israeli Prime Minister who visited India since the establishment of 
the diplomatic relations between the two countries. Six bilateral 
agreements in different fields have been signed during his visit . From 
the Indian side, the high level delegation included Ministers of 
Finance, Commerce, Agriculture and chief Ministers of various states. 
These visits have led to the signing of a series of bilateral agreements 
between the two governments'^. The outcome of these exchanges of 
visits by the delegations of both the countries was the increased 
cooperation and Joint Ventures in industries and trade. Israelis believe 
that the Joint ventures could be the best way of doing business with 
India ' l 
Joint Ventures: 
Joint venture is an area where both the countries find common 
areas of cooperation. Ofri, the Israeli Economic Counselor stated:'^ 
The best way to promote trade between India 
and Israel is through joint ventures, as India 
has a well trained workforce of dedicated 
engineers and scientists as well as technology 
minded companies. While Israel has good 
connection with the US and Europe, India has 
direct access to Asia and the third world 
In this context, Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. And Solel of 
Israel has jointly set up a solar power plant at accost of Rs. 4 billion in 
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Rajasthan^". The first ever Indo-Israel joint venture was made between 
Piastre Gvat and Indian company—Finolex in February 1992 in the 
field of Drip irrigation^'. Also, a phosphate plant has been setup with 
joint collaboration of the Gujarat industrial cooperation and Titegarh 
Steel mills with Rolem fertilizers of Israel^^. Some other Israeli 
companies which have agreed for the joint venture were: Amcor and 
solar (solar energy), Rahan (tissue culture), Tahal (water management), 
Gadot (citric acid), Zinkal (irrigation pipes), Netafim (drip irrigation), 
Dan (irrigation) and others . 
Both the countries also have signed qp agreement on the 
establishment of a Joint Business council. In late 1992, a high power 
delegation of Manufacture's Association of Israel visited India in a bid 
to explore markets for their products. However, the first industrial 
mission to Israel was led by Jamshed Irani, the president of the 
Chamber of Indian industry in September 1992. This was initiated by a 
mutual programme in Joint ventures, trade agreements and mutually 
beneficial export and import programmes^''. And as part of it CII 
signed on MOU with Manufactures Association in September 1992. It 
has been assumed that Israel's access with the US and EEC could be 
converted for better market access to Indian goods. Likewise, India's 
links with South East Asian countries could be utilized for Israel's 
access to the region. 
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After the establishment of ambassadorial relations in 1992 a 
brisk and probably never ending traffic at the highest level has been 
going on not just at the government level but also at the level of private 
industrialists and businessmen. A number of projects in electronics, 
computer and agricultural sectors are operating under Israeli experts. 
The active development of Indo-Israeli economic cooperation within 
the short time is an amazing phenomenon. The India-Israel Business 
Alliance formed in October 1996 to promote the business industry and 
trade has a dynamic impact on cooperate sectors. To continue the 
momentum of the bilateral trade between the two countries commerce 
Minister Mr. Arun Jaitely visited with a high-level delegation to Tel 
Aviv recently in January 2004 to attend the third session of the India-
Israel Joint trade and economic Committee.^^ 
Indian companies also have shown their keen interest in doing 
business with the Israeli counterpart. The Confederation of Indian 
Industry CII, organized a seminar on "Indo-lsraeli Business 
Opportunities" on 15 April 1993. The Manufacture's Association of 
Israel MAI, was represented by it's the then president, Mr. Dov 
Lautman. In his presentation, he underlined the advantageous position 
of both India and Israel in trading with each other. While the India can 
provide Israel cheap labor, both skilled and unskilled, Israel can 
provide India with advanced technology. More over, the absence of 
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language barrier will also help trade and make its future prospect 
brighter^^. 
During 1999, a series of high-level contacts between the 
Information Technology Associations of India and Israel were initiated 
in order to exploit the competitive advantages the two countries 
possessed in the fast growing field. The electronics and computer 
software export promotion council EPC and Electronic Industrial 
Association of Israel have signed an MOU. Also, National Association 
of Software and Services Companies NASSCOM, signed an agreement 
for closer cooperation with their counterparts, Israeli association of 
soft ware houses, lASH. Above all, a major development in 1999 was 
the fmalization of the details of an agreement for Joint Research and 
Development between D.S.I.R and the chief scientist of Israel. They 
together moved for an area of cooperation between the two states in the 
area of Bio-technology, Life science technology, Pharmaceuticals, 
Agricultural food technology. Scientific and Medical instrumentations. 
Electronics, Automation, Aero space and Environment^^. 
Besides, the 14'*' International Agricultural Exhibition, Agritech-
99 was held at Haifa from September 5 -9, 1999. This was attended by 
a large number of visitors from India. During the same period, two 
delegations of small Business Authority of Israel and Federation of 
Israeli Chambers of Commerce made direct talks with their 
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Counterparts in India. Because of these developments, India Trade 
Promotion Organization ITPO, held a first ever India week in Tel Aviv 
in May 2000 to project the Indian Industrial strength and business 
opportunities to the Israel Market . Over hundred leading Indian 
companies participated in the India week programe, which turned out 
to be a milestone in the trade relations between the two countries^'\ 
Many delegations from India and Israel visited each other's 
country in order to increase awareness and to explore the economic 
ties. Notable visitors from Israel were the ministers of External Affairs, 
Industry and Trade, agricultural and the delegations from the 
Manufacturers Association of Israel, Federation of Israeli Chamber of 
Commerce, Electronics Association of Israel as well as several top 
raking Companies ^". However the recent visit of Israeli Premier, Ariel 
Sharon with his delegation to India in September 2003 is considered as 
the most important one from the Israeli side. During his stay both the 
countries signed six agreements in different fields ^'. Ministers of 
Finance, Commerce, Agriculture, and the many State Chief Ministers 
and the representatives of various Industrial Associations have been 
visited to Israel from the Indian side. During these visits, a number of 
bilateral agreements were signed between the two governments ^ .^ But 
the visits of the Indian Home Minister Mr. Lai Krishna Advani 
followed by the visit of the Indian External Affairs Minister, Mr. 
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Jaswant Singh to Israel in 2000 are considered the most important 
visits from the Indian side so far . 
Cooperation in Tourism and Culture: 
After the commencement of diplomatic relations, the number of 
Indian tourists to Israel and Israeli tourists to India increased 
considerably. This was mainly due to the historical and other cultural 
peculiarities of the two states. One of the Israeli ambassadors to India 
expressed his words:^ "* 
Every corner in Israel is history...Israel is 
great centre of attraction of tourists. The 
major centres are Bethlehem, Nazarath, and 
the Sea of Galilee and so on. Another is 
Kibbuts, which is the only communist society. 
There are minor collective farming 
communities in which a member does not 
have property but works according to What 
Marx said—according to his ability and 
according to his needs. It is a unique 
phenomenon. 
In the early 1992, soon after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations 3000 to 4000 visas had been issued to Indian citizens to visit 
Israel. This included pilgrims, businessmen, tourists and those visiting 
their relatives ^^ Similarly, the Israelis are also fascinated by the 
Indian tradition, culture and civilizations. This is evident from the 
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number of visitors who visited India. By 1993, i.e. after the 
establishment of the ambassadorial relations between the two states 
50,000 Israelis visited India ^^ . In 2000, their nmnber reached 
approximately to one lakh" 
When Shimon Peres visited India in May 1993 Agreements in 
•JO 
Tourism and culture were signed between the two states . The 
agreement on tourism envisaged for mutual promotion and publicity. It 
also undertakes to take measures for simplifying the formalities 
required for trips. Shimon Peres visited India with a large number of 
Israeli industrialists and businessmen. This was significant because it 
showed that Israel was earnestly interested in India and in doing 
business with India " .^ Peres believed that India and Israel could set up 
joint ventures in many fields were Israel had a strong scientific 
research base '*°. According to him Israel was more than eager to extend 
its cooperation to India in the technological and agricultural fields '*'. 
When Peres visited India, the Arab League issued a statement in 
Delhi and appealed India government to use its influence with Israel to 
make it stop its policy of economic siege and starvation in the occupied 
territories. The left parties and the Janta Dal also urged the government 
to make full bilateral ties with Israel conditional on Tel Aviv's 
recognition of an Independent Palestinian State. The BJP was in a 
celebratory mood from the very outset, characterizing the Peres visit as 
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a vindication of its foreign policy platform. Peres evidently 
reciprocated the BJP's feeling and became the first visiting dignitary 
after a long time to meet the leader of the opposition, L.K.Advani. In 
fact, Peres was the first important foreign leader to meet the BJP leader 
after the demolition of the Babri Masjid 
Tourism has become a common spot for people to people 
contact. Though tourists as such do not flow heavily to Israel, the 
visitors consist mainly pilgrims visiting to the holy city of Jerusalem. 
In August 1997 the government of India opened its Tourist office at 
Tel Aviv to encourage bilateral tourism'*^. As, such bilateral tourism is 
supposed to flourish in the specific context of cultural contacts 
between the two societies. 
Actually, the cultural cooperation between the two societies 
dates back to the very emergence of both the states. In their days of 
persecution some of the Jews found shelter in India. The cultural and 
the tradition of India protected their identity and promoted their well-
being. The absence of diplomatic relationship was not at all a hurdle 
for closer cultural interaction between the two societies. Hence, Jewish 
are fascinated to India and its culture. This could be seen in Israel that 
some of the Streets in Israel are named after Tagore and Gandhi. 
India's appreciation for Jewish artists was open in 1960's as the 
famous Jewish Violinist, Yehudi Menuhin, was chosen to receive the 
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Jawaharlal Nehru Award for International understanding in 1968 
The Israeli Consulate, after its establishment in Bombay has initiated 
variety of cultural programmes to catch up with the trend. This 
included symposia, debates, lectures, exhibition and literary events. By 
this time, the veterans from both the societies have traveled to each 
other's capital. 
In 1993, India and Israel signed a cultural agreement and a 
framework programme for cultural cooperation for the period of 1993-
1996. The agreements for the exchange of Scholars between Tel Aviv 
University and Banaras Hindu University, The Israeli Academy of 
Science and Humanities and University Grants Commission and 
Barllan University and Hyderabad University were made in June 
1994'* .^ As per the same Israel agreed to seven scholarships annually to 
students from India for Post-Graduate and Post-doctoral studies. The 
scholarships cover West Asian and International studies, Jewish 
culture, Hebraic studies and Agriculture''^. As part of the academic 
exchange programe, the Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis 
IDSA organized an annual seminar with the Jaffe Centre for Strategic 
Studies, Tel Aviv University. More over, during the visit of Israeli 
Minister for Education, A R Ubinstein, in January 1996, a proposal for 
the establishment of a chair in Hebrew Studies at Jawaharlal Nehru 
University has been proposed and agreed upon. 
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Inspite of these academic collaborations, there was fast growing 
Cultural exchanges between the two societies. Leading cultural 
performers and groups have traveled between Delhi and Jerusalem, 
Mumbai and Tel Aviv and performed in front of packed houses. These 
visits have touched nearly every sphere of culture, music, dance, art, 
literature and so on. 
The major highlights of these activities included some cultural 
festivals organized in both the countries. This included the visit of 
Zubin Mehta to Israel and the Israel Philanthropic orchestra to India in 
1994 and the participation of Zakir Hussain in the 1996 Israel festival 
in Jerusalem ''^. The other important cultural exchanges included The 
Gathering 1995, the screening of films and discussion with film 
director, Arnon Zodak in 1997, Israel's participation in the Delhi 
International Book Fair, 1996 and Shalom India events ''*. 
Similarly, India's representation in Israel included the annual 
Indian participation in the Jerusalem Film Festival, and Vikram Seth's 
visit to Jerusalem poet festival in 1997. This also included the 
Publication of the Hebrew translation of *A Suitable Boy' and Mallika 
Sarabahai's dancing programe. During March 1998, in response to the 
visit of a 33 member Israeli dance group to India, a 6 member 
Bharatantyam troop led by Alarmel Valli visited Israel''^. 
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In addition to this, the bilateral scholarship programes allow 
young Israelis to learn about Dance, Music and Sanskrit in India. 
Equally, a large number of Indian students visit Israel to study about 
West Asia, the Hwbrew language. Literature and Agriculture. In this 
context, the cultural treaty, signed in 1993 meant the exchange of 
mutual support for sharing the two cultures within the framework of 
the treaty. Two detailed cultural exchange programes CEP have also 
been signed and implemented. The second C.E.P was also signed 
during the visit of President Ezer Weizman in late December 1996. 
This included future plans for a further increase of exchanges between 
museums, more academic interaction and mutual participation in 
Golden Jubilee Celebrations in 1997 and 1998^°. The joint committee 
for C.E.P met again in early 2000 and signed a new cooperation plan 
for the year 2000-2002^'. 
Again in 1997, Israeli embassy organized the Shalom India 
Festival, a month long celebration to mark India's 50"' anniversary and 
five years of diplomatic relations. The festival included a fashion 
show, a dance performance, a food festival and film shows. In 1998 
also, Israel's leading theatre actress and film actress, Gila Almagor 
visited India. Later, in the same year, a leading Jazz quintet from Israel 
collaborated with Ustad Zakir Hussain to produce a joint performance 
in Delhi. In 1999 also, the Embassy organized a festival to celebrate 
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Israel's SO"' anniversary. The festival featured the diversity of Israel's 
culture. This was held in eight states; from Orissa in the East to 
Gujarat in the West, from Tamil Nadu in the South to Rajasthan in the 
North. Another joint project was a workshop on Israel by two 
prominent artists—Menashe Kadishman of Israel and Jalin Das of 
India". 
Finally, with the opening of an Israeli Cultural Centre in New 
Delhi, a new chapter was added to the already initiated cultural 
exchange programes and schemes. This included Hebrew classes, 
lectures, film shows, cultural discussions and expansion of the 
Department of East Asian studies at Tel Aviv University to include a 
track in Indian and Sanskrit studies^^. It was also envisaged to plan 
similar programmes at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi and 
at Hebrew University in Jerusalem. 
These varying cultural programmes have attained its own 
novelty and wisdom that the CEP was accepted by many in both the 
countries. This and the like programmes facilitated the students, artists 
of both the societies to actively learn about the features of their 
respective cultures and traditions. 
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Agricultural Cooperation: 
Since the establishment of diplomatic relations, the cooperation 
in the Agricultural sector has turned out to be a solid and unique one. 
So far, a number of Joint venture Agricultural projects were initiated in 
India. This was mainly in the fields of irrigation, water management, 
fertilizers, greenhouses, chemicals, pesticides, insecticides, tissue 
culture, horticulture, use of solar energy, animal husbandry, dairy 
development and so on. Israel's know-how in agriculture, pertaining to 
these areas and power and food industries were also included in the 
Joint venture projects ^''. 
Actually, in short history of bilateral relations between the two 
countries, cooperation in Agricultural sector, is one of the best 
exploited and explored one by the two parties. By the signing of an 
agreement for cooperation in the field of agriculture, in December 
1993, it assumed unique dimensions. The agreement was signed 
between Balram Jhakar, the then Indian Agriculture Minister and his 
counterpart Yaakov Tour. Also they held wide ranging discussions on 
promoting bilateral cooperation in this sector^^. Both the states have 
agreed that the application of the technology in India would also lead 
to the solution of the intractable problems of water logging and soil 
alkalinity. This technology could be successfully applied in 
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confronting deserts in Rajasthan and Gujarat and in increasing 
agricultural productivity in the semi-arid areas of Maharashtra . 
Israel has utilized its marginal water resources to make the 
desert bloom. Its strides in horticulture, aquaculture and floriculture 
and arid-zone farming hold applications for India. Indians hope to use 
Israeli expertise to do the same in Rajasthan and other semi-arid 
en , 
States . Earlier, Tel Aviv had organized an Agro-Tech exhibition m 
May 1993. Maharashtra the then Chief minister Shard Pawar led a six 
member delegation to the exhibition in Israel. The delegation included 
Union Agriculture Secretary M.S.Gill and Punjab Minister for 
cooperation and others. About 600 farmers from Maharashtra and more 
about 300 more from Andhra Pradesh, Karnataka, Punjab and Haryana 
were also there. The exhibition had generated great interest in the 
Indian farming community. The delegation had acquired and 
familiarized themselves with the technologies for optimum water use 
and productivity" . 
Subsequently, several proposals for joint ventures especially in 
the areas of seed production and manufacture of agricultural/ 
manufacturing machinery have been formulated pilot-projects and 
turnkey projects have also been identified for promoting Indo-Israeli 
cooperation in the Agricultural sector. Besides, a traveling seminar was 
also organized jointly by the Israeli and Indian experts and arranged a 
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visit to Indra Gandhi Canal and desert areas of Rajasthan. It was hoped 
that the same would help in evolving appropriate water management 
and micro-planning in these areas. 
In this context, the planned development of linkages between 
Ben-Gurion Desert University of Negev and an Indian Academic and 
Research Institute such as Rajasthan Agricultural University was 
envisaged to promote the scientists of the two countries in an exchange 
of ideas in the fields of desert stabilization, water management, and 
ply-green house technology and so on. India was very much optimistic 
in exploring the cooperation in this sector. She felt satisfied that the 
industry level collaboration were being underway for manufacture of 
drip-irrigation system, tissue culture, hybrid seed production and 
manufacture of farm machinery. Further, an MOU to stabilize 
cooperation in this sector was also finalized ^^ . 
J Israel was also ready to share their technology to the demands 
from India. A five day visit to India by the then Israeli president, Ezer 
Weizman in December 1996 opened a new chapter in Indo-Israeli 
cooperation. His visit was the first ever visit to India by the head of the 
state of Israel. Visualizing the future role of India he stated, "the 21^' 
century belongs to East- China, Japan, Indonesia and India will take its 
place in the technology world"''". Regarding the cooperation between 
India and Israel, he argued, "we will help each other, not teach each 
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other"^'. During his visit to India four bilateral agreements were signed 
between the two countries . President Weizman who was leading the 
delegation of the Israeli businessmen who came to India in December 
1996 offered his country as a base for re-exporting Indian goods to the 
US, Europe and other countries with which Israel has close political 
and economic links. Israel has free trade agreements with the Western 
markets, which, according to the Israeli delegation, will help India to 
access these markets more easily. It may be noted that Israeli Economy 
would also get an outlet to the rich markets of East and South East 
Asia through India ^ .^ During President Weizman's visit in December 
1996, an Indo-Israeli Research and Development Farm were 
inaugurated in the Indian Agricultural Research Institute, lARl at Pusa 
in New Delhi ^^. The farm would demonstrate the Israeli know-how in 
high-tech agriculture and would endaevour to find different techniques 
and methods of cultivation suitable for the diverse agro-climatic zones 
of India ^ .^ The demonstration farm in Pusa institute is a joint venture 
undertaken by the government of Israel and India. The farm is 
operating since November 1999. Within this farm, through training 
programes local farmers are given instructions on various effective 
measures of crop growing as well as water conservation to increase the 
growth yield. The purpose of the farm is to demonstrate the cultivation 
of different kinds of crops, through the use of sophisticated irrigation 
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technology and methods of crop protection, two fields in which Israel 
has special expertise. The farm serves as a centre for training in 
various aspects related to the farm technologies, management and so 
on. The farm grows some kinds of crops, vegetables and flowers '. 
Also, during the same visit, a cotton demonstration farm in 
Alkola in Maharashtra was established in collaboration with the state 
government and agriculture development company, AGRIDEV, in 
Israel. Further, a series of projects with many state governments in 
India have been initiated. This included the projects between the 
Punjab Agro-Industries cooperation and Ozcot Company of Israel and 
the Indo-Israel demonstration farm in the field of dairy development in 
Karnal. Besides, the proposal for setting up a hundred cows' dairy farm 
by Israeli design, the Israeli Dairy Board and Punjab government 
signed an MOU to establish the modern satellite dairy farm in Punjab ^^ . 
J Tahal, the Israeli water management company is engaged in 
Rajasthan, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu for waste land development, 
irrigation and water and modern agricultural pilot projects. Israeli 
company in the field of agriculture has provided turn-key projects for 
the establishment of tissue culture laboratories in India. Way back in 
1997, an executive agreement was signed between the two nations for 
future progrme of action in this sector. This also included the 
programmes for establishment of green houses, open field facilities, 
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infra structure and technical assistance, training and management for 
specific periods ^^ A steering Committee was also constituted 
comprising experts from both the countries to monitor the entire 
programes. It was also decided to provide twenty-five training 
scholarships for participants from India, particularly in the fields of 
irrigation, protected agriculture and horticultural production. 
Thus, the collaboration in agriculture has turned out to be one of 
the most attractive and explored one by both the states since the 
commencement of the diplomatic relations. 
So far, there are some 150 joint ventures between India and 
Israeli companies. Most of them are in the sphere of agriculture. 
Israel's famous drip irrigation systems are jointly manufactured in 
three different locations in India. These ventures enjoy participation by 
Israel's leading agricultural companies. Agriculture is still the field for 
which Israel is best known in India, as can be witnessed in Indian 
participation in Agritech, Israel's triannual agricultural exposition 
(held last in 1996 and 1999). However, cooperation also exists in other 
sectors, such as telecommunications, including joint manufacturing of 
high speed modems, voice-mail systems and fiber optic production and 
software where a couple of companies have setup their offices as well 
as R and D centers in India^^ This indicates that both the states have 
184 
shown the interest towards the areas of common interests and mutual 
benefits. 
Ephrahim Dowek in an interview stated: 
we have a special experience of developments 
which we think is nearer to the needs of 
developing countries like India, because it is 
the summing up of a new experience of the 
last 50 years. 
Science and Technology Cooperation: 
Besides agriculture, Science and technology too assumes greater 
dimensions in the bilateral cooperation between India and Israel. Way 
back in 1993, an agreement on Science and technology was signed 
between the two states during the visit of the then Israeli foreign 
minister, Shimion Peres. This agreement stood for direct scientific and 
technological cooperation between governmental agencies, academies 
of science, research institutes, and enterprises, institutions of higher 
education and scientific communities of the two states ^'. 
However, a detailed work plan was finalized in September 1993, 
identifying specific areas of cooperation namely bio-technology. 
Lasers, electro-optics and information technology. In November 1994, 
during the visit of the Israeli minister for communications and science 
and technology, Shulamit Aloni, the two governments installed an 
agreement setting up a science and technology fund with a corpus of $ 
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three million ^^ . This was made possible by equal share by both the 
governments to facilitate joint R and D projects in the areas identified 
for cooperation. 
Subsequently, a meeting of the Joint Working group and a 
Seminar on advanced materials was held in July 1996 in Israel. The 
next meeting of the Joint Working Group and a seminar on 
Biotechnology was held in March 1997 in Delhi. Some research 
projects are underway. In 1999, another one was extended for the 
research on 'Human genome' . The project found enthusiasm and 
interest in both the states and a series of collaborative endeavours on 
'Human genome' have been initiated in 2000. The Joint Committee 
which met in New Delhi in 1997 agreed that four to six Indian 
researchers will visit Israel in 1998 for a period of four to six weeks 
each. So far, four such visits have been approved and undertaken. 
Thus, there has been an impressive representation of Israeli and Indian 
scholars in International Scientific conferences in both the countries 
and also there is a regular flow of Indian students of advanced studies 
to Israel ''\ 
The tempo of bilateral cooperation is reflected in the Bi-national 
conferences that have already taken place. At first, a bi-national 
conference on genetics and research on human genome was organized 
in Israel in 1998. This conference was attended by six Indian scholars. 
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Second bilateral symposium on current issues of condensed matter and 
material physics took place in Delhi in the beginning of 1999. In this 
conference over twenty Israeli students participated . The momentum 
gained in the scientific sector is reflected in the sharing of technology 
as well. Tahal Consulting Engineering LTd, an Israel based 
multinational Company, has entered an agreement with several Indian 
partners in the field of engineering, ground water management, de-
salination, agro-industries and prevention of desertification. Already, 
this firm has played an active role in the development of Israel's water 
resources, agricultural industry and infrastructure. It has signed an 
MOU with the state governments of Gujarat and Rajasthan for the 
transfer of technical know-how . Likewise, Tadiran, Israel's leading 
electronic industry is also cooperating with India in transfer of 
technology and production on sharing arrangements. 
An agreement has also been signed between the Indian Science 
Academy and Israeli National Academy of science and Humanities for 
providing regular cooperation and exchange in the field of science and 
technology. In this regard, discussions have been held regarding 
collaboration in the field of commercial application of solar energy, 
operationalisation of Indian solar energy on the lines of those in Israel, 
Joint R and D with the Weizman Institute in a project for direct 
conversion of solar energy into steam and petrochemical refining ^ .^ 
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The fourth indo-lsraeli joint committee meeting on science and 
technology was held in Jerusalem on 3'^'^ of November 1999. The 
meeting finalized four proposals for joint research projects in the area 
of human genome research . In short, there was a very healthy 
bilateral relationship in almost all the areas of common interest 
between the two countries. On January 22, 2002 Indo-lsraeli 
cooperation attained yet another zenith, this time in the field of 
electronics and information technology close on the heels of the 
Deputy Prime Minister Shimon pere's visit to India, communication 
and information technology minister of India Shri Pramod Mahajan 
made a three day visit to Israel with an auspicious proposal up his 
sleeve very earnestly, the two countries signed a MOU to promote 
bilateral trade in electronics and information technology, thus giving a 
fillip to research and development activities and technology transfer 
between the two countries. The memorandum was signed between Shri 
Mahajan and his Israeli counterpart, Mr. Reuven Rivlin, as a first step 
towards the establishment of a framework for cooperation between the 
two countries in information technology and electronics. Earlier, an 
agreement had been initiated in the area of telecom and posts in 1994 
that came into effect from 1998. This new agreement would enhance 
industrial and technical competitiveness of both countries through 
cooperation in industrial research and development. Besides, the 
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memorandum would add further bytes to technology transfer potential 
between the two countries. One of the areas India is keen on enhancing 
with the applications of this cooperation is the defence sector. During 
Mr. Mahajan's visit to Israel in 2002 he also called upon the defense 
minister of Israel, Binyamin Ben- Elizer, which clearly indicated that 
India is very much interested to utilize the Israeli information 
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technology techniques in its defense sector . 
India and Israel also have signed various agreements to 
cooperate in Space Research in an effort to benefit from each other's 
experience and form an alliance to reach out to the global market. The 
agreements were signed during the visit of the Chairman of the Indian 
Space Research Organization ISRO, K. Kasturirangan to Israel in 
August 2003. The ISRO chief also met the Israel's Science and 
Technology Minister, Eliezer Sandberg, and the Director of Israel 
Space Research, Avi Hareven and exchanged the information regarding 
on 
the ongoing developments in Space Research 
At the economic level, relationship between India and Israel has 
been showing some upward trend almost since 1992. The total bilateral 
trade showed some increase after the establishment of diplomatic 
relations. In 1991 the total trade between the two States was 129 US $ 
million. However, slowly increase year by year pushed the trade to 
1099 US $ million in 2000. India's exports to Israel are mainly 
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tgyi iHi* 
precious stones and jewelry, cotton yarn, fabrics, drugs, 
pharmaceuticals, and so on . Whereas the Israeli exports to India 
apart from pearls, fertilizers are the military arms, which are being sold 
to India worth million dollars. Defense analysts estimated that Israel 
sold weapons to India crossed $ 500 million during the 1997-2000 
By 2001, India had signed weapons contracts worth $ 2 billion with 
Israel*^. Recently the Israeli Cabinet headed by Ariel Sharon has 
approved the sale of Phalcon Airborne Warning and Control Systems 
worth US $ 1.1 million*'*. It is clear from the above estimations that 
India is providing the market to Israel for selling her arms worth 
million US dollars to India. From the above estimation, one can easily 
analyze that India is being treated by Israeli arms exporters as 
conducive market, which could be exploited by them even if they sold 
their hardware at exorbitant price. Indo-Israel arms trade is unilateral. 
Arms from Israel to India. Only the pretext is combating terrorism and 
fundamentalism. This is high time top echelons in the government 
realize and save the poor Indian taxpayers from misery. 
On the other hand, India's relation with the Arabs dates back to 
many centuries. The intensive interaction among the people of Arabia 
and the Indian subcontinent since centuries was primarily promoted by 
trade, which saw the flowering of the two-way exchanges that have left 
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their imprint also on literature, lifestyles and the languages of the two 
85 
regions 
India's trade relations with the Arabs are growing fast since 
decades. The oil, which is in abundance in the Arab World, has built 
these trade relations very much strong and almost still overwhelming. 
India is heavily dependent on this oil of Arabia. Almost the GCC 
countries including Iran presently account for almost all of the India's 
oil imports *^ . Ever since OPEC became an effective cartel in 1973-74, 
oil has become the biggest single Indian import. Now in this age 
(1990's), India's security hinges critically on the oil exporting 
countries of the region (Arab/Gulf). Analysts point out that India can 
easily lose a war for its poor petroleum policies ^^ . It was thought that 
India's stakes were much higher in the region, as according to one 
analyst, "the Gulf is our lifeline as much as that of the West. We could 
be thwarted much more easily by development in this region" . Even 
though at the time of the invasion of Iraq, India had major economic 
stakes in both Iraq and Kuwait. India was importing crude oil from Iraq 
to the tune of 2.2 millions tons and 1.5 millions from Kuwait. Further, 
there were around 170000, Indian workers in both Iraq and Kuwait 
when the crisis broke out^^. 
The total indo-Arab trade reached $4463 million in 1990 and in 
1991, it stood at $4232 million. In the following year, the total 
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bilateral trade between Arab and India reached $6415 million. In this 
year, India established the diplomatic relations with Israel but this step 
could not reach the trade figures of India and Arab in the same year or 
after that. India's trade relations with the Arabs were overwhelming 
not only prior to the establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel 
but are still increasing and overwhelming and are still higher than 
Israel. The Indo-Arab trade which was $4232 million in 1991, reached 
$6727 million inl993 and the trade stood at $10448 million in 1996, 
whereas it touched $9941 million in 2000.On the other hand the Indo-
Israel trade was $129 million in 1991 and in 1993 it reached $370 
million but in 2000 it reached $1099 million.^'' (See tables 1, 2). 
From the trade figures mentioned above, it is clear that Indo-
Arab trade is overwhelming than its trade with Israel. The oil, which is 
mainly imported from the Arabs, has increased the trade levels. This 
oil is playing a very much significant role in the Industrial 
development in India. On the other hand, the arms and ammunitions 
that are being imported worth of million dollars from Israel can 
strangle the industrial development since huge amount is being wasted 
on the purchase of Israeli arms and ammunitions. 
Moreover above three million Indian workers are working in the 
Gulf States. They constitute the largest proportion of the total foreign 
population living in the Gulf region as whole, as well as in each of the 
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gulf countries, ranging from 21.5% in Kuwait to 54% in Oman, from 
25.4% in Saudi Arabia to 41.1% in UAE. 
It means that the Gulf is playing a significant role in minimizing 
the job crisis in India by providing jobs to millions of Indian workers 
in the region. The Indian expatriates remit some four billion dollar per 
annum to India^'. It should be noted that Israel's recent step of 
recruiting Indian workers in their hotels is minimal compound to 
millions of Indian workers already working in the Gulf and sending 
remittances strengthening Indian economy. 
As far as India's, trade relations with Israel one can deduce that 
through this relationship Israelis have gained immensely and India 
meagerly. While Israeli exports to India are of larger volume, the 
Indian exports are negligible. The trade relations between the two 
countries at this stage are titled heavily to Israel's advantage at a heavy 
cost of Indian taxpayers money and without dividends in real terms. 
Moreover, the tables depict that trade volume with the Arab world is 
very substantial and India cannot afford to annoy the Arabs at the cost 
of its newfound trade relations with Israel. 
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Table-6: India's Imports of Petroleum Crude and Products 













































































Source: Centre for Monitoring Indian Economy, Cited in Girijesh 
Pant, "India's Energy Security: The Gulf Factor", GSP 
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The Zionists, the Jansangh and the BJP: Ideological Affinity: 
The tragic partition of Palestine under the auspices of the United 
Nations had catapulted the Zionists as leaders of the newly created 
state of Israel. Soon they were busy in mustering support among those 
nations and leaders who had opposed the partition. India was a major 
State, needless to reamphasise, which had stood by the principles of 
liberty of the peoples all over the world. It had stood for the majority 
of Arabs in Palestine as against Zionist occupation of their land. 
Nevertheless, importance of India as a leader of the newl)' Afro-Asian 
I 
nations was not lost to the Zionists. Earlier they had tried to win over 
Gandhi as well as Nehru for their own ends and they had failed 
miserably in this venture. With the establishment of Israel, they again 
renewed their efforts. However, Nehru- the architect of India's Foreign 
policy brushed their pleas aside. Nehru was emphatic when he was 
approached by Moshe shertok in 1948, 'His government had decided to 
defer consideration of this question'. He further stated, "'rhc obvious 
I 
reasons were that a new state was formed and we had to wait. Normally 
we should have to be satisfied and know exactly that the international 
position before taking any step' . 
India had friendly relations with the Arabs. She had no wish to 
do any thing, which might hurt the Arab feeling. However India's 
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recognition of Israel was announced on 17" of September 1950. The 
statement made by the Indian government at that time: 
'India will always value the friendship of Egypt and other Arab 
states' said the press communique of the ministry of external affairs. A 
spokesman of the ministry of external affairs disclosed that "a 
memorandum has been received from the Egyptian government, urging 
the postponement of the recognition of Israel until, her attitude towards 
I 
the Arab refugees question has been clarified. In response to this 
memorandum (from the government of Egypt) the Indian government 
iterated that:^ 
the recognition of Israel does not mean that 
there is no difference between India's attitude 
and that of Israel over the questions like the 
status of Jerusalem and Israeli frontiers. 
These questions would be judged by India on 
merits and due regard would be given to the 
Arab claims. 
India after its independence in 1947 was charting out its own 
course of action along with African and Arab Nation States who had 
i 
recently thrown the yoke of imperialism. Non-alignment was the new 
mantra, which had brought leaders from diverse backgrounds like 
Marshall Tito, Gamal Abdul Nasser, Sukarno and Nehru together to 
1 
pursue independent policies as against ruthless interests of the West. 
At this juncture, the pursuation of the Zionists for India's support was 
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nothing but an anathema since Zionism and its aims were diametrically 
opposite to what Afro-Asian Nationalism and non-alignment stood for. 
Nevertheless, there were in India, a section of people who 
thought otherwise. For them friendship with Arabs was merely a ploy 
to appease the Indian Muslims. For them the Palestinian cause was of 
1 
no value. The massive trade with the Arab World and remittances India 
was receiving on account of millions of Indian working in the Gulf was 
of no consequence to them. Their heart felt desire was friendship with 
Israel. This had a background. 
The Bharatiya Karya Samiti- a wing of Janasangh of 1948 would 
see the state of Israel in different light. They passed a resolution on 
Israel in January 1965:^ 
Israel is the only really democratic country in 
West Asia. It is a highly developed country 
and has been playing an increasing important 
role in the economic development of newly 
emerging African countries with which she 
has developed very good relations By 
developing closer relations with Israel, India 
would not only contribute to stability in the 
region but will also improve her position in a 
number of African states. It is therefore 
imperative that India must have full 
diplomatic relations with Israel. 
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The Jana Sangh demands the establishment of full diplomatic 
relations with Israel. The party argues that when the USA and Russia, 
the UK and Yugoslavia and the countries such as Ethiopia and Ghana, 
Kenya can have diplomatic relations with Israel and Arab countries, it 
does not make any sense why India must alone insult Israel and the 
world Jews in a stupid bid to appease the Arabs. The party believes 
that India can partly checkmate Pakistani influence in the Middle East 
1 
by normalizing the relations with the state of Israel. The Jana Sangh 
argued that Why India should side with the Arabs against Israel. 'When 
they (Arab countries) do not side with us against Pakistan' 
The Sangh leadership was of the opinion that Jordon and Saudi 
Arabia have been all the time helping Pakistan who is India's enemy. 
India should also treat them as enemies. According to the party when 
the UAR, which is partially neutral, can have friendly relations with 
India, Pakistan and China, Why cannot India be friendly with both the 
UAR and Israel? And party feels that there is no reason why India 
should not have the closet relations with Israel. The party wants India 
to adopt a policy of strict reciprocity regarding Israel and Arab 
countries. If UAR claims to be neutral in the conflicts between India 
and Pakistan and India and china, then India should also become 
neutral in the UAR's conflict with Israel or any other country. 
According to the party the India should look beyond Cairo and 
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understand the variegated pattern of countries surrounding the 
Mediterranean . 
Jana Sangh merged into Janata party, which came into power 
after the defeat of Mrs. Indira Gandhi's Congress party in the 
parliamentary elections of 1977. It was the first time in independent 
I 
India that the congress was out of power and a coalition of opposition 
parties had entered the office. Although the Janata government did not 
complete its full term, it stuck to India's age-old foreign policy 
postulates. With regard to the Palestinian question, it maintained a 
consistent stand . 
Nevertheless B.J.P, which was one of the constituents, of the 
Janata party through its leader Vajpayee, who happened to be the 
foreign Minister, wanted to give a twist as far as India's relations with 
Israel were concerned. Speaking to India Today, Mr. Atal Behari 
Vajpayee, India's external affairs minister in Desai's government, 
J 
said:^ 
Differences are not that important in the field 
of foreign policy because it is always based 
on elements of continuity and change. There 
is bound to be some change. But we adhere 
strictly to the basic postulates and to national 
concerns because foreign policy should serve 
national interest. 
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This statement of Vajpayee can be construed as prelude to 
change in India's policy, which Vajpayee had always nursed, an 
alliance with Israel. 
Though the public pronouncements did not suggest change in the 
Indian foreign policy. Vajpayee, a leader of the erstwhile Jan Sangh-a 
right wing party that was a constituent of Janata party, was particularly 
critical of Indian policy with regard to West Asia. He was against the 
unqualified support given by India to the Arab states especially during 
the Arab -Israeli conflicts. He spoke for a policy based on reciprocity. 
He thought that the attitude of the most of the Arab states during the 
wars with China and Pakistan had given a severe jolt to the Indians in 
the 1960's. Vajpayee's attempts in arranging the visit of Moshe Dayan 
is a case in point. While Vajpayee wanted to upgrade the relations with 
Israel, Prime Minister Mr. Desai categorically refused it by saying that 
his government would fall if Deyan's visit became publicly known^. 
Therefore, when, Janata party took charge of Indian affairs, 
many in India and outside were quite apprehensive as to India's policy 
towards West Asia in general and about the ongoing Arab-Israeli 
conflict, in particular. There was an essential continuity of the earlier 
foreign policy of India. India maintained its policy of backing the just 
stand of the Arab nations on Palestine and the legitimate rights of the 
Palestinian people, including the right to form their own nation state, 
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about Israel it was made clear that it should withdraw to pre-June 67 
borders vacating the Arab territories. Although the right of Israel to 
exist was recognized, diplomatic status was not given and the 
statuesque was maintained, as the government did not want to 
compromise on its earlier foreign policy principles . 
Internationally, the friendship of oil producing countries was 
very valuable owing to India's economic concerns and requirements of 
oil. The need to check the allegations of Pakistan against India by 
labeling India as anti-Muslim continued. Thus the need for promoting 
India's secular image still existed. Besides, the need for support in 
various international forums for India's various interests could not be 
ignored. On the Palestinian issue the new prime minister of India Mr. 
Desai, expressed similar sentiments as his predecessors in office. He 
felt that the Arab refugees had to be settled and Israel had to withdraw 
from the occupied territories, which would then, be proclaimed a 
Palestinian state. He recognized the Israelis right to exist and its 
security concerns. Referring to his talks with Sadat, he said , 'I told 
Sadat that one could not turn the clock back, that Israel was now an 
established fact and that you, the Arabs, must guarantee her existence, 
but Israel must make possible the rise of a Palestinian state^ 
After a couple of years of rule of Janata party, the Congress 
came back to rule India in 1980 and continued its old policies 
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regarding the West Asia and showed full support to the demand of 
Palestinians for the vacation of areas occupied by Israel. In 1980, the 
Israeli consul in Bombay Yousef Hassen, in an interview to a 
newspaper, stated, 'there was a strong Muslim-Arab lobby in New 
Delhi and the Arab ambassador was making use of Indian Muslims to 
bring pressure to bear on the government''°. He also opined that Israel 
was getting a bad press in India because the press was following the 
official line, and that India as competing with Pakistan to impress 
Arabs. All this was considered objectionable by the Indian government 
and the Israeli consul was expelled. The expulsion was severely 
criticized by B.J.P, who maintained a pro-Israeli stand. The then BJP 
vice president Ram Jethmalani called it an uncivilized act and 
suggested that the better option was to request the appointing state to 
recall the diplomat". Later, Subramanyam swamy, an ardent advocate 
of Indo-Israeli friendship deputy leader of the Janata party, pleaded 
with the government to establish diplomatic relations with Israel and to 
take the initiative in bringing about a settlement between the Israelis 
and Palestinians'^.His plea was turned down by the then external 
affairs minister. P.V.Narshima Rao. 
Rao's Compulsions: 
Narsimha Rao's decision of full diplomatic relations with Israel 
was hailed by BJP. The then BJP spokesman applauded Rao's decision 
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for achieving a stated aim they had failed to realize when the party in 
its Jan Sangh incarnation shared power in the late 1970's ' \ It was in 
fact the doctrine of Hindutva that paved the way for India's closer 
relations with Israel in the beginning of the 1990s. The Bharatiya 
Janata party leader, Mr. L.K.Advani, supported erstwhile cherished 
goal of B.J.P for having full diplomatic relations with Israel. He said 
that the government of India had taken a step in the right direction in 
supporting the UN General Assembly rescinding the 1975 resolution 
equating Zionism with racism '''. 
The Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP) leader A.B. Vajpayee was more 
than happy with the decision of establishing the diplomatic relations 
with the Zionist State'^. The then party president, Murali Manohar 
Joshi also welcomed the decision and observed that there was no 
reason for withholding the decision given the fact that even Egypt had 
accepted and accorded full diplomatic recognition to Israel 15 years 
back and argued that the real reason for the delay was, "the 
apprehensions of Muslim votes in India"'^. Like wise, Shiv Sareen. the 
president of All India Hindu Mahasabha hailed the decision and said 
that it was necessary to counter the influence of Islamic bloc on 
India . The statement fully expresses the mindset of the R.S.S thinking 
and their leader. 
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The BJP, and more broadly, the Sangh Parivar, has an acute and 
long-standing obsession with Israel. Establishing full relations with 
Israel was always a distinctive part of the Jana Sangh-BJP's agenda. 
Indeed, when RSS chief Balasaheb Deoras was asked in late 1991-after 
India's turn towards economic neoliberalism-what's the one thing he 
wanted from the soft-on-the-BJP Narsimha Rao government, he 
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unhesitatingly answered; Full-scale diplomatic relations with Israel . 
While the Communist Party of India condemned the Rao Government's 
move and decision and commented that, it was a step in haste ''\ 
For over a decade, successive Israeli governments were trying to 
initiate and develop deeper and wide-ranging cooperation and 
collaboration with India in economic and defense fields to serve their 
geo-economic and geo-political interests. From the Indian side, 
L.K.Advani has always been a strong advocate of such relations with 
Israel; for; in any event, Advani's own political party and other like-
minded radical Hindu parties saw in Israel a valuable strategic partner 
on the grounds of the mutually common anti-Muslim agenda. But now 
that L.K.Advani and his BJP is fully in command of Indian decision-
making for the first time after independence, the Vajpayee government 
has shifted its foreign policy focus from Arab nations to Israel^".Once 
its embassy was established in New Delhi. Israel began to cultivate 
Indian politicians of all hues in order to give greater content to its 
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relations with India. However, the various parties rebuffed these 
overtures, except the BJP, which shared Israel's anti-Arab and anti-
Muslim perceptions. 
BJP Government and its Moves: 
The 'turning point' of Indo-Israeli relations came in 1998 when 
elections led to a political change in the country (India). The long rule 
of congress party, with its socialist outlook, lost to the BJP, the 
extremist Hindu party and Atal Behari Vajpayee became the prime 
minister of India. Home minister and the deputy Prime Minister, 
L.K.Advani, the strong man in the party is a great admirer of Israel. 
Ever since Indo-Israeli relations progressed rapidly from agricultural 
sector to defense^'. Vajpayee after becoming Indian prime minister met 
his Israeli counterpart Benjamin Netanyahu in NewYork when both 
were there on the eve of United Nations session. Both agreed to 
exchange the visits in order to develop the bilateral relations further^^. 
After Atal Behari Vajpayee Indian national security advisor Brajesh 
Mishra visited Israel in September 1999. He had meetings with Israeli 
officials, leaders on various aspects of bilateral cooperation in multiple 
fields. This visit provided a major boost to the Indo-Israeli 
relationship . This relationship has assumed much significance after 
the Kargil crisis-1999 with avenues of cooperation in security, defense 
and technology sectors opening up. During the Kargil conflict, Israel 
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was one of the countries to extend a lot of backstage help to the BJP's 
coalition government of India, on various aspects from information 
sharing to strategic consultations^"*. It was only when the BJP came to 
power in 1998 that India took some steps towards the normalizing the 
relations with Israel by sending ministers of high rank such as 
L.K.Advani, Jaswant Singh and other military officials to strengthen 
the relations from Agricultural sector to Defense ^ .^ 
The BJP government in India has made a paradigm shift from 
cultivating the Arab world towards a strategic partnership with Israel. 
This shift became evident from a series of high level visits by senior 
Indian governments officials like Advani, who visited Israel in 2000 
during a high profile tour that took him also to UK and France. His 
mission was to develop international cooperation in controlling the 
terrorism . L. K. Advani, a hard liner closely associated with the 
BJP's past campaign against the 'appeasement' of India's 200 million 
Muslims, visited Israel in June 2000. Advani became the first senior 
member of Indian government to visit Israel since the normalization of 
the ties in 1992. Foreign policy watchers in India have been talking 
about the NDA government's tilt. After Advani's visit to Israel. 
Jaswant Singh became the first Indian foreign minister who visited 
Israel in July 2000.During his visit to Israel, both the countries decided 
to setup a Joint Commission to steer their relationship in the economic, 
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scientific, energy and cultural spheres. Jaswant Singh and his Israeli 
counterpart David Levy both agreed to establish a Joint Forum for 
combating terrorism. During the visit, Jaswant Singh proclaimed:" 
Israel is the only country helping India to 
combat the Pakistani aided terrorism along 
its northern border. Neither the United States 
nor the European Union is prepared to 
condemn Pakistan or assist India to combat 
the threat. Israel is the only country willing to 
transfer high technology to India. 
He further argued 'we were thrown out of the loop of West 
Asia, particularly in the post Gulf War scenario. We have been now 
drawn in to the process of peace here. It is a beginning' 
Until 1992 when New Delhi established diplomatic relations 
with Israel, at the time, prime minister of Israel Yitzhak Rabin and the 
foreign minister Shimon Peres had played well to Hindu extremist 
sentiments and stressed on the need for India and Israel to cooperate to 
combat the 'Islamic fundamentalism' and 'terrorism'"^. The Israeli 
foreign minister Shimon Peres also visited India in January 2002. He 
had some discussions with his Indian counterpart, Indian prime 
minister Atal Behari Vajpayee, and Home minister L.K.Advani and 
defense minister during his visit. He disclosed that Indo-Israeli 
relations are witnessing the highest level of friendship since a couple 
of years of BJP's rule. Equating the struggle in Palestine with the 
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trouble in Kashmir, he stated that India and Israel were joint victims of 
the global scourge of terrorism. He said that India could look up on 
Israel as a friend in the war against terrorism"' . This analysis of 
equating trouble in Kashmir with the struggle in Palestine is appalling. 
Israel being occupiers of Palestinian lands had to face the wrath of 
Palestinian people since they had lost all hope of peaceful negotiations. 
BJP after coming to rule India provided the major boost to the 
relations between New Delhi and Jerusalem. Along with its sister 
Hindu militant organization, the BJP had been critical of the pro-Arab 
foreign policy of Congress governments^' and have always been pro-
Israeli. Israel was and is regarded a potential ally against the threat of 
Islamic militants . Pro-Israeli Indians proclaim 'Yehudi-Hindu bhai 
bhai (Jews Hindu brothers)^^. Israel and America are allies for many a 
reasons. As for India, being a key ally along with them seems to be a 
ludicrous proposition. Recently, Colin Powell the US secretary of state 
ignoring India announced, 'Pakistan to be the "major non-NATO" ally. 
The B.J.P. led Indian government cut a sorry figure since its Prime 
Minister's oft-repeated dictum that India, "a natural ally of America" 
had fallen flat on its face. 
So long as Congress governed India, the area of Indo-Israel 
cooperation remained limited to commercial and cultural exchanges^''. 
However, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) after coming to power has 
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assiduously cultivated Israel as a friend and a military partner. Since 
1998, there are constant Indo-Israeli contacts on various levels, 
especially in the realm of cooperation in the purchasing of Israeli 
arms"* .^ 
When the Hindu Right government came to power in 1998, the 
issue of terrorism took on a new urgency, since this government was 
prone to depict any act of violence by a Muslim as terrorism and 
consequently any act of violence by a Hindu as either self-defense or 
the resentment of years of tyranny. In I994,L.K.Advani, the then 
leader of the opposition in India and a major stake in the Hindu Right, 
visited Israel and has since developed warm ties with Zionist elements 
in the Israeli establishment. When he returned in 1995, he met 
Netanyahu, who presented him with a book on terrorism. Since then 
Advani has made it a practice to quote from that book when he speaks 
about terrorism, particularly the following:''^ 
'When war gives terrorism, free society must know that they are 
fighting and they must reject absolutely the notion that 'one man's 
terrorist is another man's freedom fighter'. In other words, even as this 
is a rather opaque quote, the PLO [for Israel] and the various Kashmiri 
militant groups [for India] are terrorists regardless of any political 
claims they may have. 
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Hindutva's alliance with the Jewish-Zionist state is not so 
strange after all, because at the ideological level Hindutva is much like 
Zionism, for both extol the importance of the Race-state, and both cast 
aspersions at the presence of a Muslim minority. If the activists of 
Hindutva yell 'Jao Kabristan ya Pakistan' (go to the grave yard or 
Pakistan) to Indian Muslims, those of radical Zionism follow Golda 
Meir former Israeli Prime minister, in the belief that, 'there is no such 
thing as a Palestinian' . 
An Indian born analyst at the Zionist Freeman Centre in Houston 
[Texas] makes just this connection:^* 
Islamic fascists see Bharat as a soft spot to 
propagate their irrational creed and foment 
violence. India tries to placate them. Israel 
expels them as it did in 1948 and 1967. This 
is what Bharat should do. If they hate Hindu 
Rashtra so much they are free to leave for 
dar-ul-islam'. India must learn from Israel , 
to act against Pakistan, for instance, in much 
the same way as the Israeli defense forces 
acts against the Palestinian authority. 
After the visits of Advani and Jaswant, Mr. Shimon Peres's visit 
to India in January 2002 also became an occasion to cement the 
strategic ties between India and Israel. Both the countries seemed to be 
convinced they were fighting a common enemy, terrorism. At that time 
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Zvi Gabey, the deputy director general for Asia in the Israeli 
government stated that, 'we find ourselves in the same camp that fights 
terrorism and we have to develop our relationship according to that'. 
The visit of Peres was considered as the visible sign of the new phase 
of the Israel-India relationship. Regarding the December attack on 
Indian parliament, Peres argued that, "December 13 is not just an 
Indian date but a world date. Terrorism against the parliament was 
targeted to hit the largest democracy. Fortunately, it was stopped at 
the right moment. Otherwise there would have been another 
September ll.It is the same problem, the same terrorism"''\ The B..1.P 
leadership taking advantage of being there in the government were hell 
bent on capitalizing on the volatile situation in India which was a 
creation of their own purport, and projecting Israel their savior. 
According to Rajiv Desai:''^ 
Unable to cope with the relentless revelations 
of underhand dealings, the saffronistas found 
an escape in the December 2002 terrorist 
attack on Parliament. They jumped at the 
opportunity and mobilized troops along the 
Indo-Pak border, only to disengage them 
eight saber-rattling months later. 
In the meanwhile, it was the best moment for the Israeli arms 
dealers. They milched the Indian taxpayer while they sold arms worth 
of millions which could not provide India respite from the ongoing 
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militancy in many parts of the country. The solution lay somewhere 
else. A political process with all sincerely had to be started. 
Closest to the Shimon Peres's visit to India the United States 
cleared the sale of the Israeli Phalcon early warning radar systems to 
India [a deal worth $ one billion]. United States had earlier stopped the 
deal with the argument that it might escalate the tensions in the 
subcontinent. However, when the tensions were at war point, the 
United States allows the sale. Israel sees India as a vast market for its 
arms and as an ally against what it calls the Islamic world. The United 
States too is eager to see a new configuration that includes Israel and 
India to encircle both Islam and Communism, to dispatch the new 
bogeymen of the 21*'century '". 
Mishra's Visit to Washington: , 
After Shimon Peres's visit to India, the Indian national security 
advisor Bajesh Mishra visited Washington in May 2003 where he 
addressed the American Jewish Committee and also proposed a. United 
States-Israel-India axis against the Islamic fundamentalism during his 
address at the 97 annual meeting of the American Jewish Committee 
in Washington he argued:'*^ 
As the main targets of international 
terrorism, democratic countries should form a 
viable alliance against terrorism and develop 
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the multilateral mechanisms to counter it. 
Such an alliance would have the political will 
and moral authority to take bold decisions in 
extreme cases of terrorist provocation. It 
would not get bogged down in definitional 
and causal arguments about terrorism. 
Blocking financial supplies, disrupting 
networks, sharing intelligence, simplifying 
extradition procedures—these are preventive 
measures which can only be effective through 
international cooperation based on trust and 
shared values. A core consisting of 
democratic societies has therefore to 
gradually emerge from within our existing 
coalition, which can take on international 
terrorism in a holistic and focused manner. It 
would ensure that the global campaign 
against terrorism is pursued to its logical 
conclusion and does not run out of steam, 
because of other pre occupations 
Mishra in his address to the American Jewish Committee 
identified India, the United States and Israel, the main democratic 
societies fighting terrorism. He underscored the growing proximity 
between the three states. "We are all democracies, sharing a common 
vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal opportunity. Stronger India-
US relations and India-Israel relations have a natural logic" ^^\ 
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Brajesh Mishra considered the United States, Israel and India as 
the main democratic societies of the proposed alliance by him. Where 
is the democracy? Is it in Bush's America? Where spin doctoring and 
blatant false hood is flavor of the times, Mishra may not sound very 
off-key. but the world knows the worth of the United States 
democracy, where a candidate with less popular votes than his 
opponent was confirmed as the president by the Supreme Court with a 
majority of conservatives showing open prejudice against the 
democrats. 
No body can compliment Israel of tolerance when it is openly 
out to commit genocide against the Palestinians in a systematic 
manner. More methodical than Hitler's more brash final solution. And 
speaking of India, where ultra-nationalist BJP, that is out to obliterate 
all diversities in India's teeming millions, through the communal riots, 
through imposing of its own hindutva brand of a state religion, through 
writing text books and re-writing history books, all by railroading its 
agenda on agitating majority, would be the last to own up Mishra's 
boast of plurality and tolerance '''*. 
During his visit to Washington in May 2003, the Indian security 
national advisor, Mr. Brajesh Mishra stated that the India "is one of 
few nations in the world with no history of anti-Semitism". But he was 
perhaps ignoring that India was also one among the nations that had 
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been consistently anti-Zionist since the early days of its national 
movement under Mahatama Gandhi. It is primarily after the BJP- led 
alliance came to power that the Indian government has started taking 
an increasingly pro-Zionist stand. When he proposed for an alliance of 
three nations including India, Israel and US to combat the so called 
terrorism during his speech to the American Jewish Committee in 
Washington, Mr. Mishra considered India, Israel and US as the 
democracies with common vision of pluralism, tolerance and equal 
opportunity. Is it not a fact that the bulk of the Palestinian minority 
population was violently displaced from the area located to Israel 
under the UN partition plan of 1947? Is it not a fact that the Palestinian 
people are under the brutal occupation of Israel? Is it not a fact that 
more than half the 8 million Palestinian population are forced to live as 
refugees both inside and out side Palestine? Is it not a fact that the UN 
Committee on the Exercise of the inalienable Rights of the Palestinian 
People has repeatedly raised its grave concern over the horrendous 
treatment of the Palestinians by the occupying Israeli defense forces? 
Then how Mr. Mishra claimed that Israel has been promoting 
Pluralism, Tolerance and Equal opportunity? It is nothing but only the 
BJP's fascists approach/ ideology to forge solid chains of friendship 
with US and Israel ^\ 
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Most of the Indian political parties have condemned the proposal 
of Mishra and attacked the ruling coalition for its 'strange and 
perverse' obsession with Israel. The most vocal among these has been 
the congress. It attacked the BJP-led government. 'Obsession with 
Israel on the part of the coalition government is strange and perverse— 
When Israel is facing international isolation. It shows the intellectual 
insolvency of the government' were the words of the party spokesman 
S.Jaipal Reddy. He further committed that his (Mishra) statement was 
not inadvertent as deputy prime minister Advani had also put forward a 
similar formulation after September 11, 2001. Noting that strategic 
partnership with Israel was qualitatively different from that between 
India and United States. He further stated that Mishra would not have 
pleaded for such an alliance without prior clearance from the Prime 
minister. The Congress warned that a strategic partnership with Israel 
could upset the consensus built around the India's 'time-tested' foreign 
policy''^ 
The Smajwadi party committed that Mishra should not have 
made 'such blatant statement which go against the proclaimed policy 
of NAM'.CPM and CPI also have accused the government of having 
'completely sold out to the United States. It is overturning our 
foreign policy. It is very dangerous ' The Communist party of 
India [Marxist] strongly opposed the India's move to ally with Israel 
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which, according the party has occupied Arab territories defying the 
United Nation's resolutions and grossly violated rights of the 
Palestinian people. The party considered the speech of the Indian 
National security Advisor which was addressed by him in Washington 
regarding the alliance of US, India and Israel for combating the 
terrorism as the complete shift of Indian foreign policy in the BJP -led 
government. It remarked the proposal of Mishra for the formulation of 
the alliance of the three states as the Indian offer to becoming a part of 
US's global strategy. The party also remarked that the Sharon 
government in Israel has been notorious for its brutal repressive policy 
towards the Palestinians. It also argued that Israel with the support of 
US, occupies Arab territories while defying the united nation's 
resolutions The party also showed strong opposition of the Indian 
forces in US-led policing operation in Iraq, because according to the 
party Washington was attempting to legitimize its aggression by 
dragging New Delhi into its plans. C.P.M also condemned the US 
efforts to drag India into its plan for occupying and policing Iraq '*'. 
There were some reasons for the BJP's interest with Israel and 
Zionism. At first, a desire to toad up to the United States through its 
most important strategic ally outside Europe and isolate Pakistan, 
which cannot possibly ally with the Israel as an Islamic state? 
Secondly, the BJP shares Likud's Islam-phobia and anti-Arabism. 
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Thirdly hyper nationalism. The BJP is fascinated by the highly 
militarized, tough-as-nails nature of Israeli society and by its 
willingness to use massive force against the Palestinians whom it treats 
as terrorists and sub-human vermin, pure and simple. This closely 
parallels what some people in the Parivar would like to do to India's 
own religious minorities 
Indian national security advisor Brajesh Mishra when visited 
United States in 2003, not only talked about the terrorism but also 
argued for an anti-terrorism axis. The same arguments regarding the 
terrorism were drawn by the Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon during 
his visit to India in September 2003. "There are no doubt the 
watershed events of 9/11 and the global campaigns against world 
terrorism have created a new opportunity to create stronger ties 
between India, Israel and the United States. We are talking about a 
trilateral strategic triangle, combining efforts and joining hands to 
combat terrorism in Asia, where we see a large rise in terror activity, 
particularly of the radical Islamic brand" were the words of a senior 
official accompanied Ariel Sharon during his visit to India in 
September, 2003^*^ 
Ariel Sharon's visit to New Delhi in September 2003 took place 
at a critical juncture when the entire strategic calculus in the West Asia 
and South Asia stands totally changed due to the events of September 
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11, the Afghanistan war and the Gulf war 2"''.Professor Martin 
Sherman in an article in the Jerusalem Post on February 28, 2003 
argued, 'an alliance between India and Israel openly endorsed by the 
United states would create a potent stabilizing force in the region and 
could contribute significantly toward facing down the force of radical 
extremism so hostile to American interests in Western and Central 
Asia'. He further pointed out there were major considerations beyond 
regional stability that made a strong case for a vibrant India-Israel axis. 
For instance in the emerging balance of geo-strategic power, the 
growing Chinese challenge to the United States primacy will almost 
invariably dictate the need for a regional counter weight to Chinese 
domination. Similar views on meeting the Chinese challenge were 
expressed by Lloyd Richardson of the Hudson Institute, a think tank 
very close to the US administration, when he said that India is the most 
over looked of our potential allies in a strategy to contain China^". In 
Sherman's opinion it was China, enemy no.I of India and all efforts 
according to him should be made to contain China not Pakistan. 
India and Israel were among the few countries, which 
enthusiastically applauded President Bush's declaration of the war on 
terror with its famous injunction with us or with the terrorists. It was in 
the context of the war on terror that the strategic relationship of India 
with Israel and the United States developed dramatically through 
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defense and security cooperation ^'. It was just a coincidence natural 
that both Israel and the United States found a partner in the Indian 
government because of its ideological commitment to militaristic 
policy. 
Washington gave its special blessings to the Israel-India 
strategic alliance when it gave the clearance to Israel to sell their 
powerful Phalcon Airborne Warning and control system to India .The 
United States calculates that the system will serve also its own 
interests. It has openly stated that any strengthening of India's military 
capability is in America's interest. Despite the reiteration of India's 
unwavering support to the Palestinian cause during the visit of 
Palestinian foreign minister Nabeel Shaath just a few days ago, the Red 
carpet welcome to Ariel Sharon sends a clear signal of India's approval 
of Sharon's policies. An Israeli commentator Lev Grinberg wrote in 
June 2002, anticipating the United States invasion of Iraq, Sharon is 
deeply satisfied with Bush's Middle East Plan that practically means a 
global war managed by the Busharon team in which Bush will play the 
role of the global sheriff imposing a new order in the Islamic states. 
Sharon has been nominated as the regional sheriff and allowed to 
impose a new order in his area of influence. 
The high profile welcome by the Indian government to the 
regional sheriff is another clear illustration of India's subjugation of its 
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national interests to the United States strategic designs for Asia . 
Rolling out the red carpet for Israeli prime minister Ariel Sharon 
during his visit to India the BJP-led government solidarized itself with 
Sharon's ever-widening repression of the Palestinian people. In pursuit 
of closer ties with both the Zionist state and the Bush Administration, 
India's BJP government has repeatedly drawn a parallel between the 
United States, Israel and India, claiming that the three are 'Frontline' 
states in the battle against Islamic and state sponsored terror. Sharon's 
visit concluded with the issuing of a joint Indo-Israeli statement that 
claimed the two countries share common goals of advancing peace, 
security and stability in Asia and defeating the 'global terrorist' ' As 
victims of terrorism', declared the statement, 'Israel and India are 
partners in the battle against this scourge call upon the 
international community to take decisive action against this global 
menace, and condemn states and individuals who aid and abet 
terrorism '^"\Thousands of people across the country took the 
streets to protest Sharon's visit. Many held placards such as Butcher 
Sharon, Go back, and Go back. The protests extended from Kashmir in 
the North to Chennai in the south. Most opposition parties had issued 
joint statement denouncing the visit and urging support for the 
protests^"*. But the Prime Minister of India described the visit of the 
Israeli premier as "historic". The Israeli Deputy Prime Minister, 
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Yosef Lapid, who was along the Israeli premier during his visit to India 
remarked regarding the visit as, 'I think our visit can be described as a 
breakthrough— your government out of consideration of your ties 
with Arab world was very moderate in proclaiming ties with Israel 
more openly. It seems as if we have reached a critical mass where there 
is no fence in hiding any more that we are on a friendly path'. In 
anticipation of Israeli Prime Minister, Ariel Sharon's visit to India, a 
perceptive scholar on Israel and Zionism wrote:^^ 
Blind and short sighted support to Israel and 
ignoring Sharon 's brutal actions represent an 
ideological shift for India. Meanwhile the 
Arab world looks on at India's indiscrete and 
hasty dealings with these military 
entrepreneurs. A basketful of dollars spent on 
high technology weapons from Israel will 
bring in truckload of wrath from Arab Muslim 
world. Learning to fight terrorism from a 
racist, terrorist state is unethical. Even if it is 
diplomatically convenient. 
A senior columnist Mr. Praful Bidwai remarked that it was 
perversion of India's foreign policy when B.J.P allowed criminal 
Sharon to visit India. Sharon has been indicted by the Israeli .ludicial 
Commission for his act of genocide in Sabra and Chatilla camps in 
Lebanon. 
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In order to combat the terrorism the three states, viz, United 
States, Israel and India met in a conference which was sponsored by 
the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs and the Manipal 
Academy of Higher Education in New Delhi in the month of February 
2003. The conference issued a joint statement:^^ 
India, Israel and the United States are united 
by a shared commitment to democratic 
values, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. Yet all three are confronted by 
terrorism in its multiple forms there can 
be no justification for any form of terrorism, 
no cause can justify it India, Israel and 
America and other countries have been 
victims of terrorism for many years. But it 
took the events of September 11, 2001 to 
convince many that concerted action to 
confront this global menace is necessary. So, 
while we applaud the success in Afghanistan— 
- the menace of terrorism persists across the 
world. The ultimate threat to humanity is the 
combination of terrorism and Weapons of 
mass destruction. 
The conferees agreed that, the United States, India and Israel as 
sister democracies and common victims of international terrorism 
should pool their resources and experiences in dealing with this 
menace and create a trilateral mechanism to promote cooperation and 
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concerted action against terrorism. The conferees also stated that all 
three countries have been victims of terrorism—.All three must take 
appropriate action against those who fund, incite, train or give safe 
haven to terrorists.' Nothing could be more farcical and blatant 
negation of realities. It was simple obstinacy on the part of the 
leadership of B.J.P that they were ready to be a party to the imperialist 
Zionist alliance, which always worked against the democratic 
aspirations of the third world people. 
The B.J.P leadership was incapable of analyzing the political 
situation and the uncontrolled outrage arising out of the fall of the 
World Trade Centre. Though, no body would condone this ghastly act. 
It is unimaginable for the citizens of independent sovereign country 
like India to heed to the warnings enunciated by Mr. Bush. 
India was once called the leader and a major force in NAM and a 
bulwark against imperialism. Much has changed since then. 
Imperialism is perhaps stronger than ever, but the world is muddier and 
more confused and the Indian government under BJP, has clearly 
abandoned any effort to project itself as anti-imperialist in any way. In 
the past few years, the NDA government has systematically dismantled 
the entire edifice of the independent foreign policy based on non-
alignment, which was created in the post-independence period.^'' 
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The long, term strategic purpose of the United Slates in building 
up its alliance with India is really to contain and possibly eventually 
destroy the growing power of China in Asia and in the world. 'China 
represents the most significant threat to both countries security in the 
future as an economic and military competitor'. The United States 
relations with its traditional allies in Asia-South Korea and Japan have 
become fragile and India emerged as a vital component of United 
States strategy. China's rapid military modernization and its impressive 
economic growth are seen as threats by both United States and India' 
discloses a report from Pentagon and also the Jane's foreign report.^ ** 
India's decision not to send troops to Iraq but confirmed that this 
decision of India would not affect its important strategic partnership 
with New Delhi ^^.Chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of staff 
general Richard Myer stated that the refusal of India for sending troops 
to Iraq does not bother United States. He further stated that the US-
India military cooperation would continue to increase. He also praised 
the India's cooperation in the global war against terrorism during his 
visit to India in August, 2003^°.The creation of United States- India 
institute for strategic policy in Washington is the outcome of a series 
of quiet meetings between the United States and Indian governments, 
which have also pushed all the military cooperation. Inspite of the 
Indian government's desire to send troops to Iraq intense pressure was 
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mounted by the people of India and the Opposition against this move. 
The government could do nothing but abandon the initiative towards 
sending the troops to Iraq. 
Iraq has been not only friendly to India but also has stood by her 
on Kashmir issue. The bulk of trade India had with Iraq prior to its 
invasion is uncomparable with Israel. B.J.P government obsessed with 
Israel and USA so-called strategic allies did not bother to count this 
Iraqi factor. 
On the first anniversary of the attack on the Indian Parliament 
the United States ambassador Mr. Blackwill visited the Parliament 
House on 13 December 2002. To paid floral tributes to the men who 
died during the attack on Indian parliament on December 12, 2001. He 
used the occasion to exhort:^' 
What could be a more appropriate occasion 
than this to repeat with full voice and strong 
heart that India and the United states are 
together in the war against terrorism. That 
war will not be won until all terrorism 
against India and America is ended 
permanently. 
But the United States since the September 11 has belied Indian 
hopes of a strategic United States-Israel- India axis fighting Pakistan. 
The United States instead made Pakistan a front-line ally in its fight 
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against the Taliban in Afghanistan. One should not forget that Taliban 
was American creation. Bush and other United States officials have 
often praised India's bugbear, Musharaf, as a stalwart ally and helped 
him to bring Pakistan back on the path of economic prosperity . 
Now the so-called war on terror brought forth a strange coalition 
of three countries, which consider themselves as an axis against the 
terrorism. Strictly speaking, the coalition of the three countries viz. 
United States, Israel and India is nothing but curious progeny of a 
spurious theory—Clash of civilizations (Samuel Huntington). The 
Hindus, Jews and Christians versus the Moslems of the world today 
and the Confucians of China tomorrow. This is nothing but an alliance 
of dangerous consequences. This is an axis that has been in the making 
for a while now ever since the quasi-fascist Hindu chauvinists came to 
power in India a few years ago. The events of September 11, 2001 have 
seen the entry of India as the Bush's favorite vassal in the region. The 
blooming of Indo-Israel romance has merely helped seal this dubious 
deal between three very different countries. What is even more horrific 
about this emerging Axis of the dangerous consequences is that all of 
them today harbor elements that have classic Nazi-like inventions 
towards a liberal and saner world. 
In the United States, there are those who talk of nuking Meca 
who are dangerously close to the powers-that-be. In Israel, the extreme 
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right wing would like to ethnically cleanse the West Bank and Gaza of 
its Palestinian people. In India, the state sponsored pogrom in the state 
of Gujarat two years ago depicts the characteristic of this regime. At 
the national level, echoing the practices of the Nazis, the current Indian 
regime has systematically re-written history text books and cooked up 
archaeological evidence to suit its Fanciful theories about India's past, 
persecuted religious minorities and sent storm troopers to physically 
intimidate its critics. According to Satya Sagar , the Israel and India 
delude themselves about being invited to sup with the Super power for 
the latter they are both a highly dispensable duo. Mere Client states to 
be disposed off with when their utility is over. Israel as the United 
State's best bulldog in the turbulent Arab world, to keep an eye on 
those precious oil reserves. India the dumb, shortsighted elephant to be 
suckered in to conflict with the Chinese dragon some day. The axis is a 
strange menagerie of a bulldog, elephant and man-eating tiger that the 
United States has currently become. A tiger that has always had 
permanent interests, never permanent friends. 
According to George W Bush administration the attack on 
Afghanistan followed by the attack on Iraq and the warning of further 
attacks on Iran and Syria are considered a fight against terrorism. The 
president's appeal that they must unite to end the terrorism from the 
whole cosmos stationed him in the front row of this battle, but a glance 
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in to the history of America reveals that a good number of terrorist 
activities are run by America directly or indirectly. The American 
administration certainly has double standards when applying the label 
terrorist as the full support extended by the United States to Israel in 
occupied territories proves the point. The word terrorist can no where 
be more aptly applied than to America's unwanted presence in 
Afghanistan, in Iraq and help to Israel's regime of terror on the 
Palestinians. Was not the horrible atomic bombardment on Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki an act of terror? Was not the attack on Libya a terrorist 
act? Was not US interference in Iran and naked aggression on 
Afghanistan acts of terrorism? The recent subjugation of Iraq by U.S.A 
has revealed the real face of terrorism and has proved as to who is a 
terrorist.^'* 
Thus India-Israel -US axis is fundamentally an endorsement of 
the imperialistic designs of the U.S.A and Israel serves the 
imperialistic-Zionist interests. The US war on terror is an imperialist 
war. 
The basic logic behind the theme of India, the United States and 
Israel being prime targets of terrorism having a common enemy and 
requiring joint action is deeply flawed as the United States and Israel 
are aggressors and India is an aggrieved party. What is common is the 
determination not to look at the root cause of terrorism and what joins 
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them in action is the conviction that military action is the only 
response irrespective of the causes of terrorism. 
The axis is more specifically a blanket support for US policy in 
the West Asia. An Israeli commentator Lev Grinberg wrote in June 
2002 anticipating the US invasion of Iraq: 'Sharon is deeply satisfied 
with Bush's Middle East Plan and practically means a global war 
managed by the 'Busharon' team in which Bush will play the role of 
the global Sheriff, imposing a new order in the Islamic states. Sharon 
has been nominated as the regional Sheriff and allowed to impose a 
new order in his area of influence. It was the regional Sheriff who was 
given the Red Carpet well comes in New Delhi on September 09, 
2003". 
By joining the axis India under BJP, has let down the Palestinian 
people. There was no reference to India's support for a Palestinian 
state in Vajpayee's speech at the banquet in honor of Sharon. The 
absence of reference to even the US sponsored road map was 
conspicuous in the Joint statement. The proforma reiteration of India's 
unwavering support to the Palestinian cause during the hastily arranged 
visit of Palestinian foreign minister Nabeel Shaath sounded even 
hoUower after Sharon's visit. 
To be a friend of Israel apparently means something quite 
simple. As Tony Smith observes in his authoritative study, 'The power 
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of ethnic groups in the making of American foreign policy' (Harvard), 
the meaning is that, 'Israel alone should decide the terms of its 
relations with its Arab neighbors and the US, should endorse those 
terms whatever they may be' . 
The delusion about a new strategic equation that would dominate 
the geographical region between the two countries will only create 
tensions and instability in Asia. It will lead to a major shift in the 
balance of power not only in the Indian sub continent but also in the 
Middle East and the rest of Asia. 
Projecting Israel as a model will be detrimental to the 
democratic and secular character of India. References made in the Joint 
declaration to India and Israel being democracies and having gained 
independence and embarked on nation building are unpardonable 
distortions of history. What is the comparison between India and 
Israel? Israel is a settler colonialist state having gained independence 
by military occupation and which embarked on nation building by more 
brutal occupation. 
References to 'civilizational relationship between India and 
Israel will invariably be seen as subscribing to the thesis of Samuel P 
Huntington's clash of civilizations and will be treated as the basis for 
anti- Islamic alliance. This has serious domestic implications. 
Panchajanya, the RSS mouthpiece Says, "Both India and Israel are 
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facing Muslim terrorism. Israel has faced the threat from Muslim 
terrorists boldly and effectively and we should appreciate it"^^. 
The axis will undermine India's position in the United Nations 
where it will be expected to vote for Israel, a state, which has 
consistently defied the United Nations. Commenting on Sharon's visit, 
the Israeli daily Haaretz called upon India 'to translate its openness 
towards Israel into changes in its voting patterns of the United Nations. 
Up to now India has automatically cast its ballot with the pro-Arab 
majority'. Rather than improving India's chances of getting permanent 
membership in the Security Council, the axis may weaken its claim 
It will complicate India's relations with China as both Israel and 
US want to project India as a regional counterweight to China's 
domination. The alliance will be used by the US in its strategy to 
contain China. This will not be conducive to peace in the region. 
India's strategic objectives and interests will be made subservient to 
u s designs in Asia 
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The tragic partition of Palestine by the United Nations gave birth 
to the Zionist state-Israel. After its creation, the United Nations 
accepted Israel as its 59"^ member. India's great nationalist leaders like 
Gandhi and Nehru rejected the Zionist claim to Palestine. They 
strongly opposed the creation of Israel and its membership to the 
United Nations. India, a member of the United Nations Special 
commission on Palestine UNSCOP, rejected the 'majority report' 
prepared by it, which recommended the partition of Palestine. India 
with Yugoslavia and Iran recommended 'minority report' which 
suggested an independent Palestine as a federal state with Jerusalem as 
its capital. However, the minority report was rejected by the General 
Assembly of the United Nations. 
Nehru always supported the Palestinian cause. He always 
supported Palestine as an Arab country. He viewed Israel as an 
Imperialist creation. But on 17 September 1950 India formally 
recognized the state of Israel. The decision to recognize Israel was a 
mark of respect to the institution of United Nations. He argued that the 
recognition could not be deferred for a long time because the United 
Nations, which had accepted the state of Israel, could treat the 
deferment of Israel's recognition as an act of defiance. 
After approving recognition to Israel the then Indian government 
allowed Israel to open a consulate in Bombay but the diplomatic 
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relations were not established. Though the recognition of Israel was 
granted but the Indian government continued to support the Palestinian 
cause. She always supported the Palestinian struggle. 
Though India maintained a consistent policy towards the then 
crisis in the region, there were certain groups of people who did not 
see eye to eye with the government. The Hindu Mahasabha represented 
them. They always criticized the Nehru government for withholding 
the recognition of Israel. They willfully ignored the fact that Israelis 
are the occupiers with imperialistic, colonialist ideology. Nevertheless, 
India being anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism her support to the 
Palestinian struggle was obvious. 
Taking recognition as a welcome gesture, the Israeli government 
made some efforts for establishing diplomatic relations with India. But 
the then Indian Prime minister rejected those efforts and also refused to 
normalize relations with Israel. The Jansangh and other likeminded 
groups however considered Israel as a democratic state in the region 
and always demanded for having the diplomatic relations with the 
Zionist state. The Jansangh perhaps was deliberately ignoring the fact 
that the so-called democratic state was established at the expense of the 
majority of Palestinians, an act quite opposite to the basic principles of 
democracy. 
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India's West Asian policy was greatly influenced by her 
relations with the Arabs and the Arab Nationalist movements. The 
Egyptian revolution of 1952 created a new dimension in Indo-Arab 
relations, which had a chain reaction to her attitude towards Israel. 
Egyptian government's opposition to imperialism, qualified by non-
alignment, found a place with Indian foreign policy makers. India and 
Egypt's consistent opposition to all forms of imperialism intrigues and 
maneuvers led to their attacks on the Baghdad pact. Their common 
policy brought both India and Egypt closer. 
India's relations with Egypt had a major role in her policy 
towards Israel. When the Israelis in collaboration with Britain and 
France launched an attack on Egypt on October 29, 1956. The Nehru 
government strongly condemned the Israeli action and branded it as a 
case of clear naked aggression. He also supported the nationalization of 
Suez Canal by Gamal Abdel Nasser. 
India also showed strong reactions against Israel in June war of 
1967. India being a non-aligned country was reluctant towards 
accepting the aggressive policy of Israel and condemned the Israeli 
attacks and American policy towards the Arabs. Due to Israeli 
belligerence of 1967 on Arab world, India decided to break off 
relations even at consulate level with Israel as an immediate measure 
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and she extended moral support to the deprived Arabs who were the 
victims of Israeli aggression. 
However, the opposition leaders from Jan Sangh and other 
likeminded parties criticized the government's stand. They argued that 
India's unnecessary support to the Arabs could encourage them (Arabs) 
to adopt more hostile attitude towards Israel. It is ironic that they were 
ignoring the fact that Arabs were not hostile to Israel but it was Israel, 
which was very much hostile to the Arabs. The Jansangh also argued 
that Indian leadership was succumbing to Arab pressure in a bid to 
appease them and thought Israel to be a worthwhile force in the region 
and a symbol of stability. However, they conveniently forgot that Israel 
was and still remains the greatest destabilizing factor in the region. 
Again, when a war broke out in the region in 1973. India 
strongly condemned the Israeli aggression and affirmed that the cause 
of the tension in the area was the Israeli aggression and its refusal to 
vacate the territories, which had been occupied by her by the armed 
forces and supported the Arab cause, which was based on justice and 
demanded immediate implementation by Israel of the United Nations 
resolutions for peaceful solution of the problem. 
Meanwhile the Janta party came to power in 1977. Moshc Dayn 
the former Israeli foreign Minister visited India during the .lanta 
party's rule. The main reason behind his visit was to seek the 
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diplomatic relations with India. But he could not fulfil! his dreams 
because the then Indian Prime Minister Mr. Desai rejected his 
(Dayan's) proposals. Dayan returned back angrily as the Indian prime 
minister Mr. Morarji Desai suggested him for withdrawing from all the 
Occupied Territories for an independent Palestinian state. 
Nevertheless, Janta Party's unequivocal support to Palestinian cause 
did not allow the normalization of relations with Israel, inspite of the 
attempts of its foreign minister Mr. Vajpayee with R.S.S mindset to 
accommodate Israel even at the expense of the Palestinians. After a 
couple of years of rule, Mrs.Indra Gandhi's Congress party again 
replaced the Janta government in 1980. 
There was another war in the region in 1982. India treated the 
atrocities committed by Israeli military during the war as very much 
horrific and condemnable. She condemned Israel's infamous history of 
misdeeds and stressed for the recognition of the rights of the 
Palestinians for establishing durable peace in the region. The then 
Israeli consul in India Yosef Hassen criticized against the Indian 
protocol for being the proArab and succumbing to their pressure. As a 
result, the Israeli consul was directed to leave the country within hours. 
It was Rajiv Gandhi, after the death of his mother-Mrs. Indra 
Gandhi, reopened Israeli consul that was lying vacant since 1982. He 
held some meetings with the Jewish leaders when he visited USA. But 
257 
these meetings could also not lead to the establishment of the 
diplomatic relations between the two states. 
After the death of Rajiv Gandhi Narsimha Rao became the Prime 
minister of India. During his rule, the extension of the diplomatic 
relations to Israel was almost a decree since there was no debate on 
this issue in the parliament or outside. The decision came as a rude 
surprise to millions of Indians who had uptill now steadfastly held to 
the view, first evacuation of occupied territories, second creation of the 
state of Palestine and finally extension of diplomatic relations with 
Israel. The very premise of the Indian foreign policy was turned upside 
down by this decision. 
According to some analysts, the end of cold war, disintegration 
of the former USSR, emergence of USA as the only super power, Gulf 
war of 1991 and the Madrid Conference forced Narsimha Rao to take 
this hasty and immature step of establishing diplomatic relations with 
the Zionist state. Before this, Narsimha Rao government in 1991 voted 
for the revocation of the United Nations Resolution of 3379 of 
November 1975 that had equated Zionism with Racism. Some analysts 
argued that this step paved the way for Narshima Rao to establish the 
diplomatic relations in 1992. Narsima Rao's decision was hailed by 
B.J.P. The B.J.P leader Mr. Vajpayee was more than happy with the 
decision. Like wise, Shiv Sareen, the president of All Hindu 
258 
Mahasabha hailed the decision. The BJP and more broadly, the sangh 
parivar. have an acute and long-standing obsession with Israel. 
Establishing full diplomatic relations with Israel was always a 
distinctive part of the Jansangh- BJP's agenda. While the communist 
party of India condemned the Rao governments move and decision and 
commented that, it was a step in haste. Moreover, the decision was 
taken without taking Indian public opinion into account. India's long 
cherished principled stand against racism was thrown to winds 
overnight. 
When the diplomatic relations were established, some claimed 
that Chandra Swami was instrumental in the process, others that it was 
part of a process of wooing the US, Israel's mentor. The government 
claimed it was a key element in India's overall West Asian strategy 
which had been devasted by its less-than categorical stand on Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait. It was said that the move would get India a seat at 
the West Asian peace talks. Relations with Israel are part of a process 
that began in the early 1980s when Indra Gandhi moved towards the 
US and began to open up the economy. Under Rajiv Gandhi, the idea 
of a step-by-step approach was given official sanction. However, an 
official in the then government argued, "Events overtook us". West 
Asian peace process got under way, aided by the shift in the power 
balance following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Iraq was 
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neutralized and Syria. Israel's remaining great antagonist, sided with 
the US. 
If India were to make a decision primarily on the criterion of 
Israel's West Asian attitude, there was and there still is no case at all 
for establishing the diplomatic relations. True, all of them have begun 
talking but Israel continues to hold out and is in illegal occupation of 
an entire country and parts of others. It is getting what was denied to it 
without an inch or an ounce of concession. There are those who argued 
that if India can have diplomatic relations with China and Pakistan, 
who are supposed to be in occupation of our land, what is the problem 
in having ties and yet opposing the policies of some one who is 
occupying not our but some body else's territories. The argument used 
by the BJP leaders is utterly amateurish. For one thing, India's ties 
with China were reopened precisely to talk and iron out problems 
peacefully just as the Arabs and Israel have now decided to. More 
important, Israel is in occupation of an entire country whose creation 
was legitimized by the world's premier International body, is stealing 
all its water and is in the process of appropriating occupied lands 
through illegal settlements being allotted to immigrants welcomed on 
the basis of religion. A doctrine diametrically opposed to what India 
professes to stand for. 
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After establishing the diplomatic relations, the two states began 
to have military collaborations. Before the establishment of the 
diplomatic relations, there were very limited military contacts between 
the two countries. But after the establishments of the diplomatic 
relations there have been several visits, contacts and consultations 
related to the military field, between the two countries. There are some 
who also argued that India would like to benefit from the Israeli 
experience in antiterrorist operations. However, they willfully ignored 
that Palestinian struggle for liberation was not an act of terrorism. 
Secondly even if it was Israel until now had been an alter failure to 
curb it. Weapons certainly are no solution to suppress a struggling 
people. Shimon Peres former foreign minister also raised the issue of 
terrorism and fundamentalism when he was on a visit to India in 1993. 
During his visit, he also raised his hands to support India regarding the 
Kashmir Issue and the Shimla Agreement. 
Mr. Peres was perhaps ignoring the fact that it was the PLO 
chairman -Mr.Yasser Arafat who played a significant role in bringing 
both India and Pakistan closer to each other, which resulted in 
concluding the Shimla Agreement between the two countries. As far as 
Peres is concerned, he has double standards on the Kashmir issue. On 
one occasion, he has supported the solution of Kashmir issue on the 
basis of the Shimla agreement and on the other occasion, he tried to 
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make the situation more volatile when he immaturely suggested for 
changing the demographic character of the Valley of Kashmir on the 
pattern of Palestine. He was trying to saw permanent seed of discord as 
he and his friends in Israel had done vis-a-vis the poor Palestinians. 
After Peres, Ezer Weizman former president of Israel visited India in 
1996. His main aim was to push an increase in 'defense cooperation' 
an euphemism for the selling of arms to India under one pretext or 
another. During his visit, the two countries decided to exchange 
military attaches. One can easily surmise that Israeli supply of arms 
can be seen as catalyst of arms race in the region. 
Almost after a year of the President Weizman's visit to India in 
1996-97, the Bhartiya Janta Party BJP, after coming to power carried 
out the nuclear tests in 1998. That was the start of the arms race in the 
region because Pakistan, which is being considered a threat to the 
Indian security also carried out the nuclear tests in retaliation, thus 
becoming a nuclear power. This was a God send opportunity for 
Israelis to take advantage of the situation. After nuclear tests, Kargil 
war broke out between India and Pakistan in 1999. This war was a 
tremendous opportune moment for Israelis to market their military 
products when India was reeling under the sanctions. These weapons 
would put India into contention as the main power not only in South 
Asia, but perhaps, as the second front against the Chinese. 
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Furthermore, the fantasy of the missile defense shield and a nuclear 
capacity enables forces of Hindutva to believe that it has once again 
attained superiority over Pakistan- a conventional advantage that had 
been neutralized by the mutual nuclear tests of 1998. 
Arms deals are continuously signed between India and Israel. 
Defense analysts estimated weapons sold to India by Israel crossed 
$500 million during 1997-2000. By 2001, India signed weapons 
contracts worth $2 billion with Israel. Recently Israel signed one more 
deal worth $1.1 million for selling her 'Phalcon Airborne Warning and 
Control Systems' to India. From the above estimations, it is clear that 
India is providing the market to Israel for selling her arms worth 
million US dollars to India. Israeli arms exporters are treating India as 
conducive market, which can be exploited by them even if they sold 
their hardware at very high price. Indo-Israeli arms trade is unilateral, 
arms from Israel to India. Only the pretext is combating terrorism and 
fundamentalism. This is high time top echelons in the government 
realize and save the poor Indian taxpayers from agony. India is the 
biggest customer for Israel's military industry. Almost one-half of 
Israel's total military sales in year 2002 worth $4.2 billion went to 
India. The Indian budget, therefore, subsidizes the Israeli arms 
infrastructure and in effect, the atrocities of the Israeli defense force. 
Even two generally conservative Indian analysts concur that the Indian 
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military does not gain immensely from the arms deals. Uday Bhasker 
of the Institute for Defense Studies and Analysis, New Delhi noted 
regarding the arms deals as 'Israelis not doing us any favors. They 
drive a hard bargain'. Brahma chellaney of the Centre for Policy 
Research-New Delhi stated regarding the relationship as, it is a patron 
client relationship rather than a relationship of equals. 
Other sectors of cooperation between these two stats are 
agriculture, trade, science and technology. India is technologically 
sound. Its information technology and technically skilled labours are 
worldwide accepted. Its technological cooperation with US, Japan and 
other developed countries would be more beneficial to her than Israel. 
However, solar energy is an area the Indian experts are looking for. It 
is claimed that Israelis have the only workable solar power generating 
system in the world. This is not just for fans and tube lights but also 
for generating substantial amounts of power for supplying power grids. 
Such system is said to be working in California. The Israelis are 
offering India a collaborative role in a more advanced 'water tower" 
solar technology, which is even more effective. Agriculture is 
considered one more important area of cooperation between the two 
states. Farmers are being sent to Israel to know the Israeli techniques 
regarding the agriculture production and so on. Israel has utilized its 
marginal water resources to make the desert bloom. Its strides in 
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horticulture, aquaculture and floriculture and arid zone farming hold 
applications for India. Rajasthan and other semi-arid states have used 
the Israeli agricultural techniques. Indo-Israeli Research and 
Development Farms were inaugurated in the Indian Agricultural 
Research Institute, lARI at Pusa in New Delhi. It is claimed that the 
farm would demonstrate the Israeli expertise in high tech agriculture 
and would endeavor to find different techniques and methods of 
cultivation suitable for the diverse agro-climatic zones in India 
Other sector of cooperation between two countries is trade. Since 
1992, various trade agreements have been signed between these two 
states. Prior to 1992, there was little direct trade between India and 
Israel. However, after establishing the diplomatic relations the trade 
between these two countries has been growing. Since the establishment 
of the diplomatic relations, agreements and treaties like Memorandum 
of Understanding MOU, Most Favored Nation Status MFN, Double 
taxation treaty DTT, and so on have been signed between the two 
states. The bilateral trade is almost limited to two major items in both 
states. That is, rough diamonds and chemicals together form about 63% 
of Israel's exports to India. While as the polished diamonds and cotton 
yarn account for approximately 76% of Indian exports to Israel. In 
1992 that is, after the establishment of diplomatic relations, the total 
bilateral trade reached $186 million and in 1999 it reached $1004 and 
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in 2000, the total bilateral trade touched $1009 million. Apart from the 
diamonds, the other main Israeli exports to India are the military arms, 
which are being sold to India worth million US dollars. These arms, 
which Israel is exporting to India, can strangle/ garrotte the industrial 
development since huge amount is being wasted on the purchase of 
these Israeli arms at very high price. 
On the other hand, India's trade relations with the Arabs are 
growing fast since decades. The oil, which is in abundance in the Arab 
World, has built these trade relations stronger and almost still 
overwhelming. Almost the GCC countries including Iran presently 
account for almost all the India's oil imports. Moreover, three million 
Indian workers are working in the Gulf States. Their remittances, 
which India is receiving in billion dollars per annum strengthening 
Indian economy. While the Israeli arms, which are being imported 
worth million US dollars, is emaciating the Indian economy as huge 
amount is being utilized in importing these arms. However, these arms 
are being imported on the pretext to curb the so-called terrorism and 
fundamentalism 
The Hindutva- Sharonist alliance is not simply about the 
opportunistic needs of the Israeli defense industry and the Indian 
military, but it is also about the creation of an alliance alongside the 
Bush -run Pentagon against two foes: Islam (or, in the most vulgar 
266 
interpretations, the Arab states and Iran in general) and Communism 
(or China). "Terror is the major issue and challenge for both countries. 
We understand each other and we see each other in similar terms, of 
Islamic terrorism" were the arguments of New Delhi's Israeli Embassy 
Spokesman, Yaran Mayer. 
Actually, Israel has been extremely successful in using the bogey 
of Islamic terrorism and fundamentalism to further its interests and 
deprive Palestinians of their legitimate rights. Even the Israeli stance 
on terrorism has been a tactical one. It is widely acknowledged that it 
was Israel, which pioneered terrorist activity in Asia. But according 
toValsan Cherian, the American commentator Noam Chomsky says, the 
'evil scourge of terrorism' in America and Israeli discourse refers to 
terrorist acts by Muslims and Arabs, but not by Zionists, just as 'peace' 
means settlement that honors the right of national-determination of 
Jews, but not of Palestinians. The goal of Israel has always been to 
encourage terrorism in West Asia so that Palestinians or Islamic 
militancy can be blamed, delaying a peaceful solution to the 
Palestinian question. 
L.K.Advani and his own political party and other like-minded 
radical Hindu parties saw in Israel a valuable strategic partner on the 
grounds of the mutually common anti-Minority agenda. Advani feels 
that Israel and India should be closer to each other in the field of 
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defense and counter terrorism. After coming to power in 1998, the 
Bhartiya Janta Party took steps towards normalizing the relations with 
the Zionist state by sending ministers of high rank such as Advani and 
Jaswant Singh and other military officials to strengthen the relations 
with Israel. Israel's outrages against Palestinians rose just as the 
Bharatiya Janata Party government began wooing it. A relationship has 
been established, especially in purchase of military hardware. National 
interest, however, does not require the government to grovel before 
Israel and tender abject apologies for Jawaharlal Nehru's policies as 
Jaswant Singh did. As external affairs Minister, he spoke to the Israeli 
council of foreign relations in Jerusalem, on July 2, 2000, 'of a 
tectonic shift of consciousness'. He attributed India's policy in the past 
to, predictably, the Muslim vote and, at one remove, Nehru. He went to 
the extent of saying that it was this 'vote bank policies", which 
prevented the two countries from becoming natural allies. He perhaps 
was ignoring the fact that India being a non-aligned country could not 
be a natural ally of Israel, which is the occupier of other's land. Ilan 
Pappe a scholar of Haifa University has amplified that "the Jews came 
and took, by means of uprooting and expulsion, a land that was 
Arab...We wanted to be a colonialist occupier, and yet to come across 
as moral at the same time.' As the peace loving Israeli Scholars, 
journalists understood the reality of their state (Israel). However, the 
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Indian External Affairs minister Mr. Jaswant Singh could not 
understand this reality. 
The BJP government made a paradigm shift from cultivating the 
Arab world towards a strategic partnership with Israel to curb the so-
called terrorism. Hindutva's alliance with the Zionist state is not so 
strange because at the ideological level Hindutva is much like Zionism, 
for both extol the importance of the Race-State and both cast 
aspersions at the presence of religious minorities. If the activists of 
Hindutva yell 'Hindu Rashtra for Hindus' against Indian religious 
minorities, those radical Zionists follow Golda Meir, the former Israeli 
Prime minister, in the belief that, 'there is no such thing as a 
Palestinian.' 
After the visits of Advani and Jaswnt Singh to Israel in 2000, 
Mr. Shimon Peres again visited India in 2002. He had played well to 
Hindu extremist sentiments and stressed on the need for India and 
Israel to cooperate to combat the so called 'Islamic fundamentalism 
and terrorism'. During his visit, he disclosed that Indo-Israeli relations 
are witnessing the highest level of friendship since e a couple of years 
of the BJP's rule. He further argued that India could look up on Israel 
as a friend in the war against the terrorism. He also made some 
comments regarding the December 13 attack on the Indian parliament, 
only to keep the flow of Israeli arms continue to India. The BJP 
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leadership taking advantage of being there in the government was hell 
bent on capitalizing on the volatile situation in India, which was a 
creation of their own purport, and projecting Israel their savior. 
According to an analyst the saffronistas, which were unable to cope 
with the relentless revelations of underhand dealings, found an escape 
in the December 2002 attack on Parliament and jumped at the 
opportunity and mobilized troops along the Indo-Pak border only to 
disengage them eight saber-rattling months later. 
After Shimon Peres, the Israeli Premier Ariel Sharon visited 
India in September 2003. During his trip to India, he also raised the 
same bogey of so called 'terrorism and fundamentalism', which had 
been already raised by all those who had visited each other's country. 
He also argued some measures for combating the terrorism during his 
discussions with the Indian officials including Prime Minister Mr. 
Vajpayee. It is an irony that a person who himself is a war criminal and 
a terrorist gave some tactics to the Indian government and supported 
the proposals of Mr. Mishra for making an axis comprising of three 
states viz India, Israel and US for dealing with the terrorism and 
fundamentalism. 
It was the Indian National security Mr. Brajesh Mishra who 
proposed for an axis between India, Israel and US for combating the 
so-called terrorism, during his visit to Washington in May 2003. He 
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considered these three states as democratic with common vision of 
pluralism, tolerance and equal opportunity. He perhaps ignored the fact 
that world knows the worth of the US democracy, where a candidate 
with less popular votes than his opponent was confirmed as the 
president by the Supreme court with a majority of conservatives 
showing open prejudice against the democrats. George W. Bush's 
elevation to the US presidency by the decision of the Supreme Court to 
stop the re-count of the deeply flawed ballots in the state of Florida 
where his brother, Jeb, happened to be Governor and thus award him 
the White House, had even then felt like a Judicially- Sanctioned Coup 
d'etat. 
No body can compliment Israel of tolerance when it is openly 
committing genocide against the Palestinians in a systematic manner. 
More methodical than Hitler's more brash final solution. And speaking 
of India, where ultranationalist BJP, that is out to obliterate all 
diversities in India's teeming millions, through the communal riots, 
through imposing of own hindutva brand of a state religion, through 
writing text books and re-writing history books, all by railroading its 
agenda on agitating majority, would be the last to own up Mishra's 
boast of plurality and tolerance. 
During the same address Mishra also pointed out that all the 
three states viz, India, US and Israel have some 'fundamental 
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similarities' and are 'natural allies'. Further, more the relationship 
between these three states bears a 'natural logic'. What seems 'natural' 
in the world of geopolitical alliances may not seem so obvious to the 
citizenry of the states in question. 'India', Mishra noted correctly, is 
one of the 'very few countries with no history of anti-Semitism'. 
However, the foreign policy of India has been strongly opposed to 
Israeli intransigence on the question of the Palestinians. 
Actually these speeches indicate BJP's interests in supporting 
US president's 'global war on terrorism' which was launched by 
United States supported by other countries after the World trade centre 
and Pentagon were attacked on 11 September, 200I.India offered 
whole support even not asked for, to Bush's call of 'global war on 
terrorism'. In his fateful speech of 20"* September 2001, Bush referred 
to this 'war' as 'a task that never ends' and one that might be fought in 
as many as fifty or sixty countries. He further argued that, 'any country 
that does not actively concede to US demands, whatever they may be, 
shall be deemed a friend of terrorists and shall meet the same fate: 
'regime change', 'dead or alive', and so on. By his speeches Mr. Bush 
echoed John Foster Dulles, the rabid secretary of the Eisenhower years 
who said that non-alignment was 'immoral' Bush too has put the whole 
world on notice: 'every nation in every region has a decision to make. 
You are with us or you are with the terrorists', every country must join 
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up each time, or else it too becomes an enemy and perhaps the next 
target'. 
A brief word about this particular form of fighting, which is 
called 'Terrorism'. Bush was careful enough to say that America's 
enemy was that particular 'terrorism' which has global reach'. In other 
words, he is not particularly concerned with the great many varieties of 
terrorism, which include the IRA in Ireland, the RSS fraternity in 
India. Nor is 'fundamentalism' the issue: Taliban fundamentalism is 
bad but fundamentalism in the entire Gulf is good, and Bush himself of 
course speaks the language of that Christian fundamentalism which 
defines the far right in the contemporary United States. 'Terrorism with 
global reach', the designated enemy, is the one that challenges 
American Power. 
The BJP led government always came forward to endorse Bush's 
proposals whether it was the National Missile Defense Plan or the War 
on Global Terrorism. The Indian government was among the very first 
to seek membership and offered its own facilities even before Bush's 
own European allies or any other country on the planet. Actually, the 
Vajpayee government's offers of the Indian airspace and naval 
facilities to US were to get an upper edge over Pakistan. However, in 
fact it got as little out of this unilateral concession as it did from the 
earlier, equally abject support for the American National Missile 
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Defense Programmes. But Musharaf got the desired concession from 
Collin Powel-the US secretary of State when the latter argued that the 
'Kashmir dispute should be resolved in accordance with the wishes of 
the Kashmiri People' 
Indian government even considers herself as a strategic and 
natural ally in the Bush's war of terrorism. Israel and America are 
allies for many a reasons. As for India, being a key ally along with 
them seems to be a ludicrous proposition. Recently, the US secretary of 
state Mr. Collin Powel ignored India by announcing Pakistan to be the 
'major non-NATO' ally. Clearly, the secretary of state did not think it 
worthwhile to take India as a valued strategic partner of the US. By 
this American move, the BJP had probably lost the hopes of a strategic 
United-Israel-India axis fighting Pakistan. 
Now, it is strange that a, 'strategic partner' should not disclose 
to its intimate ally that it is about to confer MNNA status upon a 
neighbor with whom the ally has a relationship of strategic hostility 
and a hot-cold war for half a century. The US decision to elevate 
Pakistan's status as an ally just proves that Washington's relations with 
New Delhi and Islamabad are not a 'Zero-Sum game'. It also proved 
that the BJP leader's self-Congratulatory, self serving claim to have 
raised India's global profile by riding the partnership with the US 
bandwagon was essentially hollow. Pakistan's historic involvement in 
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Afghanistan on the side of the Americans and its enduring geo-political 
location has come to haunt Jaswant Singh's dream of turning India into 
America's 'most allied ally', as Pakistan was once called. The BJP led 
Indian government cut a sorry figure since its Prime minister has oft 
repeated dictum that India, 'a natural ally of America' had fallen flat 
on its face. 
The America's global war on terrorism was nothing but the 
implementation of her imperialistic designs over some regions. Bush's 
attack on the Afghanistan followed by the attacks on Iraq and warning 
of the attacks on Syria and Iran are her imperialistic designs for which 
it sought the support from the other nations. However, this war on so-
called international terrorism was fully appreciated and supported by 
the BJP leadership without analyzing the political situation arising out 
of the fall of the world trade centre. However, nobody would condone 
the ghastly act of bombarding. They perhaps could not understand that 
US tries to consolidate a ring of military bases in Southwestern Asia 
and the Caspian states, to capture oil resources estimated to be worth 
over a trillion dollars and to choke both Russia and China militarily. 
India was once called the leader and a major force in NAM and 
a bulwark against imperialism. Much has changed since then. 
Imperialism is perhaps stronger than ever, but the world is muddier and 
more confused and the Indian government under BJP, has clearly 
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abandoned any effort to project itself as anti-imperialist in any way. It 
has dismantled the entire edifice of the independent foreign policy 
based on non-alignment by joining with US and its major ally-Israel in 
the so-called war on terrorism. Even though an Israeli writer-Uri 
Avnery has emphasized that what the Bush administration envisions 
today is something Sharon has been advocating since the 1980s. B.J.P 
probably forgets the fact that it is the US itself were the word 
'terrorist' could be more aptly applied for its unwanted presence in 
Afghanistan, in Iraq and help to Israel's regime of terror on the 
Palestinians. The American administration's full support to Israel in 
occupied territories proves the point more clearly. Before joining to 
Israel and US, the Indian government should also see the past history 
of the US, which is full with the terrorist activities like the horrible 
atomic bombardment on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Naked aggression on 
Afghanistan and the recent subjugation of Iraq by US has revealed the 
real face of terrorism and has proved as to who is a terrorist. On the 
other hand Israelis are the occupiers of some one else's land. While 
India is a non-aligned country and fought her war of independence 
against imperialistic and colonialist powers. So how could India be a 
natural ally to US and Israel, as the Vajpayee government has been 
saying. 
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BJP government also could not realize the internal policies of 
both Israel and US, which aimed to project India as a regional 
counterweight to china's domination by taking India under their own 
umbrellas of axis, which could be used by US in its strategy to contain 
China. This will not be conducive to peace in the region. India's 
strategic objectives and interests will be made subservient to US 
designs in Asia. BJP leadership should also realize that the US has 'no 
permanent friends only permanent interests.' The recent US 
subjugation firstly over Afghanistan then over Iraq has proved this, 
point. Both were the close friends of US. The friendship remained alive 
until the cause of the US became full filled. 
At the time Iraq made the shift, the Euro was worth 82 percents 
to a US dollar, today it stands at $1.5 - gaining by 17 percent. Iraq's 
decision was a key element in making the Euro a competitive currency 
for the first time. If the other oil producing countries were to shift 
accordingly, the US economy would face the prospect of immense 
shrinkage, even collapse. For saving her economy and to bring its own 
people into the government in order to keep her interests alive in Iraq, 
it waged war against the Ba'athist regime on the pretext of 'Weapons 
of mass destruction', which were never found in the country. However, 
the Vajpayee government could not understand the US policies behind 
the war on so-called terrorism. 
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India's unseemly rush to join the US-Israel camp indicated its 
weakening democratic credentials and diminishing commitment to 
governance through consent rather than coercion, chiefly under the 
current dispensation. 
India is a democratic polity stands dangerously diminished by its 
clumsy effort to be part of the US- Israel strategic nexus. In pragmatic 
terms too, the strategic gambit is likely to backfire, since military 
responses to civil conflicts never been known to produce durable 
results. The blooming of India under BJP and Israel romance had 
merely helped to seal the dubious deal between three different 
countries. What is even more horrific about this emerging axis of the 
dangerous consequences is that all of them today harbor elements that 
have classic Nazi like inventions towards a liberal and saner world. 
The growing strategic ties between India and Israel and their 
cooperation in the nuclear field have created much serious concerns in 
the Arab world. With the Indo-Israeli strategic collaboration gaining 
momentum in recent years, Arab leaders are becoming more vocal and 
critical of it. Arab league alleged the both India and Israel have 
military and nuclear cooperation and warned against the consequences 
for the Arab world. Arab countries are worried about the growing 
defense cooperation between India and Israel and some countries feel 
that these military collaborations could have adverse impact on the 
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region and can jeopardize peace and security. When Advani proposed 
India's nuclear cooperation with Israel during his visit to the Zionist 
state in June 2000 the Israelis retraced. The Arab worries increased 
further. When Israeli Prime Minister Sharon visited India in 2003, an 
Arab diplomat argued that Sharon's visit could have an adverse impact 
on Indian diplomacy in the Arab world. Some argued that India had 
encouraged Israel in its aggressive policies by receiving a war criminal 
prime minister. Yasser Arafat commented that the Israeli prime 
minister's visit to India could only escalate the situation and war 
between Pakistan arid India. Arab diplomats are also of the opinion that 
US could use the campaign as a pretext to establish a permanent 
presence in the Asian region, which has the world's largest energy 
reserves. They also point out that the new situation has arisen after the 
failure of the 'New World Order'. Some Arab diplomats argued that 
Israel and US can never subdue the Arabs and India is isolating herself 
by choosing Israel as an ally. 
While the U.S. actively backs Israel, the Arabs states do no more 
than mouth protest. The non-aligned movement is quiescent. And, the 
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